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Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays on inferring information from option contracts and
other financial derivatives in the U.S. market as well as in the international markets.
The first essay examines corporate bankruptcy probabilities inferred from option prices
and credit default swaps (CDS) spreads around the 2008 financial crisis in the U.S. market.
Option pricing framework is used where the risk-neutral density of the underlying asset is
assumed to be a mixture of two lognormals augmented with a probability of default, to cal-
ibrate to the market option prices. The CDS model assumes a constant default probability
which is solved from the non-linear equation that equates the present value of expected pre-
mium payments with the present value of expected payoffs. The essay documents that both
sources provide ex-ante bankruptcy probabilities, but there is no significant evidence sug-
gesting one predicts the other.
The second essay constructs volatility indices for 15 markets around the world and ex-
amines implied volatility spillover between these markets. Volatility indices are constructed
using option prices based on the new VIX methodology with modification to address its lim-
itations. Spillover effects are then examined using vector autoregressive analysis, impulse
response functions and forecast error variance decomposition. Empirical results show that
the U.S. is unambiguously the dominant source of uncertainty in the world. Correlation
between markets largely depends on geographical proximity. The findings support the no-
tion of informationally efficient international stock markets, in that information transmitted
i
from one market to another is processed within one or two days.
The third essay further investigates spillover effects in variance risk premiums, which has
been interpreted as the difference between the realised variance under the physical measure
and the risk-neutral measure. Realized variance under the physical measure is constructed
for each market using the HAR-RV model, which is able to capture long-memory character-
istic of volatility. Risk-neutral expectation of future variance is approximated by a portfolio
of option contracts, as calculated in the second essay. Steps are taken to address serial cor-
relation and dependence, and variance risk premium spillovers are examined using vector
autoregressive analysis, impulse response functions, and Granger Causality tests. The find-
ings are consistent with those found in implied volatility spillovers. The U.S. market is the
distributor of uncertainty in the global market. Information transmitted from one market to
another is quickly digested, but it may take longer in crisis period due to greater uncertainty.
ii
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A derivative can be defined as a financial contract whose value is derived from an under-
lying asset. Over the past 40 years, derivatives have experienced explosive growth and have
become increasingly important in Finance. Many different types of derivative contracts have
been developed and used by financial institutions, fund managers, and corporate treasurers.
Derivatives can be used for hedging, speculation or arbitrage, and they play a key role in risk
measurement and risk transfer. Prices of these derivatives contain information beyond that
conveyed by the basic underlying asset. Extracting information from these derivatives may
provide useful views on risk management and asset allocation.
Options are one of the most popular derivatives traded in both exchanges and over-the-
counter markets. Option prices are contingent upon all possible future payoffs, hence they
contain a rich source of information about the underlying asset’s distribution at option ma-
turity. The risk-neutral distribution identified in the option pricing framework provides an
appealing way to extract forward looking information.
Credit default swaps (CDS) are the most popular and liquidly traded credit derivatives. A
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CDS contract provides insurance against the risk of default by a particular company, known
as the reference entity. During the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis and the subsequent 2008
financial crisis, CDS contracts continued to trade actively, though with dramatically increased
protection cost, while many other credit derivatives, such as securitized assets, ceased to
trade due to lack of transparency. The nature of a CDS contract and its popularity and liq-
uidity in trading provide a natural channel in extracting the reference entity’s default risk
over the life of the CDS contract.
In this thesis, I extract information from option prices and CDS spreads to examine bankruptcy
probabilities estimated for a number of financial companies during the 2008 financial crisis.
In contrast with early empirical studies on bankruptcy predictions which use accounting-
and equity market-based information, derivatives markets provide extra useful information
ex-ante.
Volatility plays a key role in asset pricing and risk management. Implied volatility is em-
bedded in option prices and can be obtained by equating the market price of an option with
the price indicated by an option pricing model. Option-implied volatilities reveal impor-
tant information on the dynamics of volatility evolution, and they are used to monitor the
market’s opinion on the volatility of a particular asset.
A Volatility index is an index of implied volatilities over a specific horizon calculated from
a basket of call and put options on a representative equity index. The Chicago Board Op-
tions Exchange (CBOE) was the first to introduce a volatility index, called the VIX, designed
to measure the market’s expectation of 30-day volatility of the S&P 500 index, which then
quickly became the benchmark risk measure of the U.S. equity market. Many exchanges
across the world have developed their own respective volatility index following the steps of
the CBOE. Volatility indices have become core instruments for risk management and they
underly a number of volatility derivatives such as VIX futures, options and variance swaps
2
following their introduction.
A variance swap is an over-the-counter derivative contract that allows one to speculate
or hedge the movement of the volatility of an underlying asset. It is an agreement to ex-
change the realised variance between times t and T for a prespecified fixed variance. The
variance risk premium is quantified as the difference between the realised variance and the
risk-neutral expectation of future variance. The fixed variance can be synthesized using a
portfolio of call and put options, which approximates the risk-neutral expected variance.
The introduction of volatility indices has made quantifying the variance risk premium read-
ily convenient.
In this thesis, I construct volatility indices for 15 markets around the world. Following
the notion of a variance swap, I construct the variance risk premium using the square of the
volatility index as the proxy for the risk-neutral expected variance. I then investigate implied
volatility and variance risk premium spillover effects across the world’s equity markets.
This thesis aims to provide information inferred from the derivatives markets from differ-
ent perspectives. The main contributions include: first, estimating ex-ante bankruptcy prob-
abilities from derivative instruments and providing a direct comparison between option-
implied probabilities and CDS-implied probabilities; second, constructing volatility indices
for a wider range of markets using a revised methodology, which addresses issues associated
with the CBOE methodology; third, providing empirical spillover analysis of variance risk
premiums across the world.
1.2 Structure of the thesis
The thesis is organised as follows. Chapters 2 to 4 are three individual essays with respec-
tive literature reviews contained within each chapter.
Chapter 2 examines bankruptcy probabilities inferred from option prices and CDS spreads
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for 12 U.S. financial institutions around the 2008 financial crisis period. This chapter be-
gins with a literature review on empirical bankruptcy prediction studies, as well as literature
on estimating risk-neutral densities from option prices. I specify a mixture of two lognor-
mal densities augmented with a probability of bankruptcy, and calibrate this density to op-
tion prices to infer the bankruptcy probability parameter. CDS bankruptcy probabilities are
solved from a non-linear equation that equates the present value of the expected premium
payments with the present value the expected payoff. Bankruptcy probabilities inferred from
the two sources are then compared for each of the firms and groups of firms.
Chapter 3, "Model free expectation of implied volatility and spillover effects", first con-
structs volatility indices for 15 equity markets around the world. The methodology to con-
struct the volatility index is based on the CBOE procedure in constructing the VIX, but with
modified smoothing steps to address the shortcomings of the CBOE procedure. Volatility in-
dices are then grouped based on geographical location to study the spillover effects. Vector
autoregressive methodology is employed for spillover analysis.
Chapter 4, "Variance risk premiums and international spillover effects", quantifies vari-
ance risk premium building upon some of the results presented in chapter 3. The risk-
neutral expected future variance is taken as the square of the implied volatility calculated in
chapter 3. The realised variance under the physical measure is constructed using the HAR-
RV model. The dynamics of variance risk premiums for the sample examined are presented,
and spillover effects for subsamples are investigated. Some issues concerning heterogeneity
and autocorrelation in variance risk premiums are addressed in employing vector autore-
gressive analysis.




Bankruptcy Probabilities Inferred from
Option Prices and CDS Spreads
2.1 Introduction
In the field of default probabilities and bankruptcy estimation, various kinds of historical
data and estimation models have been considered. Mainstream examples are accounting
based models and market based models. An accounting based model, as its name suggests,
predicts bankruptcy based on accounting information – a set of accounting ratios as pre-
dictor variables. The model evolves from early stage linear discriminant analysis (Altman
(1968) and related literature in section 2.2.2) to the later advanced parametric (Shumway
(2001)) and non-parametric models (Peat (2008)) in the aim to overcome the limiting statis-
tical assumptions of multivariate discriminant analysis. The main conclusion of this body of
research is that financial ratios provide a significant indication of the likelihood of financial
distress.
Market based models, in particular, the Merton type structural model, are another type
of default prediction model. As opposed to accounting based models, market models make
use of market information, such as equity price, which reflects all information contained in
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accounting data and expectations about the firm’s future performance. It relates the credit
quality of a firm to the firm’s economic and financial conditions. It is thus more appropriate
to use market information in a default prediction setting. Examples are Black and Scholes
(1973), Merton (1974), and related literature in section 2.2.3. Market models have devel-
oped as a competing rival of accounting based models. A number of studies have exam-
ined empirically the relevance of accounting variables versus market variables in explaining
bankruptcy, but conclusions are difficult to draw whether one is superior to the other. While
some studies find Merton type structural models outperform accounting based models, oth-
ers find that structural models have little forecasting power.
This raises the intriguing question as to whether information about bankruptcy can be
inferred from the derivative markets. It was not until recently that econometric models
emerged which make use of derivative market instruments, i.e. options and credit default
swaps. Option prices are considered forward-looking; they reflect the aggregate market ex-
pectation about the underlying asset price until the expiration of the option contract. Option
data contain high information efficiency. Empirical studies have found that option-implied
volatilities and densities have strong forecasting ability, especially when forecast horizon is
one month or three months (Liu et al. (2007), Shackleton et al. (2010)). Various papers which
studied index options have found evidence that option prices contain incremental informa-
tion on volatility forecasting (Blair et al. (2001), Poon and Granger (2003), Jiang and Tian
(2005), Liu et al. (2007) and Taylor (2011)). Chen and Fong (2012) finds supporting evidence
that risk-neutral densities are useful forecasting tool in extreme market conditions.
However, the use of option prices to infer bankruptcy probabilities has been limited. One
example is Câmara et al. (2012) who assume a single lognormal density augmented with a
probability of bankruptcy for the underlying asset. Taylor et al. (2014) generalise the density
to be a mixture of two lognormals augmented with a probability of bankruptcy to avoid the
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rigid shape of the lognormal density, and they find the density reproduces options prices
better than the single lognormal density. The double lognormal density does not necessarily
avoid the rigid shape of each lognormal component, but it produces a kurtosis higher than
that of the single lognormal density that creates fatter tails. Information contained in option
prices can be extracted if the appropriate risk-neutral density for the underlying asset can be
identified. There is a huge literature on estimating risk-neutral densities including paramet-
ric fitting, non-parametric method, extensions of price dynamics, volatility smile, etc., and
the choice depends on researchers’ purposes and preferences. In this study, I follow Taylor
et al. (2014) who assume a mixture of two lognormal densities.
An alternative source of information which provides forward looking measure of bankruptcy
probabilities is CDS spreads. CDS contracts, which protect against default of a reference en-
tity, play a crucial role in risk management by providing a measure of probability of default.
Bharath and Shumway (2008) construct a model using CDS information to directly extract a
measure of default probabilities. In this study, I follow the general idea of their method with
revision on certain parameter inputs.
This study examines empirically bankruptcy probabilities inferred from option prices
and CDS spreads, and compares the information conveyed in both markets. To the best of
my knowledge, this is the first study that makes a direct comparison of the bankruptcy prob-
abilities between the option market and the CDS market. In this study, I include 12 American
financial institutions to investigate bankruptcy risk around the 2008 global financial crisis,
as this crisis period is a natural setting to test the models. I find that option prices and CDS
spreads provide risk-neutral bankruptcy probabilities ex-ante. Consistent with the results
found in Taylor et al. (2014), distressed firms have higher chances of bankruptcy than rela-
tive healthy firms. Option market and CDS market provide complementary information in
assessing bankruptcy risk, but one does not lead the other. I emphasize that all probabilities
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obtained from option prices and CDS spreads are risk-neutral. Real-world probabilities em-
bed investors’ risk preferences. In theory, any change in the market’s risk tolerance should
be sufficient to explain a risk-neutral change.
The context of bankruptcy is worth a clarification in order to understand what the prob-
abilities inferred from option prices or CDS spreads actually measure. In the option pricing
model, bankruptcy is assumed to be a particular state in the risk-neutral density for the fu-
ture underlying stock price when the future stock price goes to zero. The theoretical value
zero assigned to bankruptcy is an extreme way to fatten the left tail of the risk-neutral den-
sity, but it does not necessarily mean that the bankruptcy can only happen when the stock
price is exactly zero. In fact, Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual share prices were still
worth a few dollars ($3.65 and $1.69) one day prior to their filings of bankruptcy.
The probability of default in the CDS pricing model measures the probability of a credit
event that triggers the settlement of the CDS contract. The credit event, defined in the
ISDA Agreement, refers to either of the following: 1) bankruptcy (the reference entity has
filed for relief under bankruptcy law); 2) failure to pay (the reference entity fails to make
interest or principal payments when due; 3) debt restructuring (the configuration of the
debt obligations is changed); and 4) obligation default, obligation acceleration, and repudi-
ation/moratorium (these are very rare)1. Mergers and acquisitions, however, are not defined
as credit events that will trigger CDS payout.
Clearly, the probability of default defined in the two pricing models are not exactly mea-
suring the same underlying, except for the case when companies file for bankruptcy that
the two measures are loosely equivalent. However, the emphasis about the default proba-
bility in this study is on the overall state of distress of each firm, which may lead to filing for
bankruptcy, or triggering a credit event, or maybe nothing at all if firms manage to get out
of distress. In this sense, option-implied probabilities and CDS implied-probabilities both
1See Markit Credit Indices Primer.
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provide information on to what extent the company is in financial distress. Qualifying any
of the following criteria can be thought of a signal for financial distress: 1. The firm has gone
bankrupt or acquired by other firms during the crisis. 2. The share price fell below $5 from a
previous high level and remained low for a long period of time.
The study proceeds as follows. The next section provides a comprehensive literature re-
view on bankruptcy estimation models and econometric methods associated with density
estimation. Section 2.3 details models used to extract bankruptcy probabilities using option
prices and CDS spreads. Data is discussed in section 2.4 and section 2.5 describes empirical
results. Section 2.6 concludes. A list of Figures and Tables are in Appendix in section 2.7.
2.2 Literature review
2.2.1 Introduction
The literature on bankruptcy prediction dates back to the 1930s when initial studies be-
gan to concern the use of ratio analysis to predict future bankruptcy. These studies focused
on individual ratios and compared those of financially distressed firms to those of successful
firms. In 1935, the Bureau of Business Research at University of Illinois (Smith and Winakor
(1935)) published some results of a ratio study of failing industrial firms. The study analysed
24 ratios to determine common characteristics of failing firms and compared them with the
average ratio across 29 failing firms. A number of ratios were identified as good indicators of
distress of a firm. These are accounting ratios typically measuring profitability, liquidity, and
solvency.
Research up to mid-1960s focused on univariate analysis; the most widely recognized is
that of Beaver (1966). The univariate studies laid the groundwork for multivariate bankruptcy
prediction models using discriminant analysis led by Altman (1968). Multivariate discrim-
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inant analysis is a statistical technique which considers a number of accounting ratios at
the same time to determine the most significant ones, and then classifies an observation
into a qualitative group, in this case bankruptcy or non-bankruptcy, depending on the ob-
servation’s individual score calculated from those ratios. Discriminant analysis was a very
popular method at the early stage of bankruptcy prediction models, but advancements in
knowledge have made other methods available, including probit and logit analysis, and sur-
vival/duration analysis later in the 1980’s to late 1990’s.
Despite its simple structure and easy application, discriminant analysis lacks a theoret-
ical background in determining bankruptcy risk. The Merton-type contingent claims valu-
ation approach is a more appealing alternative. The model is based on Black and Scholes
(1973) and Merton (1974) option pricing framework, where equity can be viewed as a Eu-
ropean call option on the value of the firm’s assets, with exercise price being the face value
of the debt. When the option expires, shareholders either exercise the option and pay off
debtholders if the option expires in-the-money, or do nothing – in this case, the firm goes
bankrupt. The probability of the outcome happening either way is embedded in the Black-
Scholes option pricing formula. This kind of model is referred to as Merton-type structural
model or market-based model in that the observed variables are market measures.
It was not until very recently that the econometric technique emerged in the literature to
infer bankruptcy probabilities from option prices. This is a significant move beyond accounting-
based models and market-based models because, first, the econometric methods are more
advanced method than prior statistical procedures and avoid strong assumptions of struc-
tural models; and second, option prices are forward-looking which contain rich information
about the future and carry higher information efficiency than accounting numbers or equity
market data. Prominent example is that of Taylor et al. (2014) which develops a parametric
risk-neutral density model with a probability of default, and calibrate the model to market
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option prices. Option implied densities have strong forecasting abilities (Liu et al. (2007),
Shackleton et al. (2010)). The model is useful in providing an ex-ante measure of probability
risk which can be applied to other risk management. The literature in this strand is relatively
small, which opens up opportunities for researchers to further investigate derivatives.
The rest of this section details related literature covering four areas aforementioned –
accounting-based models, market-based models, econometric models, and methods asso-
ciated with estimating risk-neutral densities from option prices. The volume of existing liter-
ature is huge and it is very difficult to cover it all. As a result, this review tends to be selective.
2.2.2 Accounting-based models
Beaver (1966) pioneered the study of bankruptcy prediction models using univariate anal-
ysis. Following many earlier accounting ratio studies, Beaver compared mean values of 30
ratios of 79 matched pairs of failed and non-failed publicly owned corporations in 38 indus-
tries, but unlike most studies, Beaver took a step further to test individual ratio’s predictive
ability in classifying bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms. Six ratios were chosen on the basis
of the lowest percentage error when comparing the dichotomous outcome as bankrupt or
non-bankrupt from an optimal cut-off point to the actual failure status. He finds that cash
flow to total debt has the strongest predictive ability, followed by net income to total assets
and total debt to total assets, with three liquid-asset ratios, namely working capital to total
assets, current ratio, and no-credit interval, performing least well. In his suggestions for fu-
ture research, Beaver indicated that a multi-ratio model may predict better than single ratios,
and so began the evolution of bankruptcy prediction models.
Altman (1968) was the first study to employ multivariate discriminant analysis (MDA). He
developed a five-factor (out of 22) model to classify a firm as bankrupt or non-bankrupt by
referring to a Z-score which falls below or above a certain range. Model predictability is mea-
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sured by the percentage of firms correctly classified. Altman finds that the model has a high
predictive ability at 95% accuracy for the initial sample one year before failure and 83% ac-
curacy for two years before failure. However, the model performs considerably poorer when
predicting bankruptcy up to three, four, and five years prior to failure, where the predictive
accuracy drops below 50%. The model reliability is tested using a hold-out sample where
the test results are impressive. Altman concluded that bankruptcy can be accurately pre-
dicted up to two years prior to the failure, and called for future research on smaller-sized and
unincorporated entities where business failure is more likely to occur. Altman et al. (1977)
subsequently updated the original Z-score model to a ZETA-analysis adjusting for changes
in reporting standards since 1960s. They find that the ZETA discriminant model is extremely
accurate for up to five years before failure.
Ever since Altman’s study, numerous papers applying, improving and extending discrim-
inant analysis to predict bankruptcy have appeared in the literature. These studies include
models for medium and large manufacturing firms, among others, by Deakin (1972), Blum
(1974), and Moyer (1977); small business by Edmister (1972); and models for specific indus-
tries such as Sinkey (1975), Santomero and Vinso (1977), and Martin (1977) on commercial
banks; Altman (1973) on railroads; Altman and Loris (1976) on broker/dealers, and Altman
(1977) on savings and loan associations. At the same time, considerable efforts have been
made to replicate and extend these models on an international level. Altman (1984) pro-
vides an extensive survey on the works by both academics and practitioners in ten countries:
Japan, Germany, Switzerland, Australia, United Kingdom, Ireland, Canada, The Netherlands,
Brazil and France.
The multivariate discriminant analysis has been the primary method used for bankruptcy
prediction models for the decade between late 1960s and 1970s, however, the conclusion are
difficult to assess because the models play loose with certain statistical assumptions. Dis-
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criminant analysis requires equal variance-covariance matrices of predictors for both failed
and non-failed groups, and that the predictors are normally distributed. Violation of these
conditions renders the conclusion unreliable. Ohlson (1980) developed a conditional logit
model to avoid problems with respect to MDA. The analysis uses maximum likelihood to es-
timate parameters of some probability function, which are then used to compute the prob-
ability a firm fails, which is referred to as O-Score. The fundamental estimation problem
becomes: given that a firm belongs to some pre-specified population, what is the probabil-
ity that the firm goes bankrupt within a pre-specified time period. This way, no assumptions
have to be made about the distribution of predictors. Ohlson also pointed out an issue with
data collection that realistic evaluation of the model requires that the predictors are avail-
able prior to the event of bankrupt, however, previous studies have not explicitly mentioned
this point since most of them have used Moody’s Manual2 to derive financial ratios, and the
Manual does not indicate at which point in time the data was made available. Implicitly
presuming a report is available at the fiscal year-end date may be inadequate for a pure fore-
casting purpose as it may lead to ‘back-casting’ if a firm files for bankruptcy after a fiscal year
but prior to the release of financial statements. The findings of the study are that it is possi-
ble to identify four statistically significant predictors in assessing probability of failure, but
the error-rate of the sample is larger than other studies, even after accounting for the data
timing factor.
Zavgren (1985) argues that the dichotomous partition resulting from discriminant anal-
ysis is much less useful for an investor than a cardinal evaluation of financial risk, and the
logit model provides significantly better probability estimates than discriminant analysis of
the same data. He criticizes Ohlson’s choice of independent variables lack of theoretical de-
termination; instead, he employs a factor analysis to determine the attribute vector so that
2Moody’s Manuals are a series of annual manuals published by the Moody’s Coporation containing brief
reports on companies. Volumes in each year are divided into manuals named for the types of the companies
they contain, e.g. Industrial, Bank & Finance, International, etc..
13
no significant attributes should be omitted. Zavgren also traced the significance of the co-
efficients for each of the variable for five years and found the pattern is congruent with a
priori expectation. He concluded that the model proved highly significant in detecting up to
five years prior to the failure. Lau (1987) further extended dichotomous classification into a
five financial state model and estimated the probability that a firm enters each of the states,
which provides a measure of the firm’s financial position on a continuous scale.
Zmijewski (1984) pointed out that researchers typically estimate bankruptcy prediction
models on non-random samples which result in two estimation biases: choice-based sample
bias and sample selection bias. The choice-based sample bias results when the sample is
selected based on knowledge of some variables, so the probability of a firm entering the
sample depends on the variable’s attributes. Sample selection bias results when only firms
with complete data are used to estimate the model and incomplete data observations occur
non-randomly. Zmijewski used a weighted exogenous sample maximum likelihood probit
model and a bivariate probit model respectively to assess the two biases and found clear
evidence of their existence. However, he claims that the biases, in general, do not affect
statistical inferences or overall classification rates.
Greene (2008) points out that the differences between MDA models and standard form
logit and probit models are not as significant as once believed, because, MDA model can be
constructed as nothing more than a linear probability model. Thus the difference between
MDA and logit, probit model should not be that great. Two major problems arising from
these standard or ‘simple’ models are: one, restrictive IID assumptions; two, inability to cap-
ture firm-specific heterogeneity in model estimation. There have been a number of attempts
to overcome these limiting statistical assumptions, either by selecting a parametric method
with fewer distributional assumptions, or by moving to a non-parametric approach.
The mixed logit model is an example of an advanced form logit model (parametric model)
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that can accommodate firm-specific heterogeneity across firms. The essence of the method
is to decompose the stochastic error component into two parts: one is IID that does not
depend on underlying parameters, and the other is heteroskedastic representing the unob-
served heterogeneity across firms, whose distribution depends on underlying parameters
and observed data. The major advantage of the mixed logit model is that it allows for com-
plete relaxation of the IID assumption by allowing all unobserved variances and covariances
to be different up to identification, making the model highly flexible. However, a relative
weakness of the mixed logit model is the complexity of estimation as well as the lack of a
single globally efficient set of parameter estimates.
Another class of parametric model is survival or duration models which have become
increasingly popular in financial distress research. Survival models are concerned with ex-
amining the length of time interval between transition dates where the transition is marked
by the occurrence of an event, such as corporate failure. The duration can be modelled by a
non-negative random variable T until transition occurs; or can be modelled under different
probability distributions, such as, a cumulative distribution, a survivor function, a proba-
bility density function, or a hazard function. The primary benefits of survival analysis are
in the area of censoring and time-varying covariates. Shumway (2001) argues that models
like traditional MDA and standard logit are static models which are inappropriate for the
use of bankruptcy prediction because of the nature of bankruptcy data. He pointed out that
static models fail to account for each firm’s period at risk because the model only uses one
set of explanatory variables of which observations are usually made one period before fail-
ure, but firms’ characteristics may change from year to year, and thus introduce selection
bias. Shumway develops a discrete-time hazard model, which can be thought of as a binary
logit model, to explicitly control for time and incorporate time-varying covariates. This way,
many more observations are utilized and the model produces more efficient out-of-sample
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forecasts. Shumway found that half of the accounting ratios used in previous studies are not
statistically significant bankruptcy predictors, and the model which produces best out-of-
sample forecast uses a combination of accounting ratios and market-driven variables.
Two main types of non-parametric approach that have been used in the literature are
neural networks and recursive partitioning. The distinguishing feature of non-parametric
methods is that there is no a priori knowledge about the form of the function which is be-
ing estimated. Peat (2008) presented these two models for credit risk analysis, each with a
numerical example. He showed that the empirical application of both models has demon-
strated their potential in the credit risk analysis context, with the best model outperforming
a standard MDA model.
Despite the frequent use and improvement of accounting ratio based models, there are
reasons to question the effectiveness of probability measures that are based on accounting
data. The most important concern about accounting data is that financial statements are
designed to reflect firms’ past performance and may not be informative about future status,
while measure of bankruptcy probability is in nature about the likelihood of future events.
In addition, as discussed in Hillegeist et al. (2004), the conservatism principle required in
accounting reporting systems causes asset values to be understated, of which the biased
asset valuation will limit the performance of any accounting-based probability measure.
2.2.3 Market-based models
As early as the study of Beaver (1968), the stock market has been recognized as a poten-
tial alternative to provide a superior source of information regarding bankruptcy probabil-
ity prediction. Shumway (2001) includes three market-driven variables: market size, past
stock returns, and idiosyncratic standard deviation of stock returns in his estimation model
and finds that the inclusion of market information provides the best out-of-sample forecast.
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Option-pricing models based on Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) (BSM) pro-
vide a natural starting point in extracting bankruptcy probability related information from
market prices. Equity can be viewed as a call option on the value of the firm’s future assets.
Equity holders are residual claimants of firm’s assets and determine when the firm declares
bankrupt. Under BSM framework, the strike price of the call option is equal to the face value
of the firm’s debt and option expires when debt matures. At maturity time, equity holders
will exercise the call option and pay off the debt holders if the firm’s assets value is greater
than the face value of debt, or let the option expire and declare bankruptcy if the value of the
firm’s assets is below the face value of debt. If the firm files for bankruptcy, the ownership is
transferred costlessly to debt holders. The payoff for equity holders is either the difference
between the value of firm’s assets and the face value of firm’s debt or zero otherwise. The
probability of each outcome is embedded in the BSM model. Denote VE is the value of eq-
uity, VA is the value of firm’s assets, X is the face value of firm’s debt maturing in t periods, r is
the continuously compounded risk-free discount rate. Then the BSM European call option
formula, stated in terms of equity on a firm’s assets is
VE =VA N (d1)−X e−r t N (d2), (2.1)
where
d1 =














N (d1) and N (d2) are standard cumulative normal probabilities of d1 and d2, and σA is the
volatility of the value of assets. The probability that the option expires in-the-money at matu-
rity is represented by N (d2), and 1−N (d2)=N (−d2) is the probability that the option expires
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out-of-the-money, that is, the firm goes bankrupt. Equation (2.3) shows that the risk-neutral
probability of bankruptcy is a function of the distance between firm’s assets VA and the face
value of the debt X , relative to the volatility of firm’s assets σA, which is referred to as the
distance-to-default.
Merton’s model is considered the first structural model3 in assessing credit risk. Several
commercial vendors provide default probabilities based on option pricing models, KMV4
being the most famous. While the basic approach is similar to standard BSM model, the
implementation differs in several ways. KMV implemented a model developed by Vasicek-
Kealhofer (see Kealhofer (2003)) known as KV model. The model is a generalisation of BSM
framework and allows for various classes and maturities of debt. It assumes that the firm’s
equity is a perpetual option with the default point acting as the absorbing barrier for the
firm’s assets value. Bankruptcy occurs when the value of assets hits the default point. In-
stead of using the cumulative normal distribution to convert distance-to-default into default
probabilities, KMV uses an empirical distribution of actual defaults based on its large, pro-
prietary database. KMV also make proprietary adjustments to accounting information that
they use to calculate the value of debt. Other option-related studies include Cheung (1991),
Kealhofer et al. (1998), and Core and Schrand (1999).
The Merton model, however, is fairly parsimonious due to its rather restrictive assump-
tions, one being that default can only occur at the maturity of the zero-coupon bond. Subse-
quent studies have explored more appropriate default boundaries within structural frame-
work. Black and Cox (1976) introduced another approach that takes into account early de-
3In credit risk literature there are two main types of models that describe default processes: structural mod-
els and reduced-form models. Structural models use the evolution of firm’s structural variables to determine
time of default which is endogenously generated within the model; whereas in reduced-form models, default
is exogenously determined. Reduced-form models do not consider the relation between default and firm’s eco-
nomic and financial conditions. For the relevance of the purpose of this study, structural models are described
in detail; for a review of reduced form models, see Elizalde (2006).
4KMV was acquired by Moody’s in April 2002. Before the merger, Moody’s model to assess default proba-
bility is a hybrid one that combines BSM structural model and a statistical model determined on the basis of
historical data. Details of the model can be found in Sobehart and Stein (2000).
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fault possibilities. In their model, they assume an exogenously determined threshold level of
asset value, below which default occurs. In contrast to the Merton model, default can occur
at any time. The same idea was employed by Longstaff and Schwartz (1995). Alternatively,
default thresholds can be determined endogenously, which allows the stockholders to de-
cide when to default so that they maximize firm’s value. Examples are Leland (1994), Leland
and Toft (1996), and Anderson et al. (1996). The difference between exogenous and endoge-
nous default barrier models are in the assumption underlying the default decision. While
these studies focus on addressing early default issues, other studies try to relax one of the
Merton model assumptions by considering stochastic interest rates. Examples are Kim et al.
(1993), Nielsen et al. (1993), and Longstaff and Schwartz (1995).
Such market-based structural models provide an appealing alternative because it coun-
ters most of the criticisms about accounting ratio based models. It provides guidance about
theoretical determinants of bankruptcy risk and structure to extract information from mar-
ket prices. Market data should reflect all information contained in accounting data and
also contain information not in accounting statements, and it reflects investors’ expecta-
tions about a firm’s future performance and hence should be more appropriate in prediction
context. Market prices are less influenced by management than are accounting statements.
Over the past decade, both practitioners and researchers have examined the contribution
of the Merton model. The very first authors are practitioners employed by either KMV or
Moody’s before they merged. Falkenstein and Boral (2001) find that the Merton model is a
powerful measure of default risk, and Kealhofer and Kurbat (2002) show that the model out-
performs alternatives and it captures all information contained in accounting and agency
ratings. Other papers, including Sobehart and Keenan (1999), Stein (2000), Sobehart and
Stein (2000) argue that Merton-type models are not sufficient to predict bankruptcy proba-
bility and calls for the need for a hybrid model which combines equity market information
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with accounting ratios and agency ratings, an example is Moody’s hybrid model in Sobehart
and Stein (2000).
A number of studies have addressed empirically the relevance of accounting-based mod-
els and market-based models in explaining bankruptcy. Shumway (2001) develops a sim-
ple hazard model using three market-driven variables to determine firm’s bankruptcy risk,
and finds adding market variables on top of previously identified accounting variables helps
improve forecasting accuracy. Hillegeist et al. (2004) extend Shumway’s method by using
Merton’s option model in a discrete hazard framework to examine the predictive ability of
accounting-based variables. They take into account dividend rate and replace the continu-
ous compounded risk free rate by continuous compounded expected return on assets, µ, to
adjust for actual risk. In order to estimate BSM bankruptcy probability, VA, σA,and µ must
be estimated since these values are not directly observable. Hillegeist et al. (2004) estimate
VA and σA by simultaneously solving equation (2.1) and the optimal hedge equation, and
the estimates of VA are then used to estimate µ. They find that traditional accounting-based
variables do not add incremental information beyond standard option variables. Another
study by Vassalou and Xing (2004) uses a similar approach that adopts an iterative proce-
dure to estimate VA and σA. However Vassalou and Xing (2004) do not adjust for dividends,
and as pointed out by Hillegeist et al. (2004), their method for calculating µ often results in
negative numbers which is inconsistent with asset pricing theory. Studies by Du and Suo
(2007) and Bharath and Shumway (2008) examine the model’s predictive power in a similar
way. While Hillegeist et al. (2004) find BSM model provides significantly more information
than Altman’s Z-Score and Ohlson’s O-Score, Du and Suo (2007) and Bharath and Shumway
(2008) have negative conclusions about the accuracy of the model forecast. Campbell et al.
(2008) estimate hazard models incorporating the BSM bankruptcy probability measure but
find it adds little forecasting power after conditioning on other variables.
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Though appealing as the structural model is over accounting-based models, it suffers
from a number of strict assumptions which are not true in reality. For example, it assumes
normality of stock returns, does not distinguish between types of debt, and assumes that
the firm only has a zero coupon debt and the default happens only at maturity. It is not
surprising that the empirical evidence on the performance of market-based models is mixed.
2.2.4 Econometric models using option prices
Options market provides a rich source of information as option prices are considered
forward-looking. Option prices reflect aggregate risk-neutral market expectations about the
underlying stock price until the maturity of the option contract. These data contain high
information efficiency. Particularly during crisis periods, traditional bankruptcy prediction
models fail to provide reasonable signals in advance of the crisis, while option data provides
an appealing way to extract information due to its forward-looking nature.
Using option prices to directly extract bankruptcy probabilities is relatively new in the
literature. Capuano (2008) developed a framework by applying the minimum cross-entropy
method to infer bankruptcy probabilities from an entire set of option prices. The framework
is based upon the Merton model where the default probability is defined as the probability
when the underlying assets value fall below a threshold, and is expressed as the cumulative
distribution function of the value of the assets up to the default barrier. In order to calcu-
late this quantity, option prices are used and the minimum cross-entropy method is used for
the optimising problem. The cross-entropy approach can be interpreted as a measure of the
discrepancy between a prior probability density function reflecting prior knowledge and a
posterior density. The Lagrangian multiplier is formed incorporating several moment con-
straints given by the theory of risk-neutral pricing to minimise the discrepancy. Capuano
(2008) applied the framework to ten largest U.S. banking groups namely Bank of America,
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Citigroup, J.P. Morgan, Wachovia, Wells Fargo, Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Broth-
ers, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley, around the 2008 financial crisis to see if the model is
able to capture market sentiments. The term structure of probabilities of default reported in
the author’s Appendix 1 suggests a less than 1% default probability of all financial institutions
examined when the financial crisis broke out in September 2008.
Vilsmeier (2011) argues that despite offering an appealing tool to extract bankruptcy in-
formation, the framework of Capuano (2008) suffers serious problems regarding its numer-
ical stability and also the accuracy of the estimates. He suggests some technical modifica-
tions to the approach and hence considerably improves the general application of the ap-
proach. The first modification concerns the estimation procedure for the minimum cross-
entropy. The Lagrange multipliers are solved numerically via Newton-Raphson algorithm in
Capuano (2008), however, Vilsmeier (2011) argues that the search for the roots of the sys-
tem is infeasible in many applications and converges only for a small number of constraints
when the initial guess of multipliers are near the final solution. The modification is done
by defining a lower bound on the value of the cross-entropy function. The second modi-
fication concerns the determination of the optimal probability of default. Vilsmeier (2011)
suggests an ad hoc procedure which is based on the evolution of the Lagrange multipliers
when estimating for different default barriers, and the numerical evaluation show clearly its
accuracy. He reported a default probability range between 0.0078% and 20% when applied
to a set of user-specified data. He also uses option data to test and find convincing results
that the framework is able to anticipate elevated risk of Bank of America relative to J.P. Mor-
gan months before its downgrade by Moody’s. Zer (2014) also employs the methodology to
estimate default probabilities but his paper is focused on the relationship between firms’
disclosure decisions and the market expected value of default probabilities.
A paper by Câmara et al. (2012) also examines the default rates for financial companies
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for a period of time including the subprime mortgage crisis using options data. They assume
that the stock price follows a delta-geomeric random walk, for which in each period the stock
price can go to zero with a certain probability δ or it follows a geometric random walk with
probability 1− δ. Then the probability density function of the stock price is effectively a
delta-lognormal distribution with a probability of default. Given Black-Scholes option pric-
ing framework, closed-form solutions can be derived for this model. The probability of de-
fault is obtained by minimising the sum of squared errors between observed option prices
and prices calculated from the model. Câmara et al. (2012) investigates a sample of 144 fi-
nancial firms with traded options in the U.S. for which the data is available through Option
Metrics. The sample period span from December 1996 to October 2008. They found that the
default probabilities for global financial service firms increase steadily during the subprime
crisis period. They also compare the model performance versus Moody’s KMV model and
credit ratings, and found the model surpassed credit ratings and matched or exceeded KMV
in anticipating the magnitude of the crisis.
Taylor et al. (2014) consider a similar approach but adopts a mixture of two lognormal
densities augmented with a positive probability of bankruptcy. They argue that a mixture
of lognormal densities characterize market information better than a single lognormal dis-
tribution. They calibrate the model to daily stock and option prices of six financial insti-
tutions (J.P. Morgan, Bank of America, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and
AIG) during 2008 and 2009 on major events. American option contracts with one month
and three months maturity are used. Their results show that the acquiring institutions e.g.
J.P. Morgan and Bank of America have lower average probability of bankruptcy of 0.7% and
0.9%, whereas those of the acquired institutions e.g. Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch are high
at 3.1% and 2.3%, respectively. Lehman Brothers has the highest bankruptcy probability
which shot up to 54% on September 15, 2008 when it declared bankruptcy. The probabil-
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ity of bankruptcy of Bear Stearns was 27% when J.P. Morgan offered to acquire at a low price.
The results are generally consistent with other studies that bankruptcy probabilities increase
during crisis period and that financially distressed institutions have higher probability of
bankruptcy.
2.2.5 Methods to estimate risk-neutral densities from option prices
Option prices provide a rich source of information for estimating asset price distribu-
tions when options expire. This is because option prices are contingent upon all possible
future payoffs and hence the distribution at maturity captured under risk-neutral measure.
Following Breeden and Litzenberger (1978), it is well known that the underlying risk-neutral
distributions extracted from option prices can be estimated from the second derivative of
the European option prices with respect to the corresponding exercise prices. As a result,
there exists a direct link between European option pricing formulae and associated func-
tional forms of risk-neutral distributions.
The literature on extracting option implied risk-neutral densities is huge and still grow-
ing. Methods to estimate risk-neutral densities from option prices are generally grouped
into four categories, (1) methods associated with extensions in price dynamics; (2) para-
metric density function fitting methods; (3) nonparametric methods; and (4) volatility smile
approaches.
Hull and White (1987), Johnson and Shanno (1987), Scott (1987), Wiggins (1987), and
Stein and Stein (1991) are among the first in the first category to address inadequate price
dynamics assumptions of Black-Scholes option pricing formula by incorporating stochastic
volatility. Volatility is assumed to follow a stochastic process of its own and uncorrelated with
changes in the underlying prices. Numerical methods are used to derive solutions to Euro-
pean call option prices, however, in most cases these are not closed-form. Heston (1993)
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allows volatility to follow a mean-reverting square-root diffusion process, and allows arbi-
trary correlation between volatility and spot returns to explain return skewness and term
structure effects. Based on characteristic functions techniques, a closed-form solution for a
European call option price can be derived.
Bates (1991) investigates whether there were negative expectations prior to the financial
market crash in October, 1987. He assumes a jump-diffusion process for the underlying asset
price and fits the model to S&P 100 index option prices. He finds that the model characterises
the stylized facts better than the Black-Scholes formula, which is based on the assumption
that the asset price follows a geometric Brownian motion. Risk-neutral distributions asso-
ciated with these pricing models can be numerically obtained by twice differentiating the
European option prices with respect to exercise prices.
Researchers have enriched the literature by considering individually or together with
other extensions stochastic interest rates, pure jump or jump diffusion models. Influential
examples are stochastic interest rate models of Merton (1974) and Amin and Jarrow (1992),
pure jump models of Madan and Chang (1996), binomial method of Rubinstein (1994) and
Jackwerth and Rubinstein (1996), stochastic volatility and jump models of Bates (1996) and
Scott (1997), Duffie et al. (2000), and stochastic volatility and stochastic interest rate models
of Bailey and Stulz (1989), Amin and Ng (1993), Bakshi and Chen (1997), and Scott (1997).
The literature in the second category assumes a functional form of the underlying price
distribution instead of the price dynamics. The method is flexible, general, and direct, allow-
ing for a variety of possible shapes of terminal distributions, and better able to capture the
characteristics of price distribution when options expire.
The simplest way to relax Black-Scholes assumptions is to assume a mixture of two log-
normal distributions instead of a single lognormal distribution, as in Ritchey (1990), Melick
and Thomas (1997), Bahra (1997), Söderlind and Svensson (1997), and Gemmill and Saflekos
25
(2000). Melick and Thomas (1997) apply the mixture of three lognormal distributions to the
crude oil market during the Persian Gulf crisis. Three densities each represent a state driven
by conditions in the oil market, namely, a pre-crisis situation, a severe disruption to the oil
market, and a continuation of an unsettled situation in the Gulf region. The probability at-
tached to each density is the likelihood of such state happening. They apply the model to
American option prices and find the estimated distribution is significantly different from
that recovered using single lognormal technique. The mixture of lognormal distribution is
sensible when asset prices depend on one or two future states that can be learned before
options expire, but as Taylor (2011) pointed out, the technique can be used generally as risk-
neutral densities even when there is no obvious motivation for a set of future states. Liu et al.
(2007) is another example which applies a mixture of lognormal densities.
A second distribution, lognormal polynomial density function, developed by Madan and
Milne (1994) is an elegant theory of contingent claims valuation that assumes the density
of standardized returns is the standard normal density multiplied by a linear combination
of Hermite polynomials, which serve as an orthogonal basis. The method involves more
mathematics than others, and has strong theoretical foundations, but negative estimated
densities are sometimes inferred.
Similar but more complicated functions of lognormal and polynomial terms are given by
the Edgeworth expansion method. Jarrow and Rudd (1982) use the Edgeworth expansion to
adjust the Black-Scholes pricing formula. The true price distribution and the approximating
probability distribution are linked by the differences between the moments. In this way,
they derive a functional form of the true density by augmenting the lognormal density with
its four moments, which in fact is based on Black-Scholes formula with adjusted variance,
skewness, and kurtosis.
A more flexible distribution in the literature is the generalised beta distribution first ex-
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plored by Bookstaber and McDonald (1987). They propose and apply the generalised dis-
tribution of the second kind (GB2) with four parameters, which are required to obtain four
moments of future asset prices. The density is inherently flexible with many well-known dis-
tributions as limiting or special cases, such as lognormal distribution. Examples are Sherrick
et al. (1996), Aparicio and Hodges (1998), and Liu et al. (2007).
Like parametric methods, nonparametric methods are employed to extract risk-neutral
densities aiming at achieving flexibility from more general functions instead of assuming re-
stricted shapes of distributions. Aït-Sahalia and Lo (1998) use kernel regression to estimate
risk-neutral densities nonparametrically from option prices. They assume that the option
pricing formula is an arbitrary non-linear function of a vector of explanatory variables in-
cluding exercise price, forward price, time to maturity, interest rate, and dividend yield. By
regressing kernel estimators across these five dimensions, they construct an option pricing
formula, which is then twice differentiated with respect to exercise prices to obtain the risk-
neutral density. The method makes the assumptions that parameter values remain constant
over time, which does not always hold. In addition, the method also suffers from the inten-
sity of data needed. Aıt-Sahalia and Duarte (2003) describe an alternative nonparametric
method to enforce the constraint that the density is nonnegative. Fewer data are then re-
quired.
Bondarenko (2003) employs a convolution approach which has similarities with both
nonparametric smoothing methods and parametric mixture methods. It involves construct-
ing a set of admissible densities consisting of functions which can be represented as the
convolution of a fixed kernel and an arbitrary density function. The kernel determines the
smoothness of the densities. The optimal density is the one which provides the best fit to
option prices. The weights of the component normal densities are obtained by solving a
quadratic programming problem.
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Buchen and Kelly (1996) suggest estimating the risk-neutral density using a nonparamet-
ric maximum entropy method. They start with the maximum entropy distribution, one that
does not assume any prior form and will evolve only as information arrives. This is partic-
ularly suitable for the situation where only a limited number of options and strike prices
are available from the option market. In their study, information refers to strike prices and
the corresponding option prices. Because no interpolations or extrapolations are needed
for densities between strike prices and beyond available range of strike prices, the resulting
distribution is considered least committed to unknown information and hence least biased.
Another kind of method is a curve-fitting method, which extracts risk-neutral densities
from implied volatility functions. The strategy is to fit the volatility smile from observed
market option prices with a parametric function of volatility, such as quadratic, as in Shimko
(1993). The resulting approximated volatilities are translated back to Black-Scholes option
price formula to acquire risk-neutral densities. However, plausible volatility functions do not
guarantee nonnegative densities for all strike prices, especially in left tails. Malz (1997a,b)
develop a strategy to modify the method and guarantees the tails are well behaved. He fits
the implied volatility to the space defined by pairs of option deltas and implied volatilities
instead of options prices and strike prices. It is argued that smoothing can be done easily
in the option implied volatility and option delta space. Another strategy of this kind is to
use more parameters by fitting a cubic spline to the observed implieds, either as a function
of strike price (Campa et al. (1998) or as a function of delta (Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2002,
2004)). The rationale is that the general cubics are constrained so that the functions and
their first two derivatives are continuous. But there is trade-off between a perfect fit and
smoothness of the fitted function.
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2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 Framework using option prices
Recall that the theoretical price of a European option can often be written as the dis-
counted expectation of final payoff. This is valid when an appropriate risk-neutral probabil-
ity distribution of the price of the underlying asset can be found. Then, for call options,
C (X )= e−r T E [(ST −X )+]= e−r T
∫ ∞
X
(x−X )ψ(x)d x, (2.4)
with X the strike price, T the time until expiry and ψ(x) denoting the risk-neutral density
(RND).
In Black-Scholes framework, where the stock price follows a Geometric Brownian Mo-
tion, the probability distribution of the future stock price used to price a European option
is a lognormal risk-neutral density. Hence, assuming the asset pays dividends at a constant















RNDs are defined for all x ≥ 0, ψ(x)≥ 0 and ∫∞0 ψ(x)d x = 1. The futures price of the underly-
ing asset excluding arbitrage opportunity is
F = Se(r−q)T .
For the futures price F ,
∫∞
0 xψ(x)d x = F .
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The underlying asset now has futures price F , and inserting the density into equation
(2.4) leads to the Black-Scholes formula, which gives the price of a European option written
on futures:
CBS(X |S)=CBS(X |F )= e−r t
∫ ∞
X
(x−X ) fQ (x|F,σ)d x.
Many types of density functions provide reasonable fits to observed option prices, so
there is plenty of scope for individual preferences. Taylor (2011) and Jackwerth (1999) have
given an extensive review on the methods and types of density specifications. The lognormal
density has only two parameters: F and σ. As the futures price F can be obtained for the
stock price, there is only one free parameter σ, which restrains the density’s flexibility to
explain observed option prices. Thus, it is reasonable to look for flexible densities with more
parameters.
One of the most popular parametric densities is a mixture of two lognormals (MLN), first
proposed by Ritchey (1990). The density is weighted combination of two lognormal densi-
ties, where the weight p is between zero and one,
fQmln(x)= p fQ (x|F1,σ1)+ (1−p) fQ (x|F2,σ2),
where F1,F2,σ1,σ2 > 0.
The risk-neutrality constraint is given by
F = pF1+ (1−p)F2.
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There are five parameters θ = F1,F2,σ1,σ2, p. The risk-neutrality constraint reduces the
number of free parameters to four, which is sufficient to obtain flexible shapes. The option
price given by a mixture of lognormal densities is then,
CBS(X |θ)= e−r t
∫ ∞
X




(x−X )[p fQ (x|F1,σ1)+ (1−p) fQ (x|F2,σ2)]d x
= pCBS(X |F1,σ1)+ (1−p)CBS(X |F2,σ2).
The mixture lognormal method guarantees a nonnegative estimated density, and it offers
a possible interpretation that the density has two future states with p associated with the
probability of a relevant future event. Since the mixture of lognormal density assumes the
underlying asset price will always be positive, it is reasonable to go from this stage, to assume
a value of zero for the underlying asset price to allow for a possible state of bankruptcy.
Following Taylor et al. (2014), I generalize the mixture of two lognormal densities to in-
corporate one more state in the event of a bankruptcy, where the underlying asset price is
equal to zero. Weights p1 and p2 are allocated to two lognormal distributions and the re-
maining weight 1−p1−p2 to the probability of bankruptcy. The probability density of the
underlying asset is then,
fQl nB (x|θ)= p1 fQ (x|F1,σ1)+p2 fQ (x|F2,σ2), x > 0,
with















The risk-neutrality constraint is given by
F = p1F1+p2F2.
Additional constraints are F1,F2,σ1,σ2 > 0, p1, p2 ≥ 0, and p1+p2 ≤ 1.
I refer to this generalized distribution with a feature of bankruptcy as MLNbk. The MLNbk
distribution has five free parameters. It has one extra free parameter than the MLN distribu-
tion. Taylor et al. (2014) find that the MLNbk describes option prices better than lognormal
distribution with one parameter, lognormal distribution with bankruptcy feature with two
free parameters as in Câmara et al. (2012), and the MLN distribution with four free parame-
ters.
Inserting the MLNbk distribution into option pricing equation (2.4) gives the theoretical
call option price,
C (X |θ)= p1CBS(X |F1,σ1)+p2CBS(X |F2,σ2).
Call options are worthless if the firm goes bankrupt, but put options are worth X . So the
theoretical put option price given by the MLNbk distribution is,
P (X |θ)= p1PBS(X |F1,σ1)+p2PBS(X |F2,σ2)+ (1−p1−p2)e−r T X .
The parameter vector θ = {F1,F2,σ1,σ2, p1, p2} is estimated by minimizing the sum of the
squared differences between the theoretical price and the observed market price denoted
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(C (Xi |θ)−CM (Xi |θ))2+ (P (Xi |θ)−PM (Xi |θ))2
]
(2.5)
2.3.2 Framework using CDS spreads
Credit default swaps are one example of credit derivatives, and credit derivative markets
have experienced explosive growth in recent years, which have attracted attentions of deal-
ers, investors, regulators, and lately, the general public. According to the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association (ISDA), on a gross notional outstanding basis, the market has
roughly doubled in size every year from 0.6 trillion dollars in 2001 to 62.2 trillion dollars in
20076. After the breakout of the financial crisis in 2008, the level of CDS notional outstand-
ing has been decreasing in every subsequent year since then, however, this decrease is at-
tributable to portfolio compression, which is a process designed to terminate existing trades
and replace them with a smaller number of trades with substantially smaller notionals that
carry the same risk profile as the initial portfolio. In doing so, portfolio compression reduces
the overall notional size and number of outstanding CDS contracts, and thereby improving
derivatives risk management. ISDA reported 25.1 trillion dollars notional at year end 2012.
Though notionals outstanding is declining, market risk transaction activity which measures
trading volume during a period of time is thought to be a better way to look at the relative dy-
namics of the CDS market. A review of such activity shows that CDS transaction volumes as
5An alternative error minimisation function is, mi n
Nc∑
i=1
wi (C (Xi |θ) − CM (Xi |θ))2 +
Nc+Np∑
i=Nc+1
wi (P (Xi |θ) −
PM (Xi |θ))2, the weighted squared error loss function introduced by Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2002). This loss
function is claimed particularly appropriate when the source of option price measurement error predomi-
nantly reflects the discreteness of option prices. Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2002), Liu et al. (2007), and Taylor
et al. (2014) applied equal weighting of squared errors to obtain parameters estimates for the mixture of log-
normal risk-neutral density. This loss function may provide smaller G values and quicker convergence. The
convergence of optimisation routine using equation 2.5 performs reasonably well in most estimates through-
out our sample. Testing the robustness of the loss function is beyond the scope of this study, thus minimising
the sum of the squared errors is retained in this study.
6See Markit report, The CDS Big Bang: Understanding the Changes to the Global CDS Contract and North
American Conventions.
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measured by notionals increased through 2011 to 2013, and the number of trades executed
increase in 2013 after a slightly fall in 2012. Given the nature of a credit default swap, which
is a contract bought by the protection buyer that protects against default of a certain refer-
ence entity, and the expanding size and engagement activity in the market, it is reasonable
to assume that we can derive a measure of probability of default for a particular reference
entity from CDS market data, and compare it with the estimate obtained from option data.
In a credit default swap, the protection buyer pays a series of periodic fixed payments
known as premium to the protection seller to protect against default of a reference entity.
In return, the protection seller does nothing unless the reference entity gets into financial
difficulty. In that case, the protection seller will be obliged to buy back from the protection
seller the defaulted bond at its face value. In a cash settlement case, the protection seller
will pay the difference between the face value of the defaulted bond and the current value
determined by an auction, to the protection buyer. The percentage of the value of the bond
after default to its face value is known as the recovery rate.
Following the methodology adopted by Bharath and Shumway (2008), let S be the CDS
spread, which is the amount paid per year as a percentage of the notional principal. Notional
amount is assumed 1 dollar. Let T determine the life of the CDS contract. CDS contracts
have maturities range from 6 month, 1,2,3...10 years, up to 20, 30 years. 5 year contract is
the most liquid one, and I also examine 1 year contract in this study. Assume the premium
payments are made once every three months, e.g. March, June, September, and December.
Assume the probability of a reference entity defaulting between two consecutive payment
days conditional on no prior default is p, and for simplicity, I assume the default only hap-
pens halfway through the three months. In the event of default, a final accrual payment is
required by the protection buyer, which is equal to 0.5∗ 0.25S. The risk-free rate is r and
recovery rate is δ.
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p(1−p)4t−1e−r (t− 18 )0.5∗0.25S+ (1−p)4t e−r t 0.25S
]
,
where t = 0.25,0.5,0.75,1 for 1 year contract, and t = 0.25,0.5,0.75,1, ...,5 for 5 year contract.
The first term represents the present value of the expected accrual payments in the event
of a default assuming it happens midway between two consecutive premium payments. The
second term represents the present value of the expected periodic premium payments made
at the end of each period provided that the reference entity survives until t .
Similarly, the present value of the expected payoff is given by
T∑
t=0.25
p(1−p)4t−1(1−δ)e−r (t− 18 ).
An estimate of the recovery rate δ is needed in order to value the payoff. As of The CDS
Big Bang in 2009, the new CDS contract has been standardized in a number of ways. The CDS
contracts are grouped based on geological regions, such as North America, Europe, Asia, etc.,
and classed into different types, such as standard corporate, index, sovereign, etc. Different
classes of contracts have different estimates of recovery rates as input into models to price
CDS spreads. As of my sample Standard North American Corporate Senior, I use the market
consensus estimate 40% as recovery rate in the study.
Setting the present value of the expected premium payments equal to the present value
of the expected payoff, so that the value of the contract is zero when both parties enter the
contract, we can solve for the probability of default p from the resulting non-linear equa-
tion. Since the calculations assume no risk-premium associated with default, the resulting
implied probability should be considered a risk-neutral measure. Note that p is assumed
constant over the life of the CDS contract as a result of the modelling assumption. Of course
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in reality the instantaneous jump to default rate may change at different point in time based
on changes in the firm’s fundamentals and market conditions. The default probability in this
model represents the average default rate aggregated over the life of the CDS contract.
2.4 Data
The sample includes 12 American corporations in the financial industry7 – Lehman Broth-
ers (LB), Washington Mutual (WM), Bear Stearns (BS), American International Group (AIG),
Wachovia, Merrill Lynch (ML), Bank of America (BoA), Citigroup (Citi), Morgan Stanley (MS),
Goldman Sachs (GS), J.P. Morgan Chase (JPM), and Wells Fargo (WF). The firms are selected
based on data availability.
All of the firms in the sample experience financial distress to some extent throughout the
crisis period. LB and WM filed for bankruptcy; BS, ML, and Wachovia were saved through ac-
quisition by JPM, BoA, and WF, respectively. AIG was solely on the sell side of CDS contracts
and almost drained its assets paying out CDS claims. It would not have survived without the
government’s four-time bailout. BoA was relatively safe in 2008 but ran into trouble in early
January 2009 revealed by massive losses from the forced merger with ML. The government
infused money to BoA as part of the agreement for BoA to acquire ML. Citi was showing less
strains prior to September 2008, but the meltdown came in the week of November 17. Citi
lost 60% of its market value that week and the government stepped in to rescue Citi in an
effort to contain the financial crisis. GS, MS, JPM, and WF were relatively stable and secure
compared to the rest the of sample.
Given the crisis period setting and ex-post knowledge of the survivorship of each firm,
7The original intention was to investigate a cross sectional investigation of corporate bankruptcy probabil-
ities in all industries. However, CDS for the financial sector tend to be more actively traded than other sectors.
This is reflected by larger net notional CDS positions for firms that provide credit guarantees and therefore
represent counterparty risk to other market participants (Oehmke and Zawadowski (2017)). This is particu-
larly manifest in financial services companies with exposure to the subprime mortgage market, and later in
the global financial crisis period. Due to limited CDS trading activity in non-financial industries, the resulting
sample includes firms with both CDS data and option data only in the financial industry.
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one would naturally split the sample into two categories for comparison. However, one
would be more interested in how things evolve over time, and in particular, how information
contained in option prices and CDS spreads help to raise the flag when firms enter financial
distress. Default probabilities inferred from option prices and CDS spreads, together with
the risk-neutral densities derived from option prices provide ex-ante information in assess-
ing the state of distress for each firm. Multimodal RNDs suggest investors have divergent
views, and the emergence of bimodality in the RND, or parallel shift of RNDs can be inter-
preted as signals of potential crash in the stock price. I discuss such information for each of
the firms in section 2.5.
Option data and CDS data are collected for each firm. Option data is obtained from
OptionMetrics, which provides historical prices of options based on closing quotes at the
Chicago Board of Options Exchange. Data sample starts in January 2007 and ends in Octo-
ber 2010 for healthy firms, and for dead firms option data ends when firms went bankrupt.
All options traded on each of the firms are American. In order to avoid complexity of the
early-exercise premium of American options, only out-of-the-money (OTM) calls and puts
are used. Since the dividend yield is close to zero during crisis period, investors have lit-
tle incentive to exercise OTM options before expiration, and thus it is reasonable to assume
that a European option pricing model provides a good approximation to American option
prices. To simplify equations and calculations, options are assumed to be written on futures
contracts, with futures and options contracts having matching expiration time.
F = er T (S−pv(Di v)).
For a strike price X , calls are defined to be OTM if X > F , and puts are OTM if X < F .
The risk-free rate r corresponds to the zero-coupon rate that has the same maturity as the
option’s expiration, and is calculated by linear interpolation between the two closest zero-
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coupon rates on the zero curve.
Dividend information is obtained from the dividend distribution history in OptionMetrics.
The distribution pattern for all firms is very regular — quarterly8, so it is highly predictable.
Thus it can be assumed that the information about dividend information is made available
to the public when futures contracts are priced. Since the amount of dividend distributed
during the crisis period is very small, I neglect dividends in the calculations as it does not
have a significant impact on the results9.
Option data for each firm is obtained once a month from 2007 to 2010. Option prices are
then filtered. I restrict valid options to options with bid prices strictly positive, and exclude
all options with bid price greater than ask price. The representative day on which the MLNbk
density is sought is chosen to be the first trading day available for the month with the number
of valid options greater than 510, in other words, a minimum of 6 options including both calls
and puts are required for model estimation. Options mature in, on average, one and a half
months. When there are less than 6 available valid options during the first 10 days of the
month, I drop the observation of this month. There are a small number of cases where I
have dropped the monthly observation, either due to less than 6 available valid options or
because the spot price is too low that the parameter estimates cannot be obtained. 8 out of
38 have been discarded for AIG due to extremely low spot price; 2 out of 30 for Citi, and 1
out of 44 for MS. The rest of the sample firms have satisfactory monthly observations. Only
options with standard settlement are considered11.
8All firms distribute dividends, and payments are made quarterly, e.g. January, April, July, and October as of
Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, J.P. Morgan Chase and Washington Mutual; or February, May, August, Novem-
ber as of Wachovia, Wells Fargo, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, and Lehman Brothers; or March, June, September,
December as of AIG and Bank of America.
9The amount of dividend payment per period ranges from $0.1 to $0.64 across firms pre-crisis, however it
dropped significantly after the breakout of the financial crisis, especially for distressed firms, it is practically
zero.
10I try not to choose the representative day with the most number of valid options trading, though liquidity
may reflect better pricing on options. The idea is to maintain as consistent as possible the option life across the
sample period.
11Standard settlement specifies that 100 shares of underlying security are to be delivered at exercise; the strike
price and premium multipliers are $100 per tick. Non-standard settlement may deviate from the standard
settlement specification. I restrict to options with standard settlement to avoid noise in estimation.
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CDS data is provided by Credit Market Analytics (hereafter CMA) and is obtained through
Datastream12. CDS data is obtained from January 2007 to October 201013. Daily CDS spreads
are obtained for both the 1 year contract and the 5 year contract for each firm. The 5 year
CDS contract is the most liquid contract in the market, and 1 year contract is also examined
as I am more interested in default probabilities over a shorter period. Only CDS contracts on
senior debt are selected, and the contracts are traded in US dollars.
1 year CDS prices provide expected bankruptcy probabilities over a one-year horizon,
assuming default occurs between quarterly premium payment days conditional on no prior
default; while option prices provide probabilities over on average 34 days, which is a rela-
tively shorter time horizon. CDS probabilities are then scaled using the following equation
to be comparable with option probabilities. The scaled probability is given by default within
34 days. Scaling is also done for 5 year CDS probabilities.
1−PC DS34d = (1−PC DS3m )
34
66 ,
with 66 trading days matching 3 month calendar days.
Table 2.1 gives a characteristic summary of firms in the sample and firm status, and time
span for both option and CDS data for each of the firms. Columns 6-7 present option- and
1y CDS-implied (scaled) bankruptcy probabilities estimated on September 4, 2007, which is
the earliest common start point for estimation across all firms. It can be seen at this point
in time bankruptcy probabilities are less than 1% for all firms. It suggests that all firms are
relatively secure and there is no concern that any firm is having financial difficulty, in other
12Both CMA data and Thomson Reuters data are available from Datastream, however, Thomson Reuters data
is not available for some of the firms in the sample, and for those firms where data is available, the earliest
history of data starts only from December 2007. CMA data is investigated in this study. CMA collects CDS data
from around 40 members from the buy-side community, including investment banks, hedge funds, and asset
managers who are active participants in the CDS market. Data represents aggregated average from all quoting
parties on the same reference entity. CDS data for Lehman Brothers is obtained from Bloomberg.
13The reason that the data ends at October 2010 is because starting October 1 2010, clients are required to
have a CMA license to access the data, but unfortunately the license is not available to us. In addition, I believe
that the time span is sufficient for the purpose of contrast between pre and post crisis.
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words, there appears to be no meaningful split between groups for which one are relative
healthy and the other distressed. Thus, I put each firm on a continuum and discuss them in-
dividually in section 2.5. Table 2.2 provides descriptive statistics for option information used
for parameter estimation and summary statistics for G values defined by equation (2.5). As
can been seen from the quartile results in Panel B, the distributions of G-values are positively
skewed.
2.5 Empirical results
This section first summarises estimated bankruptcy probabilities for each of the firms
along with a closer look at certain stressful events. Then bankruptcy probabilities across
firms are compared in section 2.5.1, and a comparison between probabilities inferred from
option prices and CDS prices is described in section 2.5.2.
Bear Stearns (BS)
Bear Stearns was a New York based global investment bank and securities trading and
brokerage firm that failed in March 2008, and was subsequently sold to J.P. Morgan Chase.
Figure 2.1 shows that prior to August 2007, BS had a bankruptcy probability below 0.45% for
option implied probabilities, and CDS probabilities were practically zero14. During the week
of July 16, 2007, Bear Stearns disclosed that its two subprime hedge funds had lost nearly
all of their value amid a rapid decline in the market for subprime mortgages. On August 1,
2007, investors in the two funds took action against Bear Stearns and its top board and risk
management managers. This was the first legal action made against Bear Stearns. The Co-
14Figures 2.1 to 2.12 display bankruptcy probabilities estimated from option prices and CDS spreads (1 year
and 5 year). Panel (a) display time series of estimated bankruptcy probabilities along with stock prices. Vertical
axis on the left-hand-side (right-hand-side) corresponds to bankruptcy probabilities (stock prices). Panel (b)
display scatter plots of option-implied probabilities against scaled 1y CDS-implied probabilities. Panel (c) show
risk-neutral densities on certain event days.
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President was then asked to resign as a result of the collapse of the two hedge funds. Option
implied bankruptcy went up to 2.18% on August 1, and CDS probabilities went up as well.
On March 11, 2008, The Federal Reserve Board announced the creation of the Term Secu-
rities Lending Facility (TSLF), which will lend up to $200 billion of Treasury securities for 28-
day terms against certain type of securities including federal agency residential mortgage-
backed securities. Investors interpret this announcement as a sign of difficulty for BS. Option
implied probability rose up to 2.94% reflecting increased risk of bankruptcy. Liquidity dried
up dramatically the next couple of days, the probability of bankruptcy was 3.6% on March
12 and 5.44% on March 13.
On March 14, The Federal Reserve Board approved the financing arrangement announced
by J.P. Morgan Chase to provide Bear Stearns the liquidity for up to 28 days that the mar-
ket refused to provide. The bankruptcy chance went up to 13.7% reflecting serious liquid-
ity problem at BS. The RND shows obvious bimodality with the means of the two lognorml
component being $16 and $42. The distinct bimodality of the RND reflects that investors
hold different views on Bear Stearns’ future stock price and that the price may fall sharply.
On March 17, J.P. Morgan offered to acquire BS at $2 per share. This sale price repre-
sented a staggering loss as its stock had traded at $93 a share as late as February 2008. The
RND shows progressively spiked peak around $5, revealing market consensus view that Bear
Stearns is going to collapse. Option implied bankruptcy probability was 9.34%. A week later,
the revised deal was struck that BS would be acquired by JPM at $10 per share to quiet upset
investors. After the acquisition was agreed, bankruptcy probabilities decreased to 0.72% and
0.42% in April and May.
It can be seen that the bankruptcy probabilities given by CDS spreads went up when BS
gradually went into trouble, and was high at BS’s crisis period, and settled down after the
agreement of acquisition was made. We observe that the two sources of bankruptcy proba-
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bilities agree with each other except that the magnitude of option implied probabilities are
higher than those from CDS spreads during the crisis period. Both probabilities exhibit in-
verse relationship with the stock prices, in particular when stock price plummets, the two
sources of bankruptcy probabilities shoot up in consensus.
Lehman Brothers (LB)
Figure 2.2 shows that LB’s option implied probability was below 0.5% prior to mid-March
2008, and went up starting with the Bear Stearns crisis until it went bankrupt in September
2008. The RND on September 4, 2007 is well-behaved in that it is negatively skewed and does
not have sharp spikes. At this point Lehman Brothers did not have known liquidity issues and
therefore do not reveal any market concerns.
After Bear Stearns was taken over by JPM, market analysts suggest that LB would be the
next major investment bank to fall due to its heavy exposure to credit derivatives linked to
the sub-prime mortgages. During this time, LB relied on overnight Fed funding to survive
BS crisis period. The RND is bimodal where one mode is as low as $10 and the other above
$40, which evidenced market concern that Lehman Brothers may collapse. The bankruptcy
probability was 6.59% on March 17.
In June, Lehman Brothers announced $2.8 billion second-quarter loss as market volatility
rendered many of its hedges ineffective. On June 3, the bankruptcy probability was 5.28% as
analysts and investors anticipated the loss, reflecting deteriorated liquidity concern. During
August, LB closed up 5% of its shares and held secret talks with state-controlled Korea Devel-
opment Bank. As investors perceive that Korea Development bank was considering buying
LB, this was considered positive news, and bankruptcy probabilities decreased from 2.86%
in July to 2.34% in August.
However, gains quickly eroded as news came in that Korea Development Bank was strug-
42
gling to please the regulators and finding partners for the deal. The bankruptcy probability
went up to 3.37% at the start of September, reflecting negative expectation about LB. LB’s
share priced plunged to $7.79 on September 9, after it was reported that the talks with Korea
Development bank was put on hold. The RND shows more probability at the lower mode
which indicates very low future price expectations. The bankruptcy probability went up to
17.56%. On September 12, the spike of the RND shows consensus view that Lehman Broth-
ers is going to collapse. The bankruptcy probability was 25.63%, and three days later, LB
declared bankruptcy on September 15.
CDS spreads for LB was obtained from Bloomberg, and gaps shown on CDS probabilities
are due to missing values of CDS spreads. CDS probabilities were low before BS crisis, below
1%; they gradually went up as LB’s situation deteriorates in July and August; and shoot up
to 2.43% on September 12 for the last available data point before bankruptcy. LB’s filing for
bankruptcy triggered the CDS payout to buyers who sought for LB’s credit default protec-
tion. The auction for LB’s debt occurred on October 10, and the resulting price of LB’s senior
debt was only 8.625 cents on the dollar, which means that the sellers of LB’s CDS contracts
were obliged to pay the insured counterparties 91.375% of the face value of LB’s senior debt.
The Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) announced about $5.2 billion in net
funds transfer from net sellers to net buyers as a result of LB’s CDS settlement.
Merrill Lynch (ML)
In November 2007, Merrill Lynch announced it would write-down $8.4 billion in losses
associated with the national housing crisis. As shown in Figure 2.3, option implied bankruptcy
probability went up to 0.62% from 0.17% a monthly earlier, and stayed around 0.5% for the
next couple of months prior to the BS crisis. On March 17, Merrill Lynch shows a similar per-
ception of option-implied bankruptcy risk about 6.5% to that of Lehman Brothers, but the
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RND does not reveal serious concern over future price drop.
In July 2008, ML announced $4.9 billion fourth quarter losses for the company from de-
faults and bad investments in the ongoing mortgage crisis. Two weeks later on July 28, the
company announced the sale of selected hedge funds and securities in an effort to reduce
their exposure to mortgage related investments. The company’s share price declined signif-
icantly. Bimodality emerges in the RND, and the bankruptcy probability was 2.35%.
On September 5, ML’s stock was downgraded to ‘conviction sell’ by Goldman Sachs and
warned of further losses. As Lehman Brothers came under severe liquidity issues, ML held
talks with Bank of America and finally made a sale to BoA on September 15. The lower mode
of the RND on September 15 became more peaked indicating investors’ increased worry that
ML is heading into trouble. The bankruptcy risk is 4.73%.
CDS probabilities are high at BS crisis and September 2008 when the break out of finan-
cial crisis occurred, with the latter higher than the former. But generally, bankruptcy prob-
abilities given by both option prices and CDS spreads for ML are smaller than those for LB,
reflecting the fact that ML was able to strike a deal with BoA whereas LB failed.
Washington Mutual (WM)
Washington Mutual Inc. was a savings bank holding company and the former owner
of Washington Mutual bank, which was United States’ largest savings and loan association
bank until its collapse. At the start of the common date on September 4, 2007, the stock price
is around $40, and the RND is well-behaved, almost symmetric but with a small chance of
future price falling below $30.
On March 17, the RND shifted to a low level with mean around $9. WM held a significant
exposure to credit derivatives, and the bankruptcy probability was high at 11%. WM had
sustained losses and difficulties as a result of the subprime mortgage crisis, and the situation
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deteriorated quickly since July.
When Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy and Merrill Lynch sold to Bank of America,
the market hit a critical stage. The holding company of Washington Mutual bank received
a credit rating agency downgrade, and option implied bankruptcy probability was high at
25.49% as of September 12, see Figure 2.4. Starting September 15, WM’s customers started
heading for the exits. Over the next 10 days, WM experienced a bank run of in total $16.7 bil-
lion withdrawal in deposits, which eventually led to the seizure of the bank by Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS) and was placed into receivership with the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration (FDIC). FDIC sold most of Washington Mutual bank’s assets to J.P. Morgan Chase
at a very low price, and WM filed for bankruptcy on September 26. The bankruptcy was
the second largest in the U.S. history, with the largest being Lehman Brothers.w Bankruptcy
probability on the day before was 57.41%. The RNDs on both September 12 and 25 show sig-
nificant spikes on the tail, indicating high volatility and panic over the survivorship of WM.
CDS probabilities were small and flat before July 2008, and gradually increased in July
and August. Starting early September, bankruptcy probabilities increased dramatically with
significant jumps. It was 6.65% on September 8, and within a few days’ time it went up to
21.2% on September 16, reflecting an accelerated expectation of default risk in the credit
market. The magnitude of CDS bankruptcy probabilities for WM is much higher than those
for BS, LB, and ML. The auction to determine the CDS settlement price was held on October
23, and the final result agreed by all parties was that the recovery rate on WM’s senior debt
was 57 cents on the dollar, and the sellers of CDS on WM would pay 43 cents on the dollar to
CDS purchasers.
Wachovia
Wachovia was a diversified financial services company and was the fourth largest bank
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holding company in the United States before Wells Fargo acquired it in 2008. On Septem-
ber 4, 2007, Wachovia’s stock price was $49. The RND appears almost unimodal, with the
means of two modes very close to the future stock price, and the volatilities for the two log-
normal component are small. Bankruptcy probability is less than 1%. On March 17, when
Bear Stearns almost collapsed, the RND became bimodal with increased volatility for both
lognormal components. The stock price fell to $25.6 and the bankruptcy probability went
up to 3.68%.
It can be seen in Figure 2.5 that prior to September 2008, Wachovia had bankruptcy
probabilities below one half of 5%, while on September 15 when Lehman Brothers declared
bankruptcy and Merrill Lynch sold to Bank of America, option implied bankruptcy proba-
bility went up to 14.2%. Due to the seizure of Washington Mutual by FDIC and the filing of
bankruptcy the previous day, on September 26, Wachovia experienced a similar bank run
of deposit withdrawals from businesses institutional investors, which amounts to 1% of the
bank’s total deposits. Its stock price plunged 27% and the option bankruptcy probability
went up to 39.98%. The large outflow of deposits attracted regulators’ concerns, and over
the weekend FDIC has been considering what actions needed to be taken on Wachovia. As
being deemed systematically important to the health of the economy, Wachovia was not al-
lowed to fail, as did Washington Mutual. On September 29, FDIC announced to auction off
Wachovia’s banking assets to Citigroup and since then Citigroup has become the main source
of liquidity provider to allow Wachovia to continue operating. The bankruptcy risk was high
at 32.73%. The RND became a sharp spike at $1.84 signalling the collapse of Wachovia.
On October 3, Wachovia and Wells Fargo announced a merger agreement of $15 billion
in stock. Wachovia preferred the deal with Wells Fargo despite Citigroup being its liquidity
provider, because it would keep their business intact and there was far less overlap between
the banks. Citigroup abandoned its attempt to purchase Wachovia’s banking assets after
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exploring its legal options against the discussion between Wachovia and Wells Fargo with no
success. The Federal Reserve unanimously approved the merger with Wells Fargo on October
12, and the option implied bankruptcy probability decreased to 4.2% on the 13th, reflecting
the market’s relieved anxiety about the complete failure of Wachovia.
Compared to option implied probabilities, CDS probabilities are rather mild. It shows
a slight increase during Bear Stearns crisis and early September turmoil. Though probabil-
ities sharply increased after the collapse of Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual, the
highest bankruptcy probability was 3.96% on September 26. CDS probabilities show that the
chances of bankruptcy generally decreased after the merger agreement between Wachovia
and Wells Fargo was made; however, due to data limitation, I am unable to obtain option
implied probabilities for after the merger.
American International Group (AIG)
AIG is the much troubled financial institution in the sample that survived the financial
crisis through a series of government bailouts between September 2008 and March 2009.
AIG was active in the credit derivative business, including CDSs and CDOs, and was severely
affected by the liquidity dry-up during the financial crisis.
Figure 2.6 shows that prior to September 2008, the estimated chance of bankruptcy from
option prices was below 2%, and increased after July 2008. On September 12, S&P put AIG on
a negative credit watch, signalling a possible rate downgrade. The chance of bankruptcy was
13.89%. Monday September 15, AIG’s credit rating was downgraded, forcing it to post addi-
tional collateral. AIG’s financial crisis intensified and the chance of bankruptcy was 43.12%.
Its share price dropped 60% to $4.76 over the weekend. The fat tail of the RND reflects height-
ened fear about AIG’s future uncertainty.
Seeing Lehman Brothers collapse without rescuing, the U.S. government decided that
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AIG was too big to fail because an incredible amount of institutional investors – investment
banks, hedge funds, mutual funds, and pension funds – invested in and also were insured by
AIG. The Federal Reserve stepped in and announced an injection of $85 billion on September
16 to allow it to deliver additional collaterals to prevent it from collapsing, and the govern-
ment effectively seized control of AIG, making it the largest government bailout of a private
company in U.S. history. The estimated chance of bankruptcy was nearly 50%. AIG received
its second and third bailout from the government on Oct 8 and November 10, respectively,
and its share price has been at only a few dollars throughout the first half of 2009.
In early March 2009, AIG received the fourth bailout and the bailout which was restruc-
tured to give the Fed preferred interests in life insurers. By then AIG had received more than
$170 billion taxpayers’ money in bailouts, and two weeks after, AIG announced its plan to
pay out $165 million in executive bonuses. Word of bonuses stirred up outrage from the gov-
ernment as well as the general public. Under the pressure of the Treasury Secretary, the deal
was cut to $9.6 million going to the top 50 executives, as the firm was contractually obliged
to pay them. At this stage, it was not clear where AIG stood in the recovery from the financial
crisis.
CDS probabilities increased significantly to about 10% since the September 2008, and
remained high throughout the first half of 2009. However, the CDS probabilities are as low
as 2% from December 2008 to February 2009 when CDS spreads dropped significantly, pos-
sibly due to the intervention of the U.S. government in bailing out AIG, investors deem AIG
unlikely to collapse.
J.P. Morgan Chase (JPM)
J.P. Morgan Chase, relative to all other financial institutions, has the lowest bankruptcy
probabilities across the whole sample period. Option implied probabilities are below 2% and
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CDS probabilities are below 1%. It was strong enough to stay profitable during the financial
crisis and bail out two failing competitors, Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual.
Figure 2.7 shows that option implied bankruptcy probabilities were generally below 0.5%
prior to the Bear Stearns crisis. JPM stepped in as a rescuer after intense negotiation be-
tween the two parties and the federal government. On March 17, JPM announced its plan
to acquire BS in a stock swap valuing BS at $2 per share. The estimated bankruptcy risk in-
creased temporarily to 1.24%, and the RND has low probability of low future price. On March
24, JPM announced a revised deal at $10 per share to pacify BS’s angry shareholders, and the
merger was complete in June. The bankruptcy risk dropped to 0.41% after consent with the
new offer price. CDS probabilities show that the chances for bankruptcy increased during
the Bear Stearns crisis period, but decreased as soon as the acquisition deal was approved.
On September 15 when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, the estimated chance of
bankruptcy risk for JPM was just slightly above 1%. The relative stable RND reflects market
perception about JPM’s rather healthy financial conditions. On September 25, the Office
of Thrift Supervision (OTS) seized Washington Mutual bank and placed it into receivership
with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). JPM bought most of WM’s banking
operations from FDIC. The bankruptcy chance was 1.01% on September 26. The long left tail
of the RND shows investors’ sceptical concern about the benefit of the acquisition to JPM due
to the significant write-downs and losses from WM’s assets and debts. CDS probabilities give
the same trend of estimates of bankruptcy risk. Probabilities jumped when Lehman Brothers
collapsed, but were low prior to the critical day.
The Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson released a $700 billion proposal to purchase trou-
bled mortgage-related assets on September 20, called the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP), in order to stabilize the crashing market. However, the proposal was initially rejected
by the House. Just a few days later, the Senate and the House passed the bill and the president
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signed the $700 billion Emergency Economic Stabilization Act into law. On October 14, The
Treasury Department announces that it will invest up to $250 billion in the nation’s banks via
the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), a subcomponent of the TARP. This allows the Treasury
to purchase illiquid, difficult-to-value assets from banks and other financial institutions to
improve the liquidity of these assets allowing participants to stabilize their balance sheets
and avoid further losses. Nine large financial organizations announced their intention to
subscribe to the facility through preferred stock investments in an aggregate amount of $125
billion. JPM was one of them and received $25 billion on October 28. The option implied
bankruptcy risk was 1.32% and 1.65% respectively on October 14 and 28, relatively higher
than pre-crisis period, reflecting market anxiety about collective collapse of major financial
institutions, but the RND on October 28 has lower probability of future lower price.
CDS probabilities are also the lowest for JPM throughout the sample period relative to
other companies. It fluctuates within 0.5% for most of the times with little volatility, with the
highest record goes slightly above 0.5% in March 2009.
Bank of America (BoA)
BoA was relatively safe throughout the crisis from March to September 2008, but condi-
tion deteriorates since the start of 2009. During the Bear Stearns crisis, the option implied
probability of bankruptcy for BoA, see Figure 2.8, was less than 1%, and on March 17 when
JPM offered to buy Bear Stearns at $2 per share, the estimated chance of bankruptcy for
BoA was 0.52%, showing how slightly BoA was affected by the event. In September, before
Lehman Brothers failed, BoA was the leading bidder to purchase Lehman Brothers. How-
ever, due to a lack of government backing for the takeover, BoA stopped bidding for Lehman
Brothers, who filed for bankruptcy the next day. The same day, Merrill Lynch entered into
agreement to be acquired by BoA. The bankruptcy probability for BoA on September 15
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went up to 3.14%, reflecting some systemic credit risk stemming from Lehman Brother’s
bankruptcy.
BoA was one of the nine institutions signed on for the CPP program on October 14, and
received $25 billion on October 28. The estimated bankruptcy chances were 1.39% and
3.02%. The RNDs shown in Figure 2.8 up to October 28 do not show expectations of very
low future price.
On January 16, 2009, in its earnings release, BoA revealed massive losses at Merrill Lynch
in the fourth quarter, which necessitated an infusion of money which was previously ne-
gotiated with the government as part of the government-persuaded deal to acquire Merrill
Lynch. The Treasury announced $20 billion investment in BoA. The bank’s stock price sank
to $7.18, the lowest in 17 years. The market capitalization of BoA was $45 billion, less than
what it offered to Merrill Lynch of $50 billion. The bankruptcy risk on January 16 1.45%. The
emergence of bimodality in the RND clearly shows concerns over BoA’s financial stability
which was not alleviated by the announcement of the government bailout.
CDS probabilities were a lot less volatile, with less than 0.5% for pre-crisis period and
went up to as high as 1.5% between March and May 2009. BoA would not have gone in such
difficulty had it not acquired Merrill Lynch through a forced deal by the U.S government.
Citigroup (Citi)
Citigroup was one of the largest bank holdings company in the U.S. as of 2008, but suf-
fered huge losses during the global financial crisis and eventually entered into a rescue plan
by the U.S. government. Prior to Bear Stearns running into trouble, bankruptcy risk for Cit-
igroup was below 0.5%, see Figure 2.9. However, the bankruptcy chance went up to 2.76%
on March 17 when JPM offered to buy Bear Stearns at $2 per share. Citigroup had heavy
exposure to troubled mortgages in the form of collateralized debt obligation (CDOs), com-
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pounded by poor risk management; high bankruptcy risk reflects a possibility of hosing
downturn at national level, however, Citigroup deemed it tiny and excluded them from their
risk analysis. The RND has roughly equal weights for the two lognormal component, but
with higher volatility for the lower mode.
On September 15, the estimated chance of bankruptcy was 4.35%, much higher than that
of JPM and BoA, showing worsened conditions for Citigroup stemming from the subprime
mortgage crisis. The RND does not show indication of serious deterioration of Citi’s finan-
cial condition. The CPP program was introduced by the Treasury as a plan to help ’healthy’
institutions to lend in tough market times rather than a bailout for the banks, but some par-
ticipants turned out to be not so healthy and only needed further injections later. Citigroup
was clearly one of them. Citigroup received their first injection of $25 billion on October 28
and the bankruptcy risk was 2.54%.
November 17, Citigroup announced plans for about 52,000 new job cuts, on top of 23,000
cuts already made during 2008, resulting from four quarters of consecutive losses and reports
that it was unlikely to be in profit again before 2010. By that time, Citigroup was insolvent de-
spite its receipt of $25 billion funds. The share price dropped and the chance of bankruptcy
went up to 5.12%. The RND shifted to a lower mean around $8, and became more peaked
with increased volatility.
On November 23, government and regulators stepped in and approved a plan to stabilize
the company and prevent it from failing. On the 24th, the government announced a massive
stimulus package of $20 billion of investment in Citigroup which gives the government a
major say on its operations. Citigroup issued preferred shares to the Treasury and FDIC in
exchange for protection against losses on a $306 billion pool of commercial and residential
securities held by it. The chance of bankruptcy was high at 6.36% on the 24th. The RND
warns of a possible further fall in the already low share price, which indicates that investors
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were not sure whether the government bailout would be sufficient in rescuing Citi.
The U.S. government was taking necessary actions to strengthen the financial system
and protect taxpayers and the economy. In February 2009, Citigroup announced that the
U.S. government would be taking 36% equity stake in the company by converting $25 billion
emergency aid into common shares. In June, it was announced that Citigroup was removed
from Dow Jones Industrial Average due to a significant government ownership. Citi’s share
price has been at a very low level throughout 2009.
CDS probabilities are relatively low below 1% prior to 2009. Bankruptcy probabilities
increased to about 2% throughout the first half of 2009 when Citigroup’s stock price plum-
meted during this period.
Goldman Sachs (GS) and Morgan Stanley (MS)
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley were the last two major investment banks in the Wall
Street history who became traditional bank holding companies in September 2008. Figure
2.10 and Figure 2.11 show that the bankruptcy risk was below 1% for both companies prior
to the failure of Bear Stearns. However, on March 17, the chances for bankruptcy went up
to 2.24% for Goldman Sachs and 3.59% for Morgan Stanley. Similar to Citigroup, Goldman
Sachs and Morgan Stanley suffered from the systemic credit risk stemming from the Bear
Stearns crisis.
On September 15, bankruptcy chance for Goldman Sachs was 1.46% while 4.41% for Mor-
gan Stanley. A few days later on September 21, both firms confirmed they would become
traditional bank holding companies. In becoming holding companies, Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley would get access to the Federal Reserve’s emergency lending facilities, and
it will allow them to better organize their assets and place them in better position for merg-
ers and acquisitions. The bankruptcy risk after the announcement was 1.84% and 6.86%
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for Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley respectively. Upon completion of converting, both
firms received $10 billion funds from the government through CPP program on October 28.
Bankruptcy risk was 4.76% and 9.36% for Goldman and Morgan. Clearly, the market was
not confident whether both former investment banks would avoid following the footsteps of
Lehman Brothers.
The RNDs of both companies display very similar characteristics. Prior to the BS crisis,
the RNDs appear almost identical with unimodal and fatter left tail. On both dates when
JPM offered to acquire BS and LB filed for bankruptcy, the RNDs show slightly concern over
future share price drop. On October 28 when both companies received government funding
through the CPP program, the RNDs has further increased mass in the lower mode of the
lognormal component, reflecting concern over the systemic risk in the financial markets.
However, there was no signal of serious deterioration of either firm’s financial stability even
during the most stressful market condition, reflecting two firms’ relative healthy condition
throughout the crisis period.
CDS bankruptcy probabilities for both firms exhibit similar trends, with low and less
volatile shape for pre- and post- financial crisis period, and sharp spike after the break out of
financial crisis in September 2008. The magnitude of bankruptcy risk is higher for Morgan
Stanley than for Goldman Sachs, especially during the crisis period, with the highest being
nearly 6% for Morgan and only 2% for Goldman.
Wells Fargo (WF)
Figure 2.12 shows that the bankruptcy probabilities for Wells Fargo are generally low
across the sample period. Wells Fargo was only slightly impacted by the Bear Stearns cri-
sis, with a bankruptcy risk of 0.88% on March 17 increased from 0.45% on March 3. It was
the only bank in the United States to be rated AAA by Standard & Poor’s in 2007 and became
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one of the big four banks of the United States, along with Bank of America, Citigroup, and J.P.
Morgan Chase, through acquisition of Wachovia.
Wells Fargo was less affected by the systemic credit risk after the collapse of Lehman
Brothers and sale of Merrill Lynch. The bankruptcy risk on September 15 was 1.86%. Despite
the low risk of bankruptcy, the RND warns a probable decrease in share price with higher
probability in the lower mode lognormal component.
On October 3, 2008, Wachovia agreed to be bought by Wells Fargo for about $14.8 billion
in an all-stock transaction. This news came four days after the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) made moves to have Citigroup buy Wachovia for $2.1 billion. Citigroup
protested Wachovia’s agreement to sell itself to Wells Fargo and threatened legal action over
the matter. However the deal with Wells Fargo overwhelmingly won shareholder approval
since it valued Wachovia at about 7 times what Citigroup offered. To further ensure share-
holders’ approval, Wachovia issued Wells Fargo with preferred stock holding 39.9% of the
voting power in the company. The bankruptcy risk for Wells Fargo on October 3 was 0.44%,
decreased from early September, reflecting shareholders optimism about the acquisition.
The shrinkage of the lower mode lognormal component suggests investors alleviated con-
cern over WF’s solvency stemming from the credit crunch.
October 14, the Treasury announced the CPP program and Wells Fargo signed on to par-
ticipate in the program and on October 28, Wells Fargo received $25 billion. The bankruptcy
risk increased to 1.19% and 1.21% respectively on the two dates, reflecting systemic credit
risk in the unstable financial system. The RND on October 14 shows concern about a small
chance of mild decrease in future share price.
CDS bankruptcy probabilities are generally low for Wells Fargo. Probabilities increased
slightly during the Bear Stearns crisis and the global financial crisis, with the highest being
less than 1%.
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2.5.1 Comparison of bankruptcy probabilities across firms
In this section, the sample is split into two groups for a comparison between estimated
bankruptcy probabilities. Using ex-post knowledge of the survivorship of each firm, firms are
grouped into relative healthy firms which survived the crisis – Bank of America, J.P. Morgan
Chase, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Wells Fargo, and distressed firms – Bear Stearns,
Lehman Brothers, Washington Mutual, Merrill Lynch, AIG, Wachovia, and Citigroup. The
identification for distress is based on the ex-post knowledge of a firm either went bankrupt
or acquired by other firms during the financial crisis, or the share price fell below $5 from a
previous high level and remained low for a long period of time.
Figures 2.13 shows option implied bankruptcy probabilities (including critical event days)
for both relatively healthy firms and distressed firms. Panel (b) shows estimated bankruptcy
probabilities for when data is available. After bankruptcy or acquisition the firm drops out
of the sample. As can be seen bankruptcy risks for both groups exhibit a consensus trend —
probabilities are low before March 2008 and after May 2009, and high during both the Bear
Stearns crisis and the global financial crisis, with the only difference in the magnitude, es-
pecially during the crisis period. The probabilities around Bear Stearns crisis are generally
smaller than the Lehman Brothers failure period starting September 2008.
Prior to Bear Stearns crisis in March 2008, the average probability was 0.20% and 0.31%
respectively across healthy firms and distressed firms. During the Bear Stearns crisis, healthy
firms were only slightly affected by the systemic risk while distressed firms started to reveal
problems. Bankruptcy risk for healthy firms were less than 4% whereas that for distressed
firms went above 5%, the highest being 20% for Bear Stearns just a couple of days before JPM
offered its first deal. The probabilities decreased for both groups after Bear Stearns crisis.
Starting September when Lehman Brothers collapsed until the first half of 2009, bankruptcy
probabilities increased significantly for both groups. Healthy firms’ bankruptcy probabilities
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scattered between 1% and 7%, with a few estimates above 8% to about 14%; bankruptcy
probabilities for distressed firms were dramatically higher which range from 4% to 50% on
certain event days. These estimates are consistent with the market perception that distressed
firms have higher chances of failure and are more fragile than healthy firms.
Figure 2.14 shows bankruptcy probabilities inferred from 1 year CDS spreads grouped
the same way into healthy firms and distressed firms. Panel (b) shows estimated bankruptcy
probabilities for when data is available. After bankruptcy or acquisition the firm drops out
of the sample. Daily CDS spreads provide daily estimates of bankruptcy probabilities, which
enable us to have a clearer view on how bankruptcy risks evolve on a daily basis. There is
clearly a consistent trend among the two groups across the sample period, complemented
with idiosyncratic variation with respect to individual firms. Bankruptcy chances increased
during Bear Stearns crisis and are much higher in September 2008. The probabilities were
less than 1% for healthy firms during Bear Stearns crisis, whereas probabilities for some dis-
tressed firms went over 2%.
In September, chances of bankruptcy jumped significantly for Washington Mutual and
AIG, showing a spike in Figure 2.14(b). It went as high as 22.61% and 13.16% respectively
on critical days. Washington Mutual filed for bankruptcy at the end of September and AIG
only survived upon receiving a series of government bailouts. Wachovia and Merrill Lynch
had a bankruptcy risk below 5% in September, reflecting the fact that both firms were able
to strike a deal with another party and eventually to be acquired. The chance of bankruptcy
for Lehman Brothers was only 2.24% on September 9, which was the last date data available.
The relative low bankruptcy probability just a few days prior to its collapse may suggest that
the market did not believe that Lehman would actually go bankrupt. On the other hand,
bankruptcy risk for healthy firms was generally below 2%, except for Morgan Stanley which
had a few probabilities between 2% and 6%.
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Figure 2.15 plots share prices of all sample from January 2007 to September 2010 for when
data is available. Observations disappear from the plots when firms went bankrupt or ac-
quired by other firms. It shows clearly that share prices for all surviving firms dropped sig-
nificantly since September 2008, and remained at a low level for several months before a slow
recovery. The plummet in share prices coincides with an increase in estimated bankruptcy
probability. The collective fall of share prices and increase of bankruptcy probabilities po-
tentially reflect a systemic risk factor influencing the market.
In the CDS model, 1 year CDS probabilities provide the expected chance of bankruptcy
in three months over a one year horizon while 5 year chances are over a 5 year horizon.
Figures 2.1 to 2.12 show that in most cases 5 year CDS bankruptcy probabilities are higher
than 1 year probabilities during calm periods whereas 1 year probabilities overtake 5 year
probabilities in critical market conditions. This is consistent with market expectations that
the 5 year CDS contract protects against longer horizon than the 1 year contract, in which
there is higher chance that bad things can happen, thus under normal market conditions 5
year CDS bankruptcy probabilities are higher than 1 year probabilities. However, when there
is systemic credit risk in the market and the financial system becomes unstable, the market
worries about sudden jump to default risk in the near future. The protection seller would
then increase CDS spreads, and thus render a heightened chance of bankruptcy embedded
in shorter horizon CDS contract. 1 year CDS contract provides a view about default risk over
a shorter horizon than does the 5 year contract, which is useful for analysts who want to
assess credit risk in the near future. But the 5 year CDS contract is the most liquid contract in
the market. It may contain more accurate pricing information than the 1 year CDS contract.
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2.5.2 Comparison between option implied bankruptcy probabilities and
CDS bankruptcy probabilities
Option implied bankruptcy probabilities are risk-neutral probabilities over the horizon
defined by the options’ time to maturity, in this case around 34 days. CDS bankruptcy prob-
abilities are also risk-neutral probabilities of default within three months over the life of the
CDS contract. CDS probabilities have been scaled to the same horizon as option implied
probabilities for better comparison. The scatter plots in Figures 2.1 to 2.12 panel (b) plot
option-implied probabilities agains the scaled 1 year CDS-implied probabilities for each
firm. The plots show that CDS-implied probabilities generally increase with option-implied
probabilities. Visual comparison through Figures 2.1 to 2.12 suggests that the two sources
agree about relative bankruptcy risk, but option prices give magnified estimates during crisis
periods than CDS estimates. Clearly the two markets provide complementary information
about default risk. The next logical question to ask is whether one market leads the other
in providing relevant information. I attempt to answer this question by examining Granger
Causality between the two sources.
Granger Causality test gives an idea of whether one time series is useful in forecasting the
other. Option implied bankruptcy probabilities are said to Granger Cause CDS bankruptcy
probabilities (O →C ) if CDS probabilities can be better predicted by histories of both option
implied probabilities and CDS probabilities, and vice versa (C →O). The null hypothesis is
that the coefficients of lagged option implied probabilities are zero, in other words, option
implied probabilities do not Granger Cause CDS probabilities, and vice versa. It is impor-
tant to note that the test depends crucially on the number of lagged terms introduced in the
model, which is usually chosen using an information criterion, such as the Akaike informa-
tion criterion or the Schwarz information criterion. However, since we have a relatively small
sample, it is very difficult to choose the optimal number of lags given the limited data history.
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I include 2 lags in the test as it is intuitive that the value at each period is mostly influenced
by its close previous values.
I perform a pairwise uni-direction Granger Causality test to see if information inferred
from both option prices and CDS spreads predicts better than information from only one
source. Tests are done between option implied bankruptcy probabilities and 1 year CDS
bankruptcy probabilities. Time series of bankruptcy probabilities are monthly from 2007 to
2010. The tests are done for firms which are relative healthy and survived the crisis. As sta-
tionary assumption is required to perform the test, we could reasonably assume that the time
series of probabilities are stationary as they keep at a low level when the market is peaceful,
went up during crisis period, and eventually come down at a low level if the firm survives
the crisis. I have done two sets of tests, one for the original time series that are at level, and
the other for time series of first difference which are more applicable if the data are non-
stationary.
Table 2.3 reports F statistics, p-values, and decisions for each uni-direction test. Results
are consistent between tests on levels and tests on first differences, except for Citigroup and
one direction for Wells Fargo. However, the causality conclusions are mixed. While results for
Bank of America and Wells Fargo indicate option implied probabilities Granger Cause CDS
probabilities for levels, those of Goldman Sachs indicate completely the opposite; results of
J.P. Morgan and Morgan Stanley do not show causality between the two measures and those
for Citigroup indicate both measures Granger Causes one another. Mixed conclusions can
be caused by a non-optimal number of lags used in the test and the small sample. Daily
time series of bankruptcy probabilities may provide better outcomes as daily measures may
contain richer information about dependence on previous values. I consider the evidence
about causal relations between the two series to be inconclusive.
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2.6 Conclusions
This study makes use of option prices and CDS spreads to infer corporate bankruptcy
probabilities during the 2008 global financial crisis, and makes comparisons of the informa-
tion conveyed in both markets. An option pricing framework is used where the risk-neutral
density is assumed to be a mixture of two lognormals augmented with a probability of de-
fault, to calibrate to the observed market option prices. The bankruptcy probability is thus
obtained through least square estimation. The CDS model assumes a constant conditional
default probability and equates the present value of expected premium payments with the
present value of expected payoffs to solve for default probability. All probabilities inferred
from option prices and CDS spreads are risk-neutral.
The sample includes 12 American firms in the financial industry. Risk-neutral densities
extracted from option prices and the evolution of estimated bankruptcy probabilities are
used to provide ex-ante information to assess the degree of financial distress for each firm.
The emergence of bimodality in the risk-neutral densities can be interpreted as investors’
divergent views on the future value of stock price, which reflects the market’s concern of po-
tential price crash. This information and estimated bankruptcy probabilities can help regu-
lators and market participants monitor whether a firm is probably secure or default risky.
To avoid ex-post knowledge of splitting firms into healthy or distressed groups, firms are
put on a continuum from September 4, 2007 and examined individually. The results show
that the bankruptcy probabilities are low during calm market conditions and are high during
crisis period. Firms are then grouped into distressed firms and relative healthy firms using
ex-post knowledge of their survivorship, to compare the magnitude of estimated bankruptcy
probabilities between groups. Results show that distressed firms have higher chances of
bankruptcy than firms which are relatively healthy. Probabilities inferred from option prices
and CDS spreads are then compared using Granger Causality tests. The conclusion is that
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both markets provide complementary information, but it does not show significant evidence
suggesting one predicts the other for the data examined. It is worth noting that Granger
Causality tests depend heavily on the properties of the time series under investigation. Daily
pairwise bankruptcy probabilities may provide more meaningful results on the causal rela-
tionship than monthly observations.
One oberservation from the analysis is that option-implied bankruptcy probabilities are
higher than CDS-implied probabilities, especially on event days, the magnitude is a few mul-
tiples higher than CDS-implied probabilities. One possible explanation for the discrepancy
could be that the assumptions of p in the two pricing models are not defined for exactly the
same underlying. Option-implied p measures the probability of the stock price reaches zero,
whereas CDS-implied p measures the probability that a well-defined credit event is trig-
gered. Another explanation could come from the quoting of CDS spreads. The CDS spread
quoted by one particular counterparty on one reference entity reflects the joint default risk
for both firms. The spread cruicially depends on how much of this claim the buyer can ex-
pect to recover from the counterparty in case of a credit event. The quoting firm is likely to
lower the charge for credit proctetion if its own credit risk increases. Arora et al. (2012) finds
that counterparty risk is significantly priced in the CDS markets. This is particularly rele-
vant in the crisis setting when market participants in the financial sector are all affected by
the systemic risk. A lower price quoted by an counterparty with increased credit risk could
result in a downward bias in esitmated default probabilities. Giglio (2011) has shown that
ignoring counterparty risk biases the estimates of default probability extracted from CDS
spreads downwards.
Another observation is that the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers triggered a domino ef-
fect in the banking system that the share price of firms in the sample plummeted and default
risk increased. The systemic risk that may trigger the failure of the full banking system has
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attracted full attention from the government and banking regulators. This study investigates
banks individually one at a time, and the probability of multiple defaults is not explicitly
modelled. A probability model that captures systemic default risk will provide a meaning
tool for market regulators. CDS price contains pairwise joint default risk for the reference
entity and the quoting counterparty, but it is not possible to distinguish between the risk
that comes from the reference entity and from the counterparty. However, bond prices is
not affected by counterparty risk and reflects only individual default probabilities. Utilis-
ing combined information in CDS spreads and bond prices could be potentially useful in
exploiting joint default probability for both firms, and ultimately joint default probabilities
for several firms. However, this may pose a challenge to data availability as it would require
counterparty-specific CDS quotes rather than the average of all dealers. Giglio (2011) at-
tempts to establish such a model and constructs bounds to characterise multiple default
risk for banks which captures the notion of systemic risk. Giglio (2011)’s results are derived
from several modelling assumptions and affected by limitations in the data, nevertheless, it






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Model Free Expectation of Implied
Volatility and International Spillovers
3.1 Introduction
Over the past fifty years, financial markets throughout the world have become more open
to foreign investors, and national markets have become more closely connected. Academic
research on international market integration has come full circle. Early papers focus on port-
folio diversification where investors can benefit from less-than-perfect correlations among
returns on international investments. The surge in international portfolio investment activi-
ties spawned increasing linkages between national markets and intensified interdependency
between countries with more trades and investments. A potential by-product of this rapid
growth in capital flows is whether it has changed how global asset returns move together.
A series of studies started to investigate lead-lag relationships between international stock
markets. While some find strong contemporaneous relationships, others conclude no sig-
nificant interrelationship.
Research and public interest on this pursuit were heightened during stressful market
events, such as the International Crash of October 1987, the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and
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more recently the 2008 Global financial crisis. Stock markets around the world fell uniformly.
These events cast doubts on the very benefit of of international diversification as how could
world markets fall simultaneously when the underlying economies are fundamentally differ-
ent? This question has engendered an immense literature researching return and volatility
spillovers across markets. Some studies focus on measures of return and volatility spillover,
others try to link these spillovers to economic fundamentals, or theorize that they come from
market contagion. However, none of these efforts provided a definitive answer to the ques-
tions raised by the Crash of October 1987. One general conclusion from these papers is that
the capital flows that sought to exploit international diversification benefit have intensified
linkages across markets. These linkages in turn engender a systemic vulnerability to liquidity
gaps and market shocks whose impact was once contained within national boundaries.
Later in the early 2000s, researchers sought to revisit this topic by investigating spillovers
in terms of implied volatility. Implied volatility is directly extracted from an option price, and
is considered a forward looking measure as it reflects market expectation of future volatility
over the remaining life of an option. Empirical studies have documented its information
superiority over historical measures of volatility. It thus serves as a natural alternative to
further investigate this topic.
The development of volatility indices around the world paved the way for studies on im-
plied volatility spillover. A volatility index provides a consensus market measure of risk of
the underlying asset over a fixed period. The Chicago Board Option Exchange (CBOE) be-
came the first to introduce the volatility index VIX (now VXO), and many of the world’s other
exchanges have followed so. The methodologies in constructing volatility indices around
the world are in general a replication of that for the new VIX developed by the CBOE. How-
ever, as pointed out in Jiang and Tian (2007), the calculated volatility index using the CBOE
methodology contains substantial errors, and these errors translate to significant economic
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consequence if not accounted for.
This study first addresses the issues with the CBOE methodology, and provides an alter-
native in constructing a volatility index. I calculate volatility indices for 15 markets around
the world, and study implied volatility spillover between these markets. I employ vector
autoregressive analysis, impulse response functions and forecast error variance decompo-
sition to study the dynamic interdependence between these markets. The general conclu-
sion is consistent with those in ex-post measurement studies. I find that the U.S. market
is unambiguously the dominant source of uncertainty in the world. Correlation between
markets largely depends on geographical proximity. Developed markets have bigger impact
on developing markets. The findings support the notion of informationally efficient inter-
national stock markets, in that information transmitted from one market to another is pro-
cessed within a maximum of two days.
This study is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a comprehensive review on spillover
studies distinguishing between historical measure and the risk-neutral forward looking mea-
sure. Section 3.3 provides an overview of the CBOE methodology in constructing the new
VIX, and its associated issues. I then provide an alternative measure in constructing volatil-
ity index. Data is described in this section and an empirical analysis of calculated volatility
indices is given. Section 3.4 details empirical analysis of spillover effects and section 3.5 con-
cludes. A list of Figures and Tables are in Appendix in section 3.6.
3.2 Literature review
The studies of international market linkages took off from early papers documenting the
benefits of international portfolio diversification. Works of Grubel (1968), Levy and Sarnat
(1970), and Solnik (1974) contributed to the mean-variance portfolio investment strategy
by showing that further diversification benefits could be achieved by expanding a national
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portfolio to include stocks from other countries. The key insight delivered by these papers is
a shift in investment policy to countries with the lowest possible correlation with the home
country from countries with stronger economic ties with the home country.
The implications of international asset allocation strategy engendered a surge in inter-
national portfolio investments. As capital flows became freer across borders, the linkages
between markets grew stronger. Seemingly unrelated economies have grown increasingly
interdependent through foreign investments. Since Grubel’s work (1968), a series of stud-
ies analysed the lead-lag relationship between international stock markets. Examples are
Granger and Morgenstern (1970), Agmon (1972), and Hiliard (1979). These early empirical
results are mixed. While Agmon (1972) finds strong contemporaneous relationship between
the U.S. market and others, Granger and Morgenstern (1970) conclude that there is little
or no interrelationship between different stock markets. Hiliard (1979) uses daily data and
revealed close relationship among countries that are not apparent in Granger and Morgen-
stern (1970) who use weekly data, but finds that inter continental prices are unrelated. The
main concern of these studies on early data from the 1960s to early 1970s is to show that the
interdependency among markets is less pronounced across countries than within a country,
but little is revealed about the structure of interdependency between markets.
Eun and Shim (1989) rose to this occasion and hence initiated studies of international
equity market spillover. Early studies of stock market spillover literature employs regression
analysis to study return or price spillover effects. With the development of GARCH models
which intend to capture time varying volatilities, researchers started to investigate volatil-
ity spillovers across the world using a variety of GARCH specifications. These studies which
employ historical measures prevail for two decades since the 1990s. It was not until early in
the twenty first century that a forward looking measure emerged in the literature in studying
international spillover effects. Implied volatility, with widely documented superiority of in-
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formation content over ex-post measures of volatilities (see e.g. Blair et al. (2001)), became
a tool in providing new evidence on international market integration. The remainder of this
section first summarises related literature using ex-post measures, including return spillover
and volatility spillover, followed by a group of growing literature focused on forward looking
measure in studying international stock market linkages.
3.2.1 International stock market spillovers under the historical measure
3.2.1.1 Return spillover – regression framework
The findings in the studies of Grubel (1968), Granger and Morgenstern (1970), Agmon
(1972), and Hiliard (1979) etc. in the 1970s reveal evidence of comparable interdependence
of share price movements across and within countries. Eun and Shim (1989) then investi-
gated, upon the established evidence, the interdependence structure of international stock
markets. They employed a vector autoregressive (VAR) model on nine markets (including
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, Switzerland, the United Kingdom,
and the United States) using daily returns of stock market indices from 1980 to 1985. Their
focus was on addressing issues (1) how much movements in one stock market could be ex-
plained by innovations in other markets; (2) how influential is the U.S. market on other mar-
kets; and (3) how rapidly price movements in one market transmitted to other markets. They
employ VAR system and its structural analysis – impulse response functions and forecast
error variance decomposition – to answer these questions. The findings are that the U.S.
market is by far the most influential market in the world; no single market’s innovations can
explain its own variance; impulse responses results indicate that all markets respond to U.S.
shocks, mostly strongly with a one-day lag, and tapers off thereafter. Eun and Shim (1989)
concluded that the evidence supports the notion of informationally efficient markets.
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Von Furstenberg and Jeon (1989) conducted a principal component analysis on the world’s
four largest equity markets – U.S., Germany, Great Britain, and Japan during 1986-1988, fo-
cusing particularly on the correlation of price movements of 1987 post-crash periods using
daily stock returns. They employ a VAR model and impulse response analysis and forecast
error variance decomposition to study the leadership of news transmission between these
markets. The ordering of the variables respects the time zone of each market. They also
advance each market to allow for a chance to appear at the top of the ordering. Impulse
response analysis revealed an increased but not sustained influence of Japan on other mar-
kets. It also revealed that innovations of the British market had a longer-lasting effect on
other markets after crash than before, but possibly due to the expansion of the London Mar-
ket during the year preceding the crash. The authors also attempted to link the increased
post-crash price co-movements to economic fundamentals, but the evidence is rather weak.
Koch and Koch (1991) model daily returns for an extended sample which includes eight
countries for the years 1972, 1980, and 1987. Their sample includes Japan, Australia, Hong
Kong, Singapore, Switzerland, West Germany, United Kingdom, and United States. They em-
ploy a block-recursive simultaneous equations model to study the contemporaneous and
lead-lag relationships between these markets. Their results conclude in general that in-
ternational markets have grown more interdependent, and the high degree of market effi-
ciency is revealed by rapid adjustment to news – most adjustments are completed within
24 hours. The results further show that the interdependence between markets is largely ob-
served within time-zone region where trading hours overlap. Japan has grown to have more
impact on other markets over time whereas U.S. market’s influence has waned and starts to
respond to other markets.
Malliaris and Urrutia (1992) investigated causal relationships between six equity market
indices by means of Granger Causality. Sample includes New York S&P 500, Tokyo Nikkei,
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London FT-30, Hong Kong Hang Seng, Singapore Straits Times, and Australia all Ordinaries.
Data was divided into before, during, and after the crash of October 1987, which starts May
1987 and ends March 1988. The empirical results show that practically no lead-lag relation-
ships were detected for before and after crash period, however, bidirectional and unidirec-
tional causality was observed during the month of the crash. The causal results indicate that
Tokyo played a passive role during the crash, whereas New York failed to confirm its alleged
leading role. Contemporaneous causality was also examined by including current values in
the right hand side of Granger Causality equations. Little contemporaneous causality was
observed for pre-crash period, but an increased causality was detected during and after the
month of the crash.
Studies of international stock market linkages have found conflicting evidence. Arshana-
palli and Doukas (1993) address methodological problems associated with the VAR model
that might explain the difference. Empirical studies in the 1980s have shown non-stationary
evidence of national stock indices. To make time series stationary, the common practice is to
take the first difference. The authors argue that taking first difference may filter out potential
important information about long-run trends among non-stationary stock indices. They use
theory of cointegration and error correction analysis to test linkages between Japan, France,
Germany, the U.K., and the U.S. for the period between 1980 and 1990. Their results re-
port strong linkages of France, Germany and U.K. with the U.S. for post-crash period, but
the same cannot be found for the pre-crash period. They also find no evidence of linkages
between Japan and the U.S., and the Japanese stock market is not related to the European
markets, which suggests that the Japanese market is not fully integrated with the world’s
other major stock markets.
Copeland and Copeland (1998) studied the lead-lag structure of daily returns of 29 coun-
tries in three regions (Americas, Europe, and Pacific) by industry groups between 1992 and
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1997. They conduct pairwise OLS regression with a null assumption that the U.S. as the
largest market in the world is the lead economy for most industries. The regressions are
done for regional, country, and industry groups. They found strong contemporaneous re-
lationships among regional markets operating at the same time. Americas lead Europe and
Pacific by one day and no significant lags beyond one day, suggesting that information ad-
justments are processed within one day. They also developed a simple trading strategy to
test whether economic gain is exploitable from statistically significant lead and lags, how-
ever, the results are at best attainable by trading houses but not by individuals.
Becker et al. (1990) examine intraday data of the S&P 500 index and the Nikkei 225 in-
dex between 1985 and 1988 to study the synchronization of price movements between the
world’s largest stock markets. The use of open-to-close, close-to-open returns marked a sig-
nificant departure from earlier studies that relied on close-to-close returns. They found high
correlation between the open to close returns of U.S. stocks in the previous trading day and
the Japanese market performance in the current period. The U.S. market explains about 7%-
25% of variation in the Japanese market open-to-close returns, and 11%-18% variation in
Japan’s overnight returns. In contrast, Japan has a small impact, about 1% on the U.S. market
performance. High correlation between markets’ open-to-close returns violates an efficient
market hypothesis. Simulated trading strategies were successful in predicting up and down
movements in Japan, but profits from these strategies were eliminated immediately when
transaction costs and taxes in Japan were taken into account.
3.2.1.2 Return and Volatility spillover – GARCH framework
The crash of October 1987 was a uniform fall of national stock markets around the world,
despite the differences in economic fundamentals, market structure, liquidity, etc. A Large
number of commentaries and reports generated by this event have not answered the ques-
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tion why markets fall in such uniformity. With the development of advanced computa-
tional technology, researchers explore more methodologically rigorous approaches to un-
cover both return and volatility spillover across national markets in an attempt to address
partly the unanswered question.
Hamao et al. (1991) was one of the first studies to employ a GARCH-in-mean framework
to study the transmission mechanism in conditional first and second moments. Their sam-
ple include index returns of FTSE 100, S&P 500, and Nikkei 225 during the period of 1985 to
1988. They separate open-to-close return and close-to-open return to isolate the spillover
effect. First, they study the spillover effect of open-to-close return for a given market. They
estimate a GARCH(1,1)-M model for all markets and take the squared residual of the condi-
tional mean equation, as volatility surprise, from the most recently open foreign market, and
append it to the conditional variance equation of the domestic market. In parallel, they also
estimate another model appending volatility surprise of both foreign markets to the domes-
tic market to examine separate volatility effects from both foreign markets. The models are
estimated for the full sample and pre-crash period from the start to September 30, 1987. The
results show statistically significant positive foreign volatility surprise for all three markets
for the full sample estimation, but significant volatility spillover for pre-crash period is only
found from U.S. to Japan. The inclusion of a second foreign volatility surprise does not seem
to diminish the effect of the first foreign market. The authors conclude that Japan is most
sensitive to volatility spillover effects from foreign markets, while U.S. and U.K. are moder-
ately, if at all, sensitive. The spillover asymmetry across national stock markets coincide with
evidence documented in Eun and Shim (1989) discussed earlier.
Hamao et al. (1991) also consider spillover effects in the conditional mean by includ-
ing the open-to-close return of the most recent traded foreign market, and preserving the
volatility surprise in the conditional variance equation. The models are estimated for the
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full sample, and pre-crash sample. Same asymmetry effect is observed for mean spillover,
while significant spillover effects are observed from U.S. to Japan, U.K. to U.S., none is ob-
served from Japan to U.K.. They also estimate a noon-to-close return model for the U.S.
market to explain the observed largest significant spillover effect from U.S. to U.K., possibly
due to one-hour overlapping of trading between the two markets. The effect is eliminated
in the conditional mean once overlapping is accounted for, but volatility spillover effects in
conditional variance are still manifest.
Theodossiou and Lee (1993) provide additional insight on international stock market in-
terdependency by extending the study of Hamao et al. (1991) in a number of ways. They
use weekly data, rather than intra-day data, and expand the sample to include Canada and
Germany for an extended period from 1980 to 1991. Unlike Hamao et al. (1991) estimat-
ing GARCH-M for each market separately, Theodossiou and Lee (1993) estimate the model
in a multivariate framework under the assumption of constant conditional correlation over
time. The results for mean spillover show statistically significant effects from U.S. to U.K.,
Canada, and Germany. Geographic proximity accounts for bigger impact of U.S. past return
on Canada than that of Germany and U.K.. Interestingly Japan has a negative spillover effect
on Germany. To the extent the significant spillover effects violate efficient market hypothe-
sis, effectively forecasting stock market returns cannot be achieved as the explanatory power
of the model is as low as 5%. The results for conditional variance equation show that past
values of conditional variance are highly significant for all markets, indicating volatility per-
sistence. Own-volatility spillover is found for U.S., Germany, and Japan, but not for Canada
and U.K., suggesting that the conditional volatility is imported from abroad for these two
markets. Significant cross-volatility spillover effects are found from the U.S. to all four mar-
kets, from Germany to Japan, and from U.K. to Canada. This is consistent with findings in
Eun and Shim (1989) that the U.S. is unambiguously the leading source of uncertainty.
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Bae and Karolyi (1994) assert that the true magnitude and persistence of spillover effects
across national markets can be significantly understated if the return and volatility generat-
ing processes are mis-specified. Specifically, the leverage effect which distinguishes asym-
metric effect of past bad news and good news plays an important role in capturing the true
dynamics of return and volatility. Bae and Karolyi (1994) extend the GARCH framework to
allow for asymmetric effect of negative and positive foreign market return shocks for volatil-
ity. They focus on the joint dynamics of open-to-close and close-to-open returns for S&P
500 and Nikkei 225 between 1988 and 1992. The authors use a two-stage estimation to study
the volatility spillover for a basic GARCH model, and two asymmetric GARCH specification –
GJR-GARCH developed by Glosten et al. (1993) and partially non-parametric GARCH (PNP-
GARCH) model introduced by Engle and Ng (1993). Their evidence shows that the asymmet-
ric parameter is statistically significant and its appearance strengthens volatility spillover
effect from one market to the other. In general bad news from both domestic and foreign
markets have a much larger effect on the subsequent return volatility than good news.
Koutmos and Booth (1995) further extend research of asymmetric effects on interna-
tional stock market linkages by employing a multivariate EGARCH model developed by Nel-
son (1991). Using open-to-close returns, they study the price and volatility transmission
mechanism between New York, London, and Tokyo from 1986 to 1993. Results show signifi-
cant return spillover from New York to Tokyo and from Tokyo to London and New York, but
not from London to New York, which is possibly due to the high correlation that is accounted
for by the 2 hour overlapping effect between London and New York. Volatility spillovers are
more extensive and reciprocal. They found significant volatility spillover from New York to
Tokyo and London, from London to New York and Tokyo, and from Tokyo to London and
New York. Consistent with evidence in Bae and Karolyi (1994), volatility transmission mech-
anism is asymmetric; in all instances adverse news have a far greater impact on the next mar-
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ket session than good news. Koutmos (1996) also employs the same multivariate EGARCH
framework to study the linkages between four major European markets – Germany, France,
U.K. and Italy. Similar evidence of multi-directional spillover effects are found in both re-
turn and volatility, as well as asymmetric effects. The author concludes that the European
markets are integrated in a sense that they respond to both domestic and foreign news.
While most studies focus on markets across the globe with no or few overlapping trading
hours, some studies look directly at markets with synchronous trading. Susmel and Engle
(1994) employ a univariate GARCH model with asymmetry feature to study news transmis-
sion between London and New York, two markets having 2 hour simultaneous trading. They
use high frequency hourly data so that they can examine return and volatility spillover at
specific hourly periods as well as the behaviour at the open of the New York market. Data
is from January 1987 to February 1989. The findings are as follows, (1) there is no return
spillover between the two markets in non-overlapping periods, with only two exceptions. (2)
There is no strong evidence of volatility spillover. The most significant volatility spillover oc-
curs at New York opening time, and lasts for only one to two hours. (3) The inclusion of the
crash period October 1987 does not seem to alter spillover effects between markets.
Karolyi (1995) uses a bivariate GARCH model and a VAR model to examine the short-run
dynamics of return and volatility between the U.S. and Canadian stock markets. These two
markets have perfect synchronous trading hours, which circumvents the problem of disen-
tangling the confounding effects of non-synchronous trading hours. Combining simulated
impulse response analysis of both models, the results show that return spillovers are sensi-
tive to the dynamics of conditional volatility. He found diminishing effect of return spillover
from U.S. to Canada in the latter part of 1980s. He also found that S&P 500 returns have a
larger impact on non-inter-listed TSE 30 stock returns than inter-listed returns, suggesting
that investment barriers might be an important factor to consider in studying international
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stock markets co-movement.
Early studies typically focused on the volatility spillovers among developed markets. The
interest in studying international stock markets linkages has gradually and naturally ex-
tended to regional and emerging markets as they become more important. To the degree
of integration of these markets with developed markets, implications can be drawn on port-
folio selection and asset allocation for investors. To name a few, studies examine linkages
between developed markets and Asian markets include Ng (2000), Worthington and Higgs
(2004), Chancharoenchai and Dibooglu (2006), Chuang et al. (2007), Beirne et al. (2010),
Wang and Wang (2010), Kang and Yoon (2011), and Li and Giles (2015). Bellotti and Willams
(2005) investigate volatility transmission between emerging markets, between Asia and Latin
America. Majdoub and Mansour (2014) study volatility spillover between the U.S. and five
Islamic equity markets. Other studies which focus on emerging European markets include
Tse et al. (2003) on the U.S. and Poland, Li and Majerowska (2008) on Poland and Hungary,
and Booth et al. (1997) on Scandinavian markets.
It is observed with regularity that stock markets behaviour displays notable similarities
during crisis periods, financial markets volatilities increase sharply and spill over across mar-
kets, despite that the underlying economies are fundamentally different. What are the de-
terminants of return and volatility spillover, or is spillover simply driven by irrational panics?
While this strand of literature is largely preoccupied with the measurement of international
spillovers, the next wave of studies seek to establish factors that drive spillovers.
One strand of literature attempts to link return and volatility spillover to fundamental
economic factors, such as interest rate, exchange rate, inflation etc. Macroeconomic news
was also addressed on the impact of covariance dynamics between markets. This linkage is
generally established by an equilibrium model of returns. The main conclusion from this
strand of literature drawn is that macroeconomic announcements do not seem to affect co-
106
movements between stock markets in a meaningful way, and that economic variables ex-
plain only a small fraction of international market comovements.
The other strand of literature explores the idea of market contagion. Contagion, as de-
fined by Claessens et al. (2001), is the spread of market disturbances (mostly on the down-
side) from one market to the other, a process observed through comovements in exchange
rates, stock prices, sovereign spreads and capital flows. The source of contagion could come
from real and financial linkages between markets, as well as from pure irrational responses,
such as herd behaviour and loss of confidence etc. Gagnon and Karolyi (2006) provide an
excellent review on market contagion literature and spillover studies linked to economic
fundamentals. A detailed description of these papers are beyond the scope of this study,
therefore I will limit the quantity of references to the above mentioned.
3.2.2 International stock market spillovers under the forward looking mea-
sure
Early studies of international stock market integration have shown that stock markets
are highly integrated in terms of realised returns and realised variance. Relatively little is
documented in the literature about the notion of implied volatility spillover. The price of
an option contains information about the market’s consensus expectation of expected risk-
neutral volatility of the underlying asset over the life of the option. The superiority of the
information content of forward looking implied volatility over ex-post measures of volatility
has been widely documented (Fleming et al. (1995), Blair et al. (2001), etc.). Since volatility
plays a key role in derivative pricing and portfolio management, how markets are linked
with one another in terms of expectation of future volatility opens up an important area for
investigation.
The seminal work of Whaley (1993) formally established the field of constructing a volatil-
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ity index from a basket of option prices. Chicago Board Option Exchange (CBOE), became
the first exchange to introduce the volatility index VIX (now the VXO) in 1993, which quickly
became the benchmark risk measure of the U.S. equity market. Following the example of
CBOE, other exchanges in the world in succession developed their respective volatility in-
dices. The Deutsche Börse introduced VDAX in 1994, and French Marché des Options Né-
gociables de Paris (MONEP) introduce two volatility indices VX1 and VX6 in 1997. CBOE
revamped the VXO and launched the new VIX using a model free approach in 2003. NYSE
Euronext published VFTSE for FTSE 100 in 2008. Many more volatility indices were pub-
lished and further revised subsequently for the more developed markets. Siriopoulos and
Fassas (2009) provides an extensive review on the world volatility indices both publicly avail-
able and proposed by academic researchers.
Motivated by traditional stock market studies of integration, and the availability of newly
developed volatility indices, researchers shifted their attentions to the examination using
forward looking measure. Since the literature is relatively small, the references listed here-
after are in chronological order.
Gemmill and Kamiyama (2000) was one of the first papers that formally studies inter-
national implied volatility spillover. They calculate implied volatility index for Nikkei 225,
S&P 500, and FTSE 100 index options from 1985 to 1995. A correlation analysis show that
Nikkei implied volatility is less well-correlated with other markets, and Granger Causality
test further shows that Nikkei implied volatility does not influence any other markets, but
itself is influenced by the U.S.. The authors conclude that the results are generally consistent
with those found using ex-post measure literature – both show significant spillovers emanat-
ing predominantly from the U.S.. The paper also investigates spillovers in terms of implied
skewness, however they found no clear evidence of skewness spillover across markets, but
there is weak evidence of long-term U.S. impact on U.K. skewness.
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Aboura (2003) examines daily observations of volatility index of the CAC40, DAX30, and
S&P 100 from 1994 to 1999, namely the French VX1, German VDAX, and the VXO. They em-
ploy VAR framework and its structural analysis, i.e. impulse response function analysis,
forecast variance error decomposition, and Granger Causality tests to test implied volatil-
ity transmission. They found that the U.S. is clearly the most influential market as it explains
about 9% and 10% error variance of the French and German market, while the latter two can
only explain 1% of that of the U.S. market. French VX1 and German VDAX responds strongly
to the shock in the U.S. within the first two days and dies down thereafter.
Skiadopoulos (2004) constructed a volatility index GVIX of the Greek market using FTSE/ASE-
20 index options and futures, and studied the contemporaneous spillover effects with the
U.S. market volatility index VXO and VXN (volatility index on NASDAQ). Their data include
554 observations from October 10, 2000 to December 31, 2002. By examining the proper-
ties of GVIX and its relationship with the underlying stock market, the author found that the
stock market has predictive power of future movements of GVIX while the reverse is not true.
They performed unidirectional regressions to test for implied volatility spillovers from the
U.S. market to the emerging market. They found contemporaneous spillovers from the U.S.
market, but no lead-lag effect.
Wagner and Szimayer (2004) reason that since implied volatility as a risk measure not
only reflects ex-ante risk expectations but also has an immediate impact on traded option
prices, shocks in implied volatility are crucial in understanding the risk. They model shocks
as jumps in implied volatility, and proposed a mean reverting model that allows for Poisson
jumps in implied volatility to estimate jump risk and spillover jump events. They investigate
the dynamic behaviour of daily implied volatility of the U.S. and Germany as measured by
VIX and VDAX from the period 1992 to 2002. They find significant positive jumps occurring
for both markets, and the magnitude of jumps in VDAX is twice as big as those in VIX. Fur-
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thermore, they find most of these jumps are caused by country-specific events rather than by
global events. Only 4 spillover shocks are detected during the 11 years of the sample period.
Nikkinen and Sahlström (2004) analysed the implied volatility index of the U.S., U.K.,
Germany and Finland from 1996 to 2000. They use VAR analysis and Granger Causality test
to investigate transmission of uncertainty. They chose generalised impulse developed by
Pesaran and Shin (1998) in the impulse response analysis, as generalised impulse do not de-
pend on the ordering of the variables. The results show that the U.S. is the leading source of
uncertainty as changes in uncertainty in the U.S. market are transmitted to the other mar-
kets. Impulse responses suggest that U.S. leads other markets by one day and shocks orig-
inated in other markets are absorbed within one day. In the European market, Germany
appears to be the leading source of uncertainty, and the Finnish market, as a representative
of smaller markets, appears to be less integrated.
In a similar context, Nikkinen et al. (2006) study linkages of market expectation of future
volatilities derived from currency options. Their data include daily implied volatilities on
three major European currencies – GBP, EUR, and CHF, quoted against USD. The sample
period used is from January 2001 to September 2003. Vector autoregressive modelling is
applied to ascertain the causal dynamics between currency volatilities. The results show that
the market expectation of future exchange rate volatilities are highly linked among major
European currencies. In particular, the Euro appears to be the dominant currency as its
implied volatility has a major impact on other currency volatilities, and not vice versa.
Äijö (2008) extends the studies of stock market integration by looking at the term struc-
ture linkages of implied volatilities. Previous studies have found that term structure of im-
plied volatility provides useful information about expectation of future volatility over differ-
ent horizons. This study adds to the literature by investigating the term structure linkages of
three European markets volatility indices – VDAX, VSMI, and VSTOXX. The underlying stock
110
indices are Germany Dax, Swiss SMI, and European blue chip Dow Jones EuroStoxx50. The
author employs vector autoregressive analysis and its structural analysis. Consistent with
findings in previous studies, the author finds that the implied volatility term structures are
highly correlated with each other in the European market. The term structure of each index
varies a lot over time, and VDAX seems to show a leading role in the European market.
The literature has shown, though limited in volume, that the vector autoregressive analy-
sis and its structural analysis is the widely adopted methodology in studying implied volatil-
ity spillover effects. More papers follow the same framework but using extended samples are
Badshah (2009) and Siriopoulos and Fassas (2009). By the same spirit, as in ex-post mea-
sure spillover studies, there are papers look into the linkages of implied volatility between
developed markets and emerging market (see Narwal et al. (2012)) for India and developed
countries. The general findings of this body of research is that world stock markets are highly
correlated with each other, with the correlation heightened with geometric proximity. The
developed markets seem to have larger impact on smaller markets, and U.S. appears to be
the dominant source of uncertainty.
3.3 Construction of model free implied volatility indices
In 1993, the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) introduced a stock market volatil-
ity index called the VIX (now VXO), also known as the "investor fear gauge". It was designed
to measure the market’s expectation of 30-day volatility and quickly became the benchmark
risk measure of the U.S. equity market. The original VIX was constructed based on the Black-
Scholes-Merton option pricing model (BSM hereafter) and is calculated using at-the-money
options on the S&P 100 index. Ten years later in 2003, the CBOE made several significant
changes to the original VIX and introduced a revamped VIX. The new VIX is based on the
S&P 500 index, which was a timely switch as the S&P 500 has becoming more important as
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the tracking index for the U.S. equity market. The construction of the new VIX no longer de-
pends on any pricing model, instead, it is based on the concept of fair value of future variance
developed by Demeterfi et al. (1999) and is calculated directly from market observables. The
new VIX is model free and reflects market expectation of volatility over the next 30 calendar
days.
The new VIX has become a core instrument for risk management since its transforma-
tion. It underlies a number of volatility derivatives such as VIX futures, options, and variance
swaps which followed its introduction. The market for volatility derivatives has since been
growing rapidly. Many exchanges across the world started to develop their own respective
volatility index following the steps of the CBOE. Early attempts similar to the construction
of the the old VIX are VDAX, and VX1 and VX6 calculated respectively by the Deutsche Börse
and the MONEP (Marché des Options Négociables de Paris). The method uses at-the-money
options and is model dependent. These volatility indices have then later been redesigned
following the update of the new VIX.
Up to date, the volatility indices for AEX and CAC40 are calculated and disseminated by
Euronext1. FTSE Group calculates and manages volatility indices for FTSE 100 and FTSE
MIB. Eurex, also created a family of volatility indices: VDAX-NEW2, VSMI, and VSTOXX3.
NIKKEI Inc. introduced its volatility index for NIKKEI 225 index in November 2010 and has
retroactively calculated the index on the end-of-day basis to June 1989. The Korea Exchange
has developed a volatility index that suits the Korean market situation and published it in
April 2009. Volatility index for Hang Seng equity index was launched by Hang Seng Indexes
Company Limited in February 2011 and backdated to January 2001. In 2002, the Montréal
Exchange introduced the Implied Volatility index (MVX) based on the old VIX methodology,
1Table 3.6 lists each volatility index with its respective underlying equity index and index constituents.
2The original VDAX is still calculated and disseminated. The discussion of volatility index on DAX through-
out this study refers to the new VDAX with Bloomberg ticker V1X.
3VSTOXX is the volatility index on DJ EURO STOXX 50, which consists of 50 largest sector leaders based on
market capitalization in the Eurozone.
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and only eight years later in October 2010 did they revise the method to reflect the con-
struction of the new VIX. The history of the new volatility index VIXC for the Canadian stock
market started in October 2010 and the original MVX stopped calculation and dissemination
thereafter4.
While the construction of the new VIX is more appealing than its predecessor, there are
flaws in the associated formula, as claimed by Jiang and Tian (2007). In their paper, they
demonstrate that the CBOE procedure in constructing implied volatility leads to biases in
the calculated values because the formula is not a perfect representation of the theoretical
fair value of future variance, which in turn results in approximation errors. Any bias against
the true model free implied volatility will render significant economical consequences. Since
the VIX methodology prevails across the world’s markets in creating volatility indices, it is
important to re-evaluate the method and address the problems accordingly.
In the next section I first give a detailed description of the CBOE methodology in con-
structing the new VIX and its associated problems pointed out by Jiang and Tian (2007).
I then provide a solution, proposed by Jiang and Tian (2007), with modification to fix the
problem. Section 3.3.4 describes data used in this study and is followed by some empirical
comparison with the CBOE procedure presented in section 3.3.5.
3.3.1 CBOE procedure for constructing VIX
Before I come to the description of VIX construction, the theoretical underpinning of the
new VIX within the broader context of model free implied volatility (MFIV) should be appre-
ciated. Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) have laid the pioneer foundation for subsequent
research on extracting risk-neutral densities and model free variance from option prices.
The concept of model free implied variance, which rose from the development of variance
4Volatility indices calculated and disseminated by organised exchanges or relevant parties revealed here may
not be exhaustive. The coverage is limited to the interest of data available.
113
swaps, appeared in as early as Neuberger (1994), which is further developed by Demeterfi
et al. (1999), Britten-Jones and Neuberger (2000), Bakshi et al. (2003), and Jiang and Tian
(2005). Specifically, the new VIX is based on the concept of fair value of future variance de-
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where C (K ,T ) and P (K ,T ) are European call and put prices with strike price K and maturity
T , r is the risk-free rate, S0 is the current asset price, and S∗ is the reference asset price that
is close to the at-the-money forward price which often marks the boundary between liquid
and illiquid options. The future evolution of the underlying asset is assumed to follow a
diffusive process – this means no jumps are allowed. Assume the stock pays no dividends.
Special case when S∗ equals futures price F , S∗ = F = S0er T , the first term in equation (3.1)
is eliminated.
As explained in "The CBOE volatility index – VIX (2009)", the generalised formula used in
















where T is time to expiration (in years), F is forward index level, and r is risk-free rate. K0 is
the first strike below the forward index level F . Ki is the i th out-of-the-money option; a call if
Ki >K0 and a put if Ki <K0; both call and put if Ki =K0. Q(Ki ) is the midpoint of the bid-ask





4Ki for the highest strike is simply the difference between the highest strike and the next
lower strike, and likewise for the lowest strike price, it is the difference between the lowest
strike and the next higher strike.
For each contract month, the forward level F is determined by identifying the strike price
at which the absolute difference between the call and put quotes are the smallest, and the
forward level is then implied by put-call parity
F = Str i ke Pr i ce+er T (C all pr i ce−Put Pr i ce)
Then K0 is identified as the first strike price immediately below F . Options with non-zero bid
quotes are selected in the order of strike price starting at K0. Out-of-the-money options are
selected by choosing call options with strike price greater than K0 and put options with strike
price smaller than K0. After encountering two consecutive strike prices with zero bid, the
selection process ends and no further options are included. Let KL and KU be the lowest and
highest strike price selected according to the selection rule. At strike price K0, the average of
the mid quote from the call and put option is used.
Equation (3.2) is intended to approximate equation (3.1) which is theoretically exact.
Equation (3.2) measures implied variance over horizon T , whereasσ2V I X is intended to mea-
sure the risk-neutral expected variance over a constant 30-day horizon. Since there are gen-
erally no options which expire exactly in 30 calendar days, two option series that are closest
to 30-day expiry need to be considered. The near-term series must have at least one week
to expiry to mitigate concerns of liquidity and microstructure effects. When the near-term
options have less than a week to expiration, the VIX calculation rolls to the second and third
maturity contracts. The implied variance is calculated for both maturities, and the desired
VIX variance with the 30-day maturity is then linearly interpolated between the two available
maturities
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VIX is expressed as σV I X ×100.
3.3.2 Problems associated with the CBOE procedure and solutions
It shows clearly from equation (3.1) that the model free implied variance is defined as
an integral of weighted option prices over an infinite range of strike prices, but the actual
construction procedure of the VIX used by the CBOE represents a discrete sum of weighted
option prices plus a correction term. The approximation of an integral by a discrete proxy
induces bias if care is not taken in minimizing implementation errors. As demonstrated by
Jiang and Tian (2007), there are mainly two sources of approximation errors in the CBOE
procedure which may bias the calculated implied volatilities5.
The first type of approximation errors is due to the limited availability of strike prices. If
options are available for all strike prices, then it is straightforward to calculate the integral
using numerical methods. But in reality, there is only a finite number of options actually
traded in the market. Let KU and KL be the highest and lowest strike prices available for a
given maturity, then truncation errors arise from the CBOE procedure as an infinite range of
strike prices is replaced by a finite range between KL and KU :
∫ K0
0















C (K ,T )
K 2
dK .
5Jiang and Tian (2007) report four types of approximation errors embedded in the CBOE procedure, some
of which are unlikely to be economically significant. For the relevance of this study and possible remedies
addressed to the problem, I mainly discuss two types of approximation errors.
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The size of the truncation error is















The negative sign indicates a downward bias in the calculated variance.
As pointed out by Jiang and Tian (2007), truncation error may vary substantially over time
as the truncation interval [KL ,KU ] is not fixed for all maturities. The reason lies in the way the
CBOE filters out problematic options. Any option with a zero bid price is excluded from the
VIX calculation. Options outside two consecutive strike prices with zero bid quotes are also
excluded from the calculation. Since options with zero bid quotes are considered illiquid
and they tend to cluster at extreme strikes (far away from at-the-money strikes), exclusion of
options at such arbitrary boundaries would induce a significant reduction of the number of
options included in the calculation, which in turn leads to a downward bias of the calculated
value.

















Although numerical integration errors can be minimised by using sufficiently finely parti-
tioned strike prices, the actual partition used in the CBOE procedure is based on listed strike























The discretization error leads to an overestimation of the calculated variance. RHS of equa-
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tion (3.1) requires the computation of the following
∫ S∗
0





C (K ,T )
K 2
dK .
The integrand function reaches a peak at K = S∗ and declines monotonically on both sides
as K goes away from S∗; it is discontinuous at K = S∗ whenever S∗ 6= F . While S∗ is an
arbitrary value close to the forward level which generally does not coincide with any listed
strike price, the option price at K = S∗ needs to be estimated. A relatively small error in the
estimated option value may lead to a sizeable approximation error in the calculated variance
since the integrand peaks sharply at S∗. Figure 3.10 illustrates BSM model simulated option
prices plot againt strike prices. Option price Q(Ki ) reaches a peak at K = S∗ (equal to 1 in
this example) and declines sharply on both sides as K goes away from S∗. The option price
Qˆ(Ki ) at K0 in CBOE procedure is calculated as the average price of the call and put option
at strike price K0. Jiang and Tian (2007) have shown that Qˆ(Ki ) tends to overestimate Q(Ki ).
The larger the gap between K0 and S∗, the bigger the overestimation.
Jiang and Tian (2007) performed Monte Carlo simulation to illustrate the magnitude of
the approximation errors in the CBOE procedure. They choose a base set of parameters
that are consistent with typical market conditions, and vary one parameter at a time while
keeping others constant to examine the size of each respective approximation error. They
show that the truncation error leads to an underestimation of the true volatility, and the
errors are likely to rise sharply when volatilities are high. The discretization error leads to
overestimation of the true volatility and declines as strike price increment increases. Both
approximation errors are negligible when the truncation interval is sufficiently large and the
differences between strike prices are sufficiently small.
They further analyse the approximation errors under a more realistic setting by using ac-
tual data on a given day. They show that total approximation error from the CBOE procedure
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ranges from -4.4% to 2.6% of the true volatility, or -197 to +25 index basis points. One index
basis point is worth $10 per VIX futures. These approximation errors translate into -$1970
to +$250 per futures contract which is clearly economically significant. Although negative
truncation errors tend to offset positive discretization errors when volatilities are low, nega-
tive errors tend to dominate the total error when the market experience a sharp increase in
volatility, leading to underestimation of the true volatility, precisely when a more accurate
measure of VIX is needed. Thus, a fix to the CBOE drawback is desired.
Jiang and Tian (2007) propose a simple smoothing method in constructing model free
implied variance to mitigate approximation errors in the CBOE procedure. The general
idea is to construct a smooth implied volatility function using an interpolation-extrapolation
scheme. Suppose N strike prices are listed for trading on a given day with maturity T . Let
CM (Ki ,T ) and PM (Ki ,T ) be market price of a call and a put option respectively with strike
price Ki . Let 0 < KL = K1 < K2 < ·· · < KN = KU < ∞. The implied volatilities σ(Ki ,T ) for
i = 1,2, . . . , N can be obtained from market option prices using the BSM model. Only out-of-
the-money options are used in constructing implied volatility functions.
The implied volatility functions are constructed for the listed available strike prices be-
tween KL and KU . To construct the implied volatility function over the entire range of strike
prices (0,+∞), N known implied volatilities must be used for interpolation and extrapola-
tion. A nonparametric approach is adopted by Jiang and Tian (2007) in fitting the known
implied volatilities exactly. Interpolation using cubic splines is first implemented between
listed strike prices to construct a smooth function of implied volatilities. Flat extrapolation
is then implemented outside the range of the lowest and highest strike price to construct an
extension of the implied volatility function on the tails. Once the implied volatility functions
are constructed for the entire range of the integral, option prices can be obtained using the
BSM model. The model free implied variance can be thus calculated accordingly. Imple-
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mentations of Jiang and Tian (2007) style interpolation methods are used in other papers,
e.g. Taylor et al. (2010).
3.3.3 Construct implied variance – the BKM methodology
Calculation of implied variance based on equation (3.1) requires the use of S∗, a selected
value, which in applications complicates calculation when dividends need to be taken into
account6. To simplify calculation I adopt the model free implied variance proposed by Bak-
shi et al. (2003) (BKM hereafter) which applies directly to the use of spot asset prices, and
also respects the continuum of options required for implied variance calculation. Let S0 be
the current asset price, and C (K ,T ) and P (K ,T ) be call and put option prices at strike price
K with maturity T . The implied variance is given by




2(1− ln KS0 )
K 2
C (K ,T )dK +
∫ S0
0
2(1+ ln S0K )
K 2
P (K ,T )dK
 . (3.4)
A continuum of options prices are needed to compute the integrals. I adopt Jiang and Tian
(2005)’s interpolation and extrapolation method with modifications in achieving this. For the
interpolation part, Jiang and Tian (2005) use cubic splines to fit the known implied volatili-
ties. The output of the cubic spline fitting is a smooth function with a first and second order
derivatives f ′(K ) and f ′′(K ) at every strike price in the interval. Smooth as its advantage,
spline method may overfit data and produces oscillations if the known implied volatilities
are not smooth. Instead, I employ the piecewise cubic Hermite interpolating polynomials 7
(pchip hereafter) to do the interpolation. Pchip constructs the interpolant almost the same
way as the splines, except that the slopes are different. Splines choose the slopes such that
6Equation (3.1) gives the correct expected variance when dividends are paid only when S∗ = F .
7Piecewise cubic Hermite interpolating polynomials and cubic splines are part of the computational rou-
tines for piecewise polynomial interpolation. See https://uk.mathworks.com/help/matlab/ref/pchip.
html?s_tid=gn_loc_drop for detailed description and comparison between them.
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the first and second order derivatives are all continuous, while it may not be the case for
pchip at the second order derivative. The slopes for pchip are chosen in a way that the func-
tion preserves the shape of the data and respects monotonicity. This means that on intervals
where data are monotonic, pchip provides no overfitting of data.
Following the implementation procedure of DeMiguel et al. (2009), I fit pchip with mon-
eyness (K /S) as an independent variable and implied volatility as a function value to ob-
tain interpolated implied volatilities within the known range of moneyness. I then extrapo-
late using the boundary strike prices to construct the tail distribution of implied volatilities.
Following Carr and Wu (2009) and Jiang and Tian (2005), I implement a flat extrapolation
scheme assuming that the implied volatility function is constant beyond the strike prices
at both ends. Once the implied volatility function is constructed, option prices at any re-
quired moneyness level can be translated from the corresponding implied volatility using
BSM model. Then the model free implied variance can be calculated following equation
(3.4) for each maturity contract, and then linearly interpolated for the 30-day expiry.
3.3.4 Data
Data used for this study is the Ivy DB Global Indices database from OptionMetrics. This
comprehensive database covers the world’s major equity indices and provides end-of-day
historical prices for index options and their associated underlying instruments. The database
includes data for 27 equity indices covering 17 countries and regions around the world. As
the interest of this study is to examine the dynamic relationship among world’s major mar-
kets, I intend to include as much coverage as possible. Initial screening of the database gives
17 indices covering non-repetitive countries and regions. A closer look into each index op-
tions finds that some data are problematic and thus excluded from the study8. Table 3.1
8Options for the Australian stock index S&P/ASX 200 show multiple prices of calls and puts with the same
strike price for year 2007 and 2009. I am not able to distinguish between these options as to which is correctly
priced for the information given. In addition, I find irrational prices sitting around for deep in- and out- of-
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shows 15 equity indices I include in this study and their respectively availability of option
data9.
To calculate model free implied variance given by equation (3.4), option data needs to be
filtered. For each index, I include options with strictly positive bid prices10, and discard op-
tions with missing implied volatilities or Black-Scholes (BS) delta, which occurs for options
with intrinsic value above mid price and when options have non-standard settlement. Op-
tion series with maturity shorter than 7 days and longer than 300 days are excluded to min-
imise pricing anomalies. Interest rates are zero coupon rates obtained from the zero_curve
file in the database, and they are linearly interpolated to match each option maturity.
I select out-of-the-money options, namely, calls with BS delta below 0.5 and puts with
delta above -0.5. I define moneyness by K /S, following Jiang and Tian (2005), options with
extreme moneyness beyond [0.7, 1.3] are excluded due to extremely high implied volatilities.
I fit pchip to known implied volatilities points within the interval to obtain the interpolated
implied volatility function and then extrapolate beyond the moneyness to obtain tail func-
tions. I fill a total of 1001 grid points in the moneyness range from 1/3 to 3 for the implied
volatility function. As suggested by Jiang and Tian (2005), truncation errors are virtually zero
when truncation points are beyond 3.5 standard deviations from K /S = 1. The discretization
increment is below 0.01, which is a sufficiently fine partition for the discretization error to be
negligible.
Once implied volatility function is obtained for the range of moneyness, option prices
for each moneyness (or strike price) can be translated from the BSM model through inter-
polated implied volatilities. Subsequently, the model free implied variance for each equity
the-money options throughout year 2013 and 2014, which I believed are either mis-priced or mis-reported by
the data provider. Thus, the Australian index is excluded from examination. The other index excluded is TAIEX
index of Taiwan, whose options history is only available until 2008.
9Note that the raw data is incomplete when provided by OptionMetrics where data for all indices for March,
April, and May are missing for years 2005, 2006, and 2007.
10Bid, ask price are defined as the best closing bid, ask price across all exchanges. Where bid ask prices are
not available for some of the indices options, last price, defined as the closing trade price or the settlement
price of the option, is used as a proxy for the bid price.
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index on each maturity can be calculated. The implied variance of 30-day horizon can be
obtained using two nearest maturities by linear interpolation, and implied volatility is taken
as the square root of the implied variance. The time series of constant 30-day expectation of
implied volatility is termed volatility index for each underlying equity index.
3.3.5 Empirical results
First I compare my calculation of implied volatilities with those calculated using the
CBOE procedure. Table 3.6 provides a brief overview of publicly available volatility indices
that are calculated and disseminated by organised exchanges or relevant party. As can be
seen that volatility indices are available for most of the equity indices under examination,
except for BEL 20,11 HELSINKI 25, and IBEX 35. The methodology to construct volatility in-
dex revealed by each respective calculation body is almost identical to the CBOE procedure
in constructing VIX. Trivial differences to accommodate the local market lie in the selection
of options where the choice of rolling convention or the correction term are not exact replica-
tion. A slight deviation from the CBOE procedure is the method used for Hang Seng volatility
index. The method replicates exactly the first term of equation (3.2) but leaves out the sec-
ond term, which was claimed to reflect its market trading characteristics. The outcome of
this choice would result in higher implied volatility than it otherwise would. FTSE calculates
volatility index for both FTSE 100 and FTSE MIB. Its methodology deviates from the CBOE
procedure in that they employ a slightly different numerical integration scheme. Options
are partitioned into three contiguous groups. Simpson’s rules with unequal-interval is used
to approximate the integral. The weights given to each option price is a weighted combina-
tion of the nearest three strikes as opposed to the simple difference between two adjacent
strike prices as in the CBOE procedure, but the method does not solve material problems
11The equity index BEL 20 is under management by Euronext Brussels. They do not seem to provide volatility
index for BEL 20 any more despite that there has been a record for doing so.
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with truncation interval and discritization issues.
Table 3.7 reports empirical results of implied volatility calculated using the BKM method
compared with those under CBOE procedure. The publicly available volatility indices are
obtained through Bloomberg. Implied volatility calculated using BKM method is denoted
bkm_ its respective equity index or IV_bkm for general referral. Bloomberg implied volatil-
ity is denoted IV_bb. Data length of each comparison is subject to data availability of both
the Bloomberg source and the calculated values. Comparisons are made for one to one
date matching between IV_bb and IV_bkm. Dates with missing values are excluded in both
sources. Numbers in the last four columns are in percentages.
Column 2 of Table 3.7 reports the number of total observations of each pair under com-
parison. Columns 4 and 5 report percentages of observations that the value of IV_bkm is
higher (lower) than IV_bb. It shows that 9 out of 12 implied volatility series calculated using
the BKM method produce more higher values than those under CBOE procedure, ranging
from 50.80% to 99.92%. Only three series produce less higher values, with the lowest being
25.44% for IV_Euro STOXX 50. It thus lends support to the claims of Jiang and Tian (2007)
that the CBOE procedure tends to underestimate the true volatility. Note that here I do not
disentangle between the truncation errors and discritization errors. The numbers are for the
total effect. It may well be the case that the two errors offset each other as their signs are
opposite. But in most cases values of Bloomberg sources are lower than those of my calcu-
lation, implying that truncation errors are more dominant leading to the underestimation of
the CBOE methodology.
Columns 6 and 7 report mean values for each comparison that IV_bkm exceeds (is below)
IV_bb12. It shows that the mean value that IV_bkm exceeds IV_bb ranges from +1.15% to
+4.81%, with the exception of +29.04% for IV_S&P/TSX 60. The mean value that IV_bkm is
below IV_bb ranges from -3.93% to -0.17%. It summarises the magnitude of approximation
12Values in column 6 and 7 are calculated as the average of IV _bkm−IV _bbIV _bb .
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errors produced by the CBOE procedure. It can be seen that the range of errors are rather
symmetric on both directions (except for one). My results are similar in magnitude to the
example illustrated by Jiang and Tian (2007) using one day of market data.
The empirical results are odd for IV_S&P/TSX 60. Results show that implied volatilities
calculated using my method are significantly higher than those provided by Bloomberg, see
Figure 3.2. Only one data point has a value smaller than that of IV_bb. The average magni-
tude of values exceeding IV_bb is +29.04%, much higher than that for the rest of the com-
parisons. The Montréal Exchange calculates VIXC exactly the same way as VIX with minor
changes in the rolling convention and calculation of risk free rate. Figure 3.2 shows that the
values are gently above IV_bb at the beginning of the series, but deviate significantly starting
July 2012. Obvious oscillation is shown for VIXC for the first half of 2014, where IV_S&P/TSX
60 shows similar pattern but with bigger magnitude. A few individual spikes are shown on
the latter part of the series. It is not clear why IV_S&P/TSX 60 deviates substantially from
IV_bb. Figure 3.3 shows one example of a ‘well behaved’ calculated volatility index which
is closely aligned to IV_bb, namely, IV_S&P 500. Table 3.8 presents summary statistics of
calculated implied volatility series together with those of Bloomberg source.
Table 3.9 provides information on near- and next-term maturity options used to calcu-
late IV_bkm. Columns (days) report average maturities in calendar days. Columns (nopt)
and (range(nopt)) report the average number, and the range, of options observed for pchip
linear interpolation. The average minimum and maximum moneyness over time for each
index is given in columns (min) and (max), followed by two columns of the range of the
minimum and maximum moneyness. The average minimum and maximum moneyness for
near-term (next-term) maturity options across sample range from 0.72 to 0.86 and 1.10 to
1.23 (0.73 to 0.86 and 1.10 to 1.25). The range of minimum and maximum moneyness given
by available strike prices after options are filtered illustrates possible truncation intervals
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used in the CBOE procedure. Options beyond the truncation interval are ignored, which
leads to truncations errors.
Volatility indices are designed to reflect the market’s expectation of future volatility over
30 days, and are closely followed by market participants. It is essential to the pricing of
volatility derivatives, such as future, options on volatility index, and variance swaps. It is also
important for estimating variance risk premium. A correctly constructed volatility index is
thus the key to ensure the accurate pricing of volatility derivatives. The CBOE procedure in
constructing VIX leads to substantial biases in the calculated values due to approximation
errors. Thus, a robust method providing a reliable volatility index is called for in building
investors confidence.
3.4 Implied volatility spillover effect
This part of the study discusses international market integration through implied volatil-
ity transmission. Early studies have shown that the stock market is highly integrated in terms
of realised returns and realised volatilities. Since volatility plays a key role in derivative pric-
ing and portfolio management, it is important to learn about whether its future expectation
across different markets are linked with each other. Volatility indices provide good tools as
they are designed for risk management purposes. Since they are directly extracted from op-
tion prices, they are forward looking and contain timely information regarding the future
development of the market. The linkage between markets provides market participants a
view ex-ante as opposed to ex-post using returns or realised variance. I will be able to see
whether market participants have different views towards future volatility development in
different markets. The interaction between markets may answer the question whether one
market drives another, which may have important implications on asset allocation and risk
management. It may also be useful for option traders and portfolio managers in implement-
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ing innovative trading strategies in the option market.
Implied volatilities used in this part of analysis are calculated from section 3.4. I employ
vector autoregressive models and its structural analysis, namely, impulse response functions
and forecast error variance decomposition to analyse the dynamic inter relationship be-
tween markets. Section 4.1 describes how data is structured. Section 4.2 gives a preliminary
glance at linkages between markets under contemporaneous correlation. Model specifica-
tion and empirical results follows.
3.4.1 Data
The analysis of transmission effects is done for different groups. Since data includes
countries covering three continents, and I am interested in the dynamic relationships of the
variables within a continent as well as across continents, I group implied volatilities into
Asia, European area, and North America according to their respective geographic locations,
and a cross-continent group, Global. The analysis within each group requires a common
time window for all variables subject to data availability of implied volatilities calculated in
section 3.4. Table 3.2 shows a description of the grouping of the variables and their time
window.
Groups Asia and North America are intuitively comprised of countries and regions in
their respective continent. European area is comprised of countries in continental Europe
as well as the U.K.. Eurozone (represented by the STOXX 50 index) is excluded from the anal-
ysis of European area, as it essentially represents a collection of companies of the eurozone,
which might induce spurious effects when examined together with its component countries.
For Global analysis I consider one country or region as a representative of each continent to
avoid calculation overload. Japan is chosen as the representative of Asia as it is one of the
most important markets in the world and has the highest market capitalization among the
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three countries in its group. Eurozone represents the continental European area13, and U.K.
is picked as it is one of the most influential markets in the world.
Time frame for each group depends on data availability. The longest shared period within
each group is chosen as its study period. Though calculated implied volatilities of European
countries generally have a longer history, there is a portion of data missing for some con-
secutive periods in 2008 for the Dutch market. Thus common period for the European area
is chosen to start in March 2009 where periods of very high volatilities due to the financial
crisis are excluded.
3.4.2 Preliminary discussion
Given that each market operates in different time zones, it is necessary to understand
the operating hours of one market relative to another on the same scale. Figure 3.1 shows
information of option market trading hours for each country in Tokyo time14, which is the
first market to open on a given day. The time zone of Tokyo is UTC + 9. As can be seen in the
figure the Asian markets are the first to open, then followed by the European markets and
lastly North American markets. Japanese market closes at 15:00 before any European market
opens, while the U.S. market opens at 23:30 with about 2 hours operating concurrently with
the European markets.
Table 3.10 shows contemporaneous correlations for the differenced implied volatility se-
ries15 among markets for each group. Group B shows that pairwise correlation among Eu-
ropean areas are much higher than those in Asia and North America. Correlations are more
than one half for most pairs in the European region except for those with Finland. Correla-
13Only Swiss market in the sample is not accounted for by Eurozone.
14Note that Japan does not use daylight saving time, whereas North American markets and the European
markets observe summer time. Relative trading hours discussed in this analysis is based on standard time
(winter time).
15Differenced implied volatility series are used for the following study of spillover analysis. Reasons for such
choice is detailed in the next section.
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tions between Finland and other European countries are between 0.31 and 0.45, suggesting
that the Finnish market might be less integrated in the European area. Second to Finland is
Italy which has relatively low correlations with other European countries. Correlation coef-
ficients are lowest at 0.31 with Finland and highest at only 0.56 with France, suggesting Italy
might have less influence on other countries in the region. The highest pairwise correlations
are among U.K., France, Germany, and Switzerland. These four markets are the largest mar-
kets in the European area in terms of their market capitalization. High correlations among
them may reflect fast information flow as larger markets tend to be more liquid.
Group A shows that the intra-regional pairwise correlations tend to be higher than inter-
regional correlations. The highest being 0.80 between U.K. and Eurozone; the lowest being
0.13 between Japan and U.S.. This pattern of contemporaneous correlations is consistent
with what I expect from the structure of time zone differences between markets. Geographi-
cally the closer the markets the higher the correlation, while the further apart between mar-
kets, the lower the correlation. This may also reflect the degree to which markets are inte-
grated. The more integrated two markets are, the more strongly one market movement may
be correlated with the other.
Developments in the Japanese market does not seem to influence much on the U.S. mar-
ket, while correlations between the U.S. market and two European markets are higher, which
may reflect the fact that the U.S. market and the European markets simultaneously operate
for about 2 hours before the latter close. The low correlation between the Japanese market
and the U.S. market seems to suggest that U.S. influences Japan. If U.S. were to be influenced
by Japan, then the U.S. market would have responded to the Japanese market, which closes
before U.S. market opens, on the same day. This in turn would result in a higher correlation
between the two markets. Contrary to results reported in Eun and Shim (1989) that the U.S.
and Canada exhibits the highest correlation for residual returns, my results show that the
129
correlation of changes in implied volatility between these two markets are moderate.
3.4.3 VAR model specification
To analyse the transmission of implied volatility, vector autoregressive analysis (VAR) and
its structural analysis are employed. The VAR model, popularised by Sims (1980), treats all
variables as a priori endogenous, and describes the dynamic evolution of its component
variables from their common history. The general mathematical form of the VAR(p) model
is:
Yt = c+Π1Yt−1+Π2Yt−2+·· ·+Πp Yt−p +²t (3.5)
where Yt = (y1t , y2t , · · · , ykt )′ denotes a (k × 1) vector of times series variables of interest. c
is a k dimensional constant vector. Πi are (k × k) coefficient matrices, and ²t is an (n × 1)
unobservable vector of random variables with zero mean and covariance matrix Σ. ²t is seri-
ally uncorrelated but may be contemporaneously correlated. p is lag length. Applied to the
Global group variables, the VAR(p) system is16:
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Here U S t , U K t , Eur ot and JP t denote the implied volatility measures of U.S., U.K., Eu-
16All following illustrations of model specification are given for group Global, and the same methodology
applies to the rest of the groups where discussions of empirical results are in subsequent sections.
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rozone, and Japan, with
Π1 =

A11 B11 C11 D11
A21 B21 C21 D21
A31 B31 C31 D31
A41 B41 C41 D41

, ..., Πp =

A1p B1p C1p D1p
A2p B2p C2p D2p
A3p B3p C3p D3p
A4p B4p C4p D4p

.
The VAR model requires variables generated from a stationary process. The economet-
rics analysis can be done either in levels or in changes. However, the choice is not easy for
this particular data. The ADF unit root tests shown in Table 3.3 indicate that the time se-
ries of implied volatility levels for U.K., Eurozone, and Japan are stationary at the 1% level,
whereas U.S. level implied volatility is only stationary at 5% level. Time series of implied
volatility changes are stationary at all conventional levels for all countries. First order au-
tocorrelation in level volatilities are high, being 0.982,0.983,0.977 and 0.981 respectively for
the U.S., U.K., Eurozone and Japan. This is intuitive as volatilities are known to be persistent
and have a long memory feature. However, the high serial correlations would give a highly
autocorrelated error term, which may induce model mis-specification. The results suggest
that an analysis in differences may be necessary. Thus, I examine how a change in implied
volatility of one market at its close impacts another.
The VAR model is estimated with OLS. In order to estimate the model, the number of lags
p needs to be determined, however, it is never an empirically easy issue. Longer lag lengths
lessen the chance of mis-specification, but result in the loss of more degrees of freedom.
Akaike (AIC), Schwarz (SIC), and Hannan-Quinn (HQ) information criteria, final prediction
error (FPE), and modified LR test are used to select the lag order. As mentioned in Lütke-
pohl (2005), the lag order obtained with information criteria depends to some extent on the
choice of the initial guess. Choosing a small lag, an appropriate model may not be in the set
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of possibilities and choosing a large number may result in a large spurious value. Using a
moderate value seems to be a sensible strategy. The same as Äijö (2008), I choose p = 8 lags
to start with.
Table 3.4 shows the determination of lag order given by aforementioned information cri-
teria. While AIC, FPE, and modified LR test suggest lag length of 8 to be appropriate for the
VAR(p) model, SIC and HQ suggest optimal lag length 7. Model adequacy can be further
checked by some formal tests. If the number of lags is appropriate, there should be no au-
tocorrelation left in the residuals. Portmanteau and Breusch-Godfrey-LM tests are standard
tools for checking residual autocorrelation in VAR models. However, the multivariate port-
manteau test and LM test collectively reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation up to
lag 12. The Q-stats are as big as a few multiples of its respective degrees of freedom. Higher
order of lags have been tried and the same rejection of no serial correlation results. This re-
sult indicates possible serious autocorrelation in the VAR system which would bias estimates
of coefficients and standard errors in the regression.
However, the cross correlograms in Figure 3.4 show that there is no obvious pattern in the
residuals up to lag 7, but some significant values at lag 10. While there is no theory suggesting
autocorrelation occurs in latter lags but not lower lags, it appears that for the underlying
data, the changes of implied volatility 10 days apart tend to coincidentally move in the same
direction. This leads us to believe that failing the test of no serial correlation may be due
to the heteroskedastic feature of the data rather than actual autocorrelation. AR roots table
shows that all inverse roots have modulus less than one and lie inside the unit circle, which
means the estimated VAR system is stable, and which further confirms that 7 lags is adequate
in capturing the system dynamics. I proceed on to structural analysis with the VAR(7) model.
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3.4.4 Impulse response analysis
3.4.4.1 Theory
The general VAR(p) model has many parameters, and it may be difficult to interpret coef-
ficients due to complex interactions and feedback effects between variables in the model. As
a result, the dynamic properties of a VAR system are often summarised through some struc-
tural analysis. Two main types of structural analysis are impulse response functions and
forecast error variance decompositions. I will employ both analyses to study the dynamics
in the VAR system.
Impulse response analysis traces the effects of a shock to one endogenous variable on
to the other variables in the VAR system. It moreover traces the speed and persistence of
the shocks, and therefore enables the examination of the time structure of the transmis-
sion. I consider in this study generalized impulse response functions17 as opposed to tradi-
tional impulse response in that the generalized responses do not require orthogonalization
of shocks and are invariant to the ordering of the variables in the VAR system. Since there
is no economic theory underpinning the causal relationship between country level implied
volatilities, it is reasonable to use generalised impulse response functions to study the inter-
relationship between them without any a priori assumption.
Under the assumption of covariance-stationarity, equation (3.5) can be rewritten as the





Where the k×k coefficient matrices Ai can be obtained by recursive substitution,
Ai =Π1Ai−1+Π2Ai−2+·· ·+Πp Ai−p , i = 1,2, . . . ,
17See Pesaran and Shin (1998).
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with A0 = Ik and A j = 0 when j < 0.
An impulse response can be described as the effect of a hypothetical k×1 vector of shocks
of size δ= (δ1, . . . ,δk )′ hitting the system at time t compared with a base-line profile at time
t +n, given the system’s history. Denoting the known history of the system up to time t −1
by the information setΩt−1, the generalised impulse response function of Yt at horizon n, is
defined by
GIY (n,δ,Ωt−1)= E(Yt+n |²t = δ,Ωt−1)−E(Yt+n |Ωt−1)
The appropriate choice of hypothesized vector of shocks, δ, is central to the properties of the
impulse response function. The generalised impulse response function shocks one element
of ²t , say the j th element, and integrates out the effects of other shocks using an assumed or
historically observed distribution of errors. Then we have
GIY (n,δ j ,Ωt−1)= E(Yt+n |² j t = δ j ,Ωt−1)−E(Yt+n |Ωt−1). (3.7)
Assuming ²t has a multivariate normal distribution with mean vector zero and covariance
matrix Σ= (σi j ), the conditional expectation is
E(²t |² j t = δ j )= (σ1 j ,σ2 j , · · · ,σk j )′σ j j−1δ j =Σe jσ j j−1δ j
where e j is an k×1 selection vector with unity at its j th element and zeros elsewhere. Hence,
the generalised impulse response of the effect of a shock in the j th equation on Yt+n at time









 , n = 0,1,2, . . . .
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Setting δ j =pσ j j , the scaled generalised impulse response function is the k×1 vector:
ψ j (n)= 1pσ j j AnΣe j , n = 0,1,2, . . . . (3.8)
3.4.4.2 Results for the Global group
Figure 3.5 presents the results of impulse response analysis with 2 standard error bounds.
The results show that given a shock to any variable in the system, all other variables will
have a positive contemporaneous response to that shock, but the magnitude of responses
is different for each variable. A shock in the change of implied volatility in Japan only gives
rise to about a half unit response of change of implied volatility for U.S., U.K., and Eurozone,
while those responses are much stronger towards a shock in the U.S., U.K., or Eurozone. The
responses are more than 1 unit. Japan clearly has a lagged response to the Western markets.
It has a very small response to the U.S. market on day 1 but has an increased response on day
2. This could be explained by the fact that Japan is on the far East of the globe, and there is
about 8.5 hours difference between the close of the Japanese market and the open of the U.S.
market. Any information not captured on day 1 is flowing into day 2 when Japanese markets
opens about 3 hours after the U.S. market closes, which gives Japan a stronger reaction on
day 2 than day 1.
Similarly Japan has a lagged response to the two European markets, but the responses
on day 2 are decreasing possibly because any news in these two markets has been commu-
nicated with the U.S. market during their 2 hours trading overlap, and is captured by the
responses to the U.S. market. While the impulse responses of Japan to the U.S., U.K., and
Eurozone are positive on the next day, those of U.S., U.K., and Eurozone are corrected on
day 2. This indicates that the responses of U.S., U.K., and Eurozone to the shocks of Japan
are incorporated within one day but Japan has a lagged response on the following day, which
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suggests that the U.S., U.K., and Eurozone markets lead the Japanese market by one day.
Analogously, the U.K. and Eurozone market have a lagged response to the U.S. market while
the U.S. markets responds to the two European markets only on day 1, which indicates that
the U.S. market leads the U.K. and Eurozone market by one day. The figure shows clearly
that the impact of the shocks are positive on day one or day two, and start to decay there-
after, which suggests that these markets are efficient in that international news are processed
within two days.
The time sequence of markets is not arbitrary. On a given date, Japan is at the top, Eu-
rozone and U.K. come in the middle, and U.S. at the bottom; simply because the Japanese
market is the first to open and U.S. is the last to close. But one can argue that which mar-
ket comes first depends on where one cuts into the chain, and we should expect to result
in the same transmission mechanism under different ordering. Hence, I advance U.S. and
European market each to the top of the chain by appropriately lagging the other variables.
Figure 3.6 shows the impulse responses when the change of implied volatilities are grouped
as U S t ,Eur ozone t+1,U K t+1 and JP t+1. It can be seen that U S t has a lagged response to
U K t+1 and Eur ozone t+1 with an increased next day response. This is because the two con-
tinental markets are grouped such that they are at the two far ends of the chain, that U K t+1
and Eur ozone t+1 have an immediate impact on U S t+1 but inevitably not much on U S t . The
pattern of the impulse responses of Japan to shocks in the U.K. and Eurozone is the same as
in the previous discussion meaning that the U.K. and Eurozone markets lead Japanese mar-
ket by one day. But JP t+1 does not have a lagged response to shocks in U S t as JP t+1 sits
immediately after U S t , of which information is processed contemporaneously. Likewise for
U.K. and Eurozone, the impact of shock to U.S. on day t is fully processed on day t +1, sug-
gesting that U.S. leads U.K. and Eurozone market by one day.
In Figure 3.7, the variables are arranged as Eur ozone t ,U K t ,U S t , and JP t+1. Results
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show that JP t+1 has a stronger impact on Eur ozone t+1 and U K t+1 than on Eur ozone t and
U K t . Putting Japan on the bottom of the chain helps us to see that the shocks to U.S., U.K.,
and Eurozone on day t is fully incorporated by Japan on day t +1, which suggests that U.S.,
U.K., and Eurozone market leads Japanese market by one day. Similarly, Eur ozone t and
U K t have a lagged response to U S t , which suggests that the U.S. market leads U.K. and Eu-
rozone market by one day. In summary, all three sets of impulse responses tend to agree that
the Japanese market is a follower in this global setup while U.S. is the dominant leader in
implied volatility spillover. The European markets sit in the middle where it follows the U.S.
and leads Japan.
The aforementioned argument can be further supported by a closer look at the VAR re-
gressions. Table 3.5 shows the R2 of each component regression equation under a VAR(3)18
specification, as well as the breakdown of lags included in the estimation. The table reports
results of all three groups under different ordering of the variables. Group one shows that
when variables are grouped on the same timeline day t , lags up to 3 periods are included in
the estimation for each of the variable. The Japan equation has the highest R2 = 0.28 whereas
U.S. has the lowest at 0.06. When U.S. is advanced to the top of the timeline and JP, Euro-
zone, and U.K. are lagged one day in the second group, R2 changed significantly. The lags
included in the U.S. equation are t −1, t −2 and t −3 while those included in JP, Eurozone,
and the U.K. equation are t , t − 1 and t − 2. R2 increased substantially for the U.S. equa-
tion to 0.44 from previous 0.06 by including Eur ozone t ,U K t , and JP t in the estimation,
indicating that changes of implied volatility of Eur ozone t ,U K t , and JP t have a significant
impact on the changes of implied volatility of U.S. on day t . Omitting the lag of U S t in the
equation of Eur ozone t+1,U K t+1, and JP t+1 significantly reduced the explanatory power.
18Different ordering of the variables requires distinct VAR specification. The system is best described by
a VAR(7), VAR(3), and VAR(3) respectively for each group. But in order to disentangle the marginal effect of
inclusion(exclusion) of one specific lag in a particular equation, I employ a VAR(3) model for all groups for
consistent comparison.
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R2 decreased to 0.04, 0.04, and 0.14 respectively, indicating that U S t has a strong influence
on Eur ozone t+1,U K t+1, and JP t+1. In the third group when Japan is ordered the last of the
chain, results show that R2 of Japan equation reduced to 0.05 when Eur ozone t ,U K t , and
U S t are not included in the equation, indicating Eur ozone t ,U K t , and U S t have a signifi-
cant impact on JP t+1. The results show consistent evidence that the U.S. market impacts
other markets on the following day, and the two European markets impact Japanese market
on the following day.
3.4.5 Forecast error variance decomposition
While impulse response functions trace the effect of shocks from one endogenous vari-
able on other variables in system, variance decomposition ascertains the proportion of in-
novations in other variables in explaining forecast variances of one variable. It provides the
relative importance of each random innovation in affecting the variables in the VAR system.
Decomposing the error variance requires uncorrelatedness of the innovations in the VAR
system. Since ²t can be contemporaneously correlated, it is desirable to orthogonalise the
shocks. The traditional approach uses Cholesky decomposition of Σ such that
PP′ =Σ,
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Note that by the law of total variance
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Figure 3.8 reports the results of variance decomposition for the four markets19. Forecast
periods are for 1 to 10 days ahead. Each entry in column 3 to 6 denotes the percentage of
forecast error variance of the panel variable explained by column variables. It can be seen
that substantial amounts of interactions are shown across continents. The variance of one
market is accounted for by its own innovations as well as innovations in other markets. The
results indicate that U.S. market is the most influential one in the world. Its own innovations
accounts for about 98% of its own variance while the other three markets collectively account
for 2%. On the other hand, innovations in the U.S. market accounts for a significant portion
of variances in other markets, 38%, 32%, and 22% respectively for the U.K., Eurozone, and
Japanese market. The U.K. market turns out to be the second most influential market in that
it explains 31% of Eurozone market’s variance and 6% of Japanese market’s variance. The
Japanese market appears to be a follower in the international markets. Innovations in the
Japanese market explain only about 1% of the variances of the other three markets.
19Cholesky decomposition of Σ implies that the shock to the second variable does not affect the first variable
contemporaneously, but both shocks on the first and second variable can have a contemporaneous effect on
the second variable. Hence, variance decomposition could be sensitive to the ordering of the variables. The
order of the variable in this analysis is U.S., U.K., Eurozone, and Japan, which is determined by its relative
importance from impulse response analysis. However, when I change the order of the variables, the U.S. still
emerges as the most dominant market.
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3.4.6 Empirical results for groups European area, Asia, and North Amer-
ica
In this section I briefly discuss the findings of impulse response analysis for the Euro-
pean area, Asia and North America20. Figure 3.9 shows impulse responses for the European
area. Each individual graph shows combined impulse responses of one variable to shocks
to all other variables. The results reveal some patterns of regional effect. It can be seen that
all markets respond to a shock in another market in almost an identical fashion. They ac-
commodate the shocks in other markets within one day, which indicate that the European
markets have a high degree of integration and possible free flow of information. However,
there is one exception in this group, Italy. The graph shows that Italy has a rather sluggish
response to shocks in all other markets. It continues to react noticeably on the following
day, and the adjustment is completed in day 2. It suggests that Italy acts as a follower in the
European region.
Further examination reveals the interesting position of the Finnish market. The bottom
right corner graph shows that the responses of the Finnish market are collectively smaller
than any other market to exogenous innovations. The size of the responses is about 0.5.
The rest of the graphs show at the same time that responses of all other markets to shocks
to the Finnish market is likewise the smallest. The weak interaction with other European
markets suggests that the Finnish market is rather independent and less integrated in the
European region, which confirms its low correlation with other European markets. A similar
conclusion is drawn in Nikkinen and Sahlström (2004).
The results also show that, the U.K., German, French, and Swiss markets, being the bigger
markets in the European region, have a much stronger influence on the rest of the smaller
20I do not perform forecast error variance decomposition analysis for each regional market. Regional markets
are highly correlated with one another and exhibit feedback effects among each other. It is thus hard to identify
the sequence of information flow, which renders the ordering of variables difficult.
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markets, as smaller markets react strongly to bigger markets while not vice versa. It sug-
gests that any news emerges in the bigger markets will be quickly transmitted to the smaller
markets, while news in the smaller markets tend to be local which will not have a big im-
pact outside its own market. Clearly, bigger markets play a more dominant role in producing
information in the region.
Results of groups Asia and North America21 reveal the same regional pattern. All shocks
are absorbed within the same day, indicating that regional markets are highly integrated.
However, the U.S. market does not appear to be dominant over the Canadian market, as the
responses of the Canadian market to the U.S. market is of the same magnitude as those of
the U.S. market to the Canadian market.
3.5 Conclusions
This study adds to the literature of international stock market integration by investigat-
ing spillover effects across markets through implied volatility. Earlier studies have focused
on ex-post measures, such as realised returns and realised volatility in establishing linkages
between markets. Implied volatility, extracted directly from option prices, is considered as a
forward looking measure which contains a rich source of information about the risk of the
underlying asset until the expiration of the option contract. By nature implied volatilities
are more informative than realised volatilities, and provide an attractive alternative to study
linkages between markets.
The world’s volatility indices on national equity indexes are publicly calculated and dis-
seminated by organised exchanges. The method generally follows that of the CBOE in calcu-
lating the VIX, which is subject to estimation errors pointed out in Jiang and Tian (2007). This
study constructs volatility indices for 15 markets in the world. The method follows the BKM
21Figures for groups Asia and North America are not reported to preserve space.
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methodology in calculating model free implied variance implemented through a modified
curve-fitting method suggested by Jiang and Tian (2007). The proposed method addresses
the issue of the truncation error and the discretization error associated with the CBOE pro-
cedure. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that calculates model free implied
volatilities for a large sample of national equity markets, and makes a direct comparison with
the CBOE method. The results provide empirical evidence that the CBOE procedure induces
substantial estimation errors. The errors are dominated by the truncation error which leads
to underestimated implied volatilities.
Implied volatility spillover effects are examined through vector autoregressive analysis
and impulse response functions and forecast error variance decomposition. The results
show that the U.S. market is unambiguously the dominant source of uncertainty in the world.
It leads the rest of the markets in the world by one day. Japan has the least impact on the
western markets in the global group. Markets within geographical proximity show higher
correlations than with markets across continents. In general, the empirical results support
the notion of informationally efficient international stock markets, in that information trans-
mitted from one market to another is processed within one or two days, with information
flow within one continent processed contemporaneously with no lags. The potential pre-
dictability of the direction from movement of one market to the other may have important
implications for traders and asset managers. An increase in implied volatility in the U.S.
might have an impact on the potential movement of implied volatility in other markets, thus
signalling possible trades for a short window.
This study also opens up areas for further investigation in terms of revisiting the method-
ology of vector autoregressive analysis. As reported in section 4.3, the multivariate portman-
teau tests reject the null hypothesis of serial correlation, possibly due to heteroskedasticity
embedded in volatility series. Inference on models when residuals do not behave like white
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noise could potentially be misleading. A possible remedy to overcome this issue could be
applying univariate GARCH modelling to each individual volatility index to account for the




Table 3.1: Equity indices underlying option data
Equity Index Country/Region Option data history
S&P 500 U.S. Jan 2004 – Dec 2014
S&P/TSX 60 Canada Jul 2007 – Dec 2014
SMI Switzerland Jan 2004 – Dec 2014
FTSE 100 U.K. Jan 2004 – Dec 2014
NIKKEI 225 Japan May 2004 – Dec 2014
KOSPI 200 South Korea May 2004 – Dec 2014
HANG SENG Hong Kong Jan 2006 – Dec 2014
CAC 40 France Jan 2004 – Dec 2014
DAX Germany Jan 2004 – Dec 2014
AEX Netherlands Jan 2007 – Dec 2014
FTSE MIB Italy Jan 2007 – Dec 2014
BEL 20 Belgium Jan 2004 – Dec 2014
HELSINKI 25 Finland Jan 2004 – Dec 2014
IBEX 35 Spain Jan 2008 – Dec 2014
DJ EURO STOXX 50 Eurozone Jan 2004 – Dec 2014
Table 3.2: Group description
Group Countries Time window
Global U.S., U.K., Eurozone, Japan 06/08/2004 – 18/12/2014
Asia Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong 04/01/2006 – 18/12/2014
North America U.S., Canada 03/07/2007 – 18/12/2014
European area U.K., Germany, France, Netherlands 02/03/2009 – 18/12/2014
Belgium, Spain, Italy, Switzerland, Finland
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Table 3.3: ADF unit root tests
levels p-value Changes p-value
U.S. -3.24 0.018 -24.14 0.00
U.K. -3.57 0.006 -24.35 0.00
Eurozone -3.87 0.002 -25.59 0.00
Japan -3.61 0.006 -22.43 0.00
Table reports Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests with five lags and without a time trend. The tests are
done for levels as well as changes in implied volatility.
Table 3.4: Lag order selection for VAR(p) model
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0 -19755.71 NA 47.19 15.21 15.21 15.21
1 -19150.63 1207.82 29.99 14.75 14.80 14.77
2 -18999.14 301.94 27.02 14.65 14.73 14.68
3 -18894.81 207.61 25.24 14.58 14.70 14.62
4 -18839.82 109.25 24.50 14.55 14.70 14.61
5 -18802.30 74.44 24.10 14.53 14.72 14.60
6 -18717.30 168.37 22.85 14.48 14.71 14.56
7 -18642.57 147.79 21.84 14.44 14.70∗ 14.53∗
8 -18614.11 54.19∗ 21.63∗ 14.43∗ 14.72 14.53
Table reports lag order selection give by Akaike, Schwarz, and Hannan-Quinn information criteria, final prediction
error (FPE), and modified LR test. * indicates lag order selected by the criterion.
Table 3.5: R2 of VAR regressions
Timeline t t t t t t+1 t+1 t+1 t t t t+1
JP Eurozone U.K. U.S. U.S. JP Eurozone U.K. Eurozone U.K. U.S. JP
Lags t-1 t-1 t-1 t-1 t t t t
t-2 t-2 t-2 t-2 t-1 t-1 t-1 t-1 t-1 t-1 t-1 t-1
t-3 t-3 t-3 t-3 t-2 t-2 t-2 t-2 t-2 t-2 t-2 t-2
t-3 t-3 t-3 t-3




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.10: Correlation coefficients for differenced implied volatility series
Group A
Global JP Eurozone U.K. U.S.
JP 1
Eurozone 0.38 1
U.K. 0.43 0.80 1
U.S. 0.13 0.51 0.55 1
Group B
European area Netherlands Belgium France Germany Finland Spain Italy Switzerland U.K.
Netherlands 1
Belgium 0.71 1
France 0.87 0.72 1
Germany 0.83 0.67 0.88 1
Finland 0.41 0.38 0.45 0.40 1
Spain 0.69 0.56 0.74 0.68 0.40 1
Italy 0.51 0.44 0.56 0.52 0.31 0.55 1
Switzerland 0.83 0.67 0.86 0.83 0.42 0.69 0.54 1
U.K. 0.84 0.69 0.86 0.81 0.40 0.67 0.50 0.82 1
Group C
Asia Japan South Korea Hong Kong
Japan 1
South Korea 0.56 1
Hong Kong 0.40 0.41 1
Group D



























































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.10: Numerical intergration method used in the CBOE procedure
Figure illustrates option prices against strike prices simulated from the BSM model for a base set of parameters.
The asset price S is 1, The lowest and highest strike price KL and KU are 0.7 and 1.3. The increment between
strik prices is 0.01. Volatilityσ of the underlying asset is 0.2. Risk free rate and dividend yield are set to 0. Option
maturity T is 30 calendar days.
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Chapter 4
Variance Risk Premiums and International
Spillover Effects
4.1 Introduction
It has been well documented in the literature that return variance on financial assets is
stochastic. When investing in a security, investors face not only risk about the return as cap-
tured by return variance, but also uncertainty about return variance itself. An understand-
ing of how investors deal with uncertainty about return variance is imperative for derivative
pricing, risk management, and asset pricing in general.
In recent research, the difference between realised variance and risk-neutral expected
value of realised variance has been interpreted as a proxy for the variance risk premium. Re-
searchers have shown in theoretical work that the risk-neutral expectation of future variance
can be well approximated by a combination of options across strike prices with the same
maturity. In line with this theoretical development, the Chicago Board of Options Exchange
(CBOE) developed the new volatility index (the VIX) that approximates the 30-day implied
variance on the S&P 500 index, thus making the risk-neutral expected value of 30-day vari-
ance almost an observable quantity. On the other hand, theories on computing realised
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variance from historical returns at different frequency have long been established. Thus, cal-
culating the realised measure minus the risk-neutral measure makes variance risk premium
almost a directly observable quantity.
In this study, I study the variance risk premiums for the U.S., the U.K., the Eurozone, and
Japan for the period from 2004 to 2014. I construct the variance risk premium for each mar-
ket from their representative equity index – the S&P 500 index, the FTSE 100 index, the DJ
STOXX 50 index, and the NIKKEI 225 index. I find that variance risk premiums across mar-
kets are on average negative with negative skewness and large kurtosis. There is significant
variation in the time series and the magnitude of variance risk premium is high when mar-
kets experience disruptive events. Negative risk premiums suggest that investors view an
increase in return variance as unfavourable and are willing to accept negative returns on a
long position in a variance swap to hedge against the upward movement in return variance.
Since the variance risk premium represents some sort of aggregate market uncertainty, it
is important to understand whether and how this uncertainty from one country is transmit-
ted to another. The channel through which variance risk premimus manifest in the global
market may have important implications in asset allocation and risk management. There
are studies documenting variance risk premium’s return predictability on domestic and for-
eign stock markets (Bollerslev et al. (2014), Londono (2015)), but they do not provide a direct
linkage between variance risk premiums across markets. To the best of my knowledge, this
study is the first to investigate the dynamic relationships between variance risk premiums
across markets.
To investigate the transmission of variance risk premiums across boarders, I employ the
vector autoregressive model and its structural analysis. Analysis is done in subsamples for
before, around, and after the 2008 financial crisis. Empirical results show that the U.S. is
unambiguously the leading source of uncertainty in the global market, and no other country
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or a combination of countries have predictive power on the U.S.. The Japanese market seems
to be less integrated with the rest of the markets due to its low correlation as well as the role
as a follower. Information flow from one market to another is fully processed within two
days, but it may taker longer to be digested during the crisis period.
The remainder of the study is organised as follows. Section 4.2 provides a review on re-
lated studies on the variance risk premium1. Section 4.3 lays out the theoretical methodology
in constructing variance risk premium. Section 4.4 describes data used to compute realised
and risk-neutral variance. Section 4.5 provides empirical analysis on variance risk premium
dynamics and spillover effects. Section 4.6 concludes. A list of Figures and Tables are in
Appendix in section 4.7.
4.2 Literature review
Early studies focus on documenting the evidence that volatility risk is priced. This strand
of literature bases its methodology on option pricing theory by specifying appropriate return
and stochastic volatility dynamics and calibrate it to option data. The main purpose of these
papers is to parametrize the data generating process for stock returns and volatility to recon-
cile with the inconsistencies found empirically when relying on Black-Scholes assumptions,
and volatility risk premia implicitly modelled in the risk-neutral underlying dynamics is cap-
tured as a by-product from the estimation. These structural models are estimated with either
Bayesian methods or efficient methods of moments which require much computational ef-
fort. This strand of literature is extensive, and prominent examples are Guo (1998), Bates
(2000), Pan (2002), Benzoni (2002), Chernov and Ghysels (2000), Jones (2003), and Eraker
(2004), among others.
1A review on spillover analysis is covered in Chapter 3 section 3.2 literature review.
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Guo (1998) investigates empirically the risk-neutral variance process and the market price
of variance risk implied in foreign currency option market. He specified Heston (1993) stochas-
tic volatility model and calibrated it to dollar/mark option prices from 1987 to 1992. From
the estimated parameters in the risk-neutral variance process combined with sample vari-
ance, as proxy for physical long-run mean variance, an estimate of variance risk premium
can be obtained through appropriate transformation between the risk-neutral and physical
measure of variance process. The author finds that the variance risk premium is not zero
and time varying; estimates are negative from 1987 to 1990 and positive from 1991 to 1992
on a yearly basis. However, the estimates of variance risk premium are negative for 1991 and
1992 if longer period of sample variance is used. The magnitude of estimated variance risk
premiums imply that the compensation for variance risk is statistically significant as well as
economically important.
Much of the attention on estimating stochastic volatility models has been on the S&P
500 index and its options, and much of the model choice has been Heston (1993) stochastic
volatility model due to its analytical tractability and computational advantage of closed-form
solution in derivative pricing. Chernov and Ghysels (2000) propose a procedure that jointly
estimates the objective and risk-neutral measure of underlying dynamics using simultane-
ously the underlying asset price and a set of option information. The method involves first
fitting a semi-nonparametric density of the underlying asset returns using market data, and
then simulates asset and option prices and calibrates the option pricing model to fit the con-
ditional density of the market data dynamics. The same methodology was adopted by Jones
(2003) and Eraker (2004). Benzoni (2002) claims that simultaneously using both derivatives
and underlying data to estimate stochastic volatility models would limit the length of un-
derlying return sample due to limited trading of option contract. Instead he applies a two-
stage estimation procedure which allows him to combine a large sample of index returns
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and a small sample of option prices. In the first stage, historical daily index returns are used
through a simulated method of moments to estimated the parameters of the model, and in
the second stage a sample of option prices together with a simulation methodology is used
to estimate the risk adjustments. Bates (2000) and Pan (2002) extend afore-mentioned pure
diffusion settings by incorporating state-dependent price jumps to allow for an explicit un-
derstanding of the role played by volatility and jump risk premia. Most recently, Wu (2011)
uses tick data on S&P 500 index futures to construct several quadratic variation estimators
and combine variance swap rates inferred from options to study variance dynamics. In this
strand of literature, while some studies do not provide insight on the relative importance of
volatility risk premia, some find significant negative volatility risk premia that are economi-
cally important for option pricing.
Coval and Shumway (2001) examine the theoretical and empirical nature of option re-
turns in the context of the broader asset pricing theory. The Black-Scholes framework as-
sumes that any risk associated with the variance of the underlying asset returns is not priced
as the return volatility is constant. This implies that options are redundant assets and op-
tions positions that are delta neutral should earn on average the risk free rate. Coval and
Shumway (2001) construct a zero-beta straddle on the S&P 500 index from 1990 to 1995,
which includes a combination of long positions in calls and puts having offsetting variances
with the index. They derive an expression for the straddle return based on call option beta
and found that this market neutral straddles on the S&P 500 index receive on average -3%
returns per week. The results are robust to non-synchronous trading, measurement error
in option beta, and changes in sample period and frequency. The authors conclude that
systematic stochastic volatility may be priced in the returns of option index.
Bakshi and Kapadia (2003a) investigate whether the volatility risk premium is negative in
index option markets by examining profit and loss arising from a dynamically delta-hedged
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portfolio with a long call position hedged by a short position in the stock. The rationale
underlying the analysis is to infer whether volatility risk is priced by looking at whether the
delta-hedged gains are zero. If volatility risk is priced, then the sign and magnitude of port-
folio gains is determined by volatility risk premium. Data includes a sample of daily short
term call and put options on the S&P 500 index from 1988 to 1995. The authors perform
both cross-sectional (across strikes) and time series (at-the-money) tests on delta-hedged
portfolios and find negative volatility risk premiums in option prices. Further tests suggest
that although jump risk explains some portion of delta-hedged gains for short dated options,
the volatility risk premium is the predominant factor that justifies the losses incurred on the
delta-hedged portfolios. Bakshi and Kapadia (2003b) extend their research to study the im-
plications of market volatility risk premium on 25 individual equity options. They find that,
first, implied volatilities are larger than realised volatilities for individual equity options, but
the differences between the two measures are smaller for individual options than for index
options; second, delta-hedged gains for individual equity options are more negative than
positive, and smaller than those for index options. Their results suggest that the volatility
risk premium in individual equity options is negative and lower than that in index options.
Some authors construct a variance risk premium based on the notion of a variance swap,
which is an over-the-counter contract that pays the difference between the realised vari-
ance over a given period and the fixed variance swap rate. Since variance swaps cost zero to
enter, the variance swap rate represents the risk-neutral expected value of the realised vari-
ance. Works of Carr and Madan (1998), Demeterfi et al. (1999), Britten-Jones and Neuberger
(2000), and Jiang and Tian (2005) have shown theoretical advances in synthesizing variance
swap rates using European option contracts. The realised variance can be obtained rela-
tively easily using historical returns of the underlying asset. Thus variance risk premium can
be handily quantified through a model free approach.
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Bondarenko (2004) employs a model free approach to study variance risk premium and
links it to the performance of hedge funds. He uses daily options prices on the S&P 500
index futures for the period from 1988 to 2000 to infer the price of a variance contract. Re-
alised variance is calculated from the S&P 500 futures using a non-standard expression of
discretely-sampled variance such that it is able to accommodate a more general assump-
tion of the underlying asset process that may include jumps. He finds that variance risk is
priced, and its premium is negative and large in economic terms. Consistent with the pre-
vious literature, the author finds that the market variance is negatively correlated with the
market return, but the negative correlation only explains a portion of negative variance risk
premium. The remaining portion can be interpreted as the compensation for a pure vari-
ance risk. This paper further establishes a link between negative variance risk premium and
hedge fund performance. The results show that hedge fund returns are negatively correlated
with variance returns. Hedge funds profits from selling variance contracts and variance risk
account for a significant portion of hedge fund average returns.
Carr and Wu (2009) synthesize variance swap rates using a large options data set, and
investigates historical behaviour of variance risk premiums on five stock indexes and 35 in-
dividual stocks. Their sample includes European options on the S&P 500 index, the Dow
Jones Industrial Index, and the NASDAQ-100 Index, and American options on the S&P 100
index, the QQQ (NASDAQ-100 tracking stocks), and 35 individual stocks for the period from
1996 to 2003. They synthesize variance swap rate at a fixed 30-day horizon, and obtain corre-
sponding annualized 30-day realised variance using daily futures prices. Statistical analysis
shows that the sample averages of variance risk premium are negative for all indexes and
most of the individual stocks. If an investor is going long a variance swap contract on the
S&P 500 index and holds to maturity, the average return on a $100 investment is -$2.74. It
is clear that investor are willing to accept negative returns to go long on variance swap con-
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tracts on stock indexes to hedge away upward movement in index return variance. On the
other hand, variance risk premiums on individual stocks show large cross-sectional varia-
tions, which suggests that the market does not price variance risk in individual stocks, but
only prices a systematic variance risk in the market portfolio. The authors further perform
some tests to investigate whether a classic asset pricing model can explain negative vari-
ance premiums. They find that the well-documented negative correlation between index
returns and volatility only generates a small portion of the negative variance risk premium,
and Fama-French factors cannot account for strong negative variance risk premium either.
Todorov (2010) adopts a semi-parametric framework in modelling both stochastic volatil-
ity and jumps associated with variance risk, to learn about the dynamic dependencies in the
premium. The model assumes that the futures price of the S&P 500 index has three compo-
nents: a drift term, a continuous martingale, and a jump martingale, where the stochastic
variance that drives the time variation of the continuous martingale is modelled as a sum
of a continuous component and a jump component. The author left the drift term, as well
as parametric form for jumps in price and stochastic volatility, purposely unspecified due to
the lack of agreement on the parametric models of these variables in the literature. Realised
variance and realised jumps are constructed from 5-minutes high frequency returns on the
S&P 500 index from 1990 to 2002. Parameters of the stochastic volatility model are estimated
by matching moments implied by the model to those inferred from high-frequency returns.
Risk-neutral expectations of future variance are inferred from the synthesized variance swap
rate using a portfolio of out-of-the-money options on the S&P 500 index. The variance risk
premium is obtained by differencing realised with risk-neutral measures. The empirical ev-
idence suggests that the variance premium is not only big but also varies significantly over
time. The time variation of variance risk premium depends on both continuous component
of stochastic volatility and past price jumps. Further tests show that jumps play an important
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role in explaining variance risk premium. The estimated variance risk premium increases
with a big market jump and slowly reverts to its long-run mean thereafter.
Another strand of literature studies the notion of variance risk premium within a consumption-
based asset pricing framework2. The basic setup involves a standard endowment economy
with Epstein-Zin-Wein recursive preferences, and extends to incorporate stochastic volatil-
ity of consumption growth volatility. The variance risk premium, as a proxy for macroeco-
nomic uncertainty risk driven solely by the consumption uncertainty risk, is the difference
between the implied variance and the realised variance. Zhou (2009) describes that there
is a fundamental link between the option-implied volatility risk premium and the variance
risk premium in consumption-based asset pricing frameworks. For the former, stochastic
volatility can only be priced if its innovation is correlated with the underlying equity return
innovation. There is ample empirical evidence (i.e. papers mentioned earlier estimating
parametric stochastic volatility models) documenting negative correlations between equity
volatility and equity returns, such that the volatility risk premium is negative and serves as
a hedging tool for investors. In the consumption-based framework, however, there is no as-
sumption about statistical correlation between the volatility and consumption innovation.
The representative agent is endowed with a preference for earlier resolution of uncertainty,
and a stochastic volatility of volatility. Under such setup the variance risk premium embed-
ded in equity markets must be positive to compensate for bearing more risk. Zhou (2009)
claims that "the positive variance risk embedded in underlying asset is entirely consistent
with the negative volatility risk premium implied from option prices".
Bollerslev et al. (2009) (hereafter BTZ) is one of the founding papers in this strand of lit-
erature that, followed by many others, leads to a new branch of research on asset return pre-
2Variance risk premiums are conventionally defined as the difference between the realised variance under
the P measure and the Q measure, which are often negative. Nevertheless, there are papers study variance risk
premiums from a consumption-based asset pricing framework, where variance risk premiums are interpreted
as the difference between the Q measure and the P measure, which are often positive. Negative variance risk
premiums are consistent with positive variance risk premiums multiplied by a factor of−1. In this study, I focus
on the variance risk premium under the traditional interpretation.
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dictability linked to variance risk premium. In the model setup, the volatility of consumption
growth rate and the volatility of volatility are governed by square root type processes, through
which the time-varying volatility risk premium is generated. The asset return derived from
the equilibrium model solutions can be shown to increase with endowment volatility and
the volatility of volatility, reflecting the compensation for bearing volatility risk. The model-
implied equity premium is composed of two terms, the time-varying volatility of consump-
tion growth, and the stochastic volatility of volatility, of which the latter represents a funda-
mentally different source of risk that dominates the variation of the equity premium, which
in turn constitutes the true volatility risk premium. The difference between the risk-neutral
expected variance and the actual variance effectively isolates this factor and should serve as
an useful predictor for asset returns. Monthly data for the new VIX index is used for quan-
tifying risk-neutral variance. Realised variance are based on summation of 78 intraday five-
minute returns on the S&P 500 index. The sample period is from January 1990 to December
2007. Time series analysis shows that the variance risk premium is almost always positive,
with spikes occurring during 1997-2002 period. The variance risk premium is then used, in
addition to other tradition predictor variables such as P/E ratio, price-dividend ratio, default
spread, term spread, risk-free rate, and the consumption-wealth ratio (CAY), to forecast re-
turns over different horizons. The empirical results show that the variance risk premium is
able to predict returns on the S&P 500 index, and the highest predictability is at quarterly
horizon, where it dominates that afforded by other predictor variables.
Zhou (2009) extends the theoretical foundation and empirical findings of BTZ to exam-
ine return predictability of variance risk premium of the S&P 500 index on equity returns,
bond returns, and credit spreads for the period from 1990 to 2008. The additional predictor
variables for equity returns, bond returns, and credit spreads are P/E ratio, forward spread,
and short rates respectively. The regression results for different return horizons show that
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the variance risk premium has a significant forecast power alone, and in combination with
other predictor variables in explaining excess returns in all three markets, and the return
predictability peaks around one-to-four months, and declines thereafter. This suggests that
the risk premia across markets co-move in the short run, which may be driven by a common
risk factor proxied by the variance risk premium. The author provides theoretical and cali-
bration evidence based on the BTZ framework and found that the stylised model can provide
qualitative justification for equity and bond risk premia, but the parameter setting is not rich
enough to simultaneously explain credit spread puzzle.
Mueller et al. (2011) empirically examine the predictability of the market variance risk
premium on bond risk premia. Similar to previously mentioned studies, the risk-neutral
expected variance is measured by the new VIX index. The realised measure adopted in this
study uses a HAR-RV (Corsi (2009)) model augmented by lags of implied variance. Data for
regression analysis runs from 1990 to 2010 on a monthly frequency. The results show that
variance risk premium is statistically significant for short term T-bill excess returns from 2-
6 months with 1-5 months holding period, and the forecasting power is negligible for long
term treasury bonds at 2-5 years with a 1 year holding period. The short run predictability
is robust with the inclusion of other well-established bond risk premium predictors. The
authors propose a potential explanation for the short-run predictability by extending BTZ’s
economy with stochastic dynamics in the inflation process. The calibrated results show that
the inflation process alone, with or without stochastic volatility, is not able to reproduce the
size of bond risk premia, but combined with consumption growth uncertainty, leads to rich
bond risk premia.
Han and Zhou (2012) study the relationship between returns and variance risk premium
on 500 U.S. individual stocks from 1996 to 2009. The sample included is a subset sample of
stocks with traded options in CRSP database that have high market cap, high institutional
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ownership, high analyst coverage, and tilt more towards growth stocks. The authors find that
the monthly variance risk premium is significantly positive for two-thirds of the stocks, and
it exhibits substantial cross-sectional variation. The variance risk premiums are significantly
related to the sensitivity of stock returns to common risk factors, such as Fama-French fac-
tors and other proxies for systematic volatility factors. Stocks with higher risk exposure to
systematic market volatility tend to have lower returns, and on the other hand, low risk ex-
posure stocks serve as useful hedges for systematic volatility risk. Stocks with high variance
risk premium outperform those with low variance risk premium. A value-weighted portfolio
that is long the stocks ranked in the top quintile of variance risk premium and short those in
the bottom quintile has an average return of 1.84% per month.
Wang et al. (2013) study predictability of variance risk premium on CDS spreads. Their
sample include monthly observations of 382 U.S. entities that are not in the government,
financial, or utility sectors. Data runs from 2001 to 2011. Regression results show that the
variance risk premium displays a significant predictive power on firm-level CDS spreads in
the presence of other credit risk determinants as well as firm-specific variables, and such
predictability cannot be substituted by the latter. In addition, firm-level variance risk pre-
mium dominates market variance risk premium and implied variance in capturing macroe-
conomic uncertainty embedded in CDS spreads. The predictive power of variance risk pre-
mium on CDS spreads increases as firm’s credit quality deteriorates, and is unchanged before
and after the 2008 financial crisis.
Bollerslev et al. (2014) extend existing empirical evidence of return predictability based
on monthly U.S. data to an international setting. Markets include France, Germany, Japan,
Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, the U.K., and the U.S.. Variance risk premiums are
calculated for each market on the respective market equity index for the period from 2000
to 2011. Statistical analysis shows that the variance risk premiums are almost all positive
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across markets, and display remarkable coherence in distributions. Regressing multi-period
returns on respective country variance risk premiums results in similar humped-shaped co-
efficient estimates across countries, however, the degree of predictability is not as strong as
that previously reported for the U.S. market. This suggests that there may be a worldwide
systematic common risk factor priced in the market as opposed to country-specific risk fac-
tor. The authors proceed to construct a global variance risk premium proxy, measured by
market-cap weighted-average of individual country variance risk premium. The regression
results show stronger findings for all countries with a peak of predictability around four-
month horizon.
Londono (2015) conducts similar analysis for an representative index for the Euro area,
as well as the U.S., the U.K., Japan, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and France for
the sample between 2000 and 2012. Consistent with the finding in Bollerslev et al. (2014), the
author finds that except the predictability found in the U.S. market, every other county’s vari-
ance risk premium is not a useful predictor for domestic stock returns. Further investigation
shows that the U.S. variance risk premium has predictive power for foreign market returns.
The predictability pattern is similar to that found for the U.S. market, which exhibits hump-
shaped pattern and is maximised around 3-6 months horizon. The predictability is robust to
several measures of variance risk premiums, and is also confirmed in an extended sample of
countries where it is not possible to calculate variance risk premium for the representative
stock index. To rationalise the predictive power of the U.S. variance risk premium on interna-
tional stock returns, the author proposes a two-country general equilibrium model based on
BTZ’s single-country setup. The additional feature in this two-country setup is that it allows
macroeconomic uncertainty to be transmitted across countries. The interaction between
the transmission of uncertainty shows that if consumption growth of one country is exposed
to macroeconomic uncertainty originated in a foreign country, then the uncertainty-driver
173
country’s variance risk premium plays a significant role in explaining the time variation of
stock returns in both countries.
The literature on variance risk premium is ever evolving, and this review is by no means
exhaustive. Other related studies include Bollerslev et al. (2011) which exploits the linkages
between the objective and risk-neutral expectation of integrated volatility to construct a risk
aversion index and links it to a set of macro-finance state variables. Aït-Sahalia and Kim-
mel (2007) estimate a stochastic volatility model and volatility risk premium using maxi-
mum likelihood method based on closed-form approximations to the true likelihood func-
tion. Bollerslev and Todorov (2011) exploit the structure of jump tails and finds fears for
rare events account for a large fraction of variance risk premium. Trolle and Schwartz (2010)
investigate variance risk premium in crude oil and natural gas. In this study, I examine vari-
ance risk premiums for a set of countries under the conventional measure, as the difference
between the P measure and the Q measure.
4.3 Construction of Variance Risk Premiums
I construct variance risk premium following the arguement proposed in Carr and Wu
(2009) in the notion of a variance swap. The payoff of a variance swap is given by the dif-
ference between the realised variance over the life of the contract and a fixed variance swap
rate,
payo f f = [RVt ,T −SWt ,T ]L,
where RVt ,T denotes realised variance, SWt ,T is variance swap rate predetermined at time t ,
and L denotes notional value of the swap contract. No arbitrage requires that the variance
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swap rate SWt ,T equals the risk-neutral expected value of realised variance
SWt ,T = EQ [RVt ,T ].
Carr and Wu (2009) has shown that EQ [RVt ,T ] can be approximated by the continuum of
European out-of-the-money option prices with the same maturity date. Assuming an ap-
propriate pricing kernel and no arbitrage, the variance risk premium is quantified by
V RPt ,T ≡RVt ,T −SWt ,T .
Following this idea, I approximate EQ [RVt ,T ] as the model free option-implied variance
IVt ,T for the representative equity index.
The methodology to calculate model free implied variance is described in Chapter 33.
Applied to Bakshi et al. (2003) method, the implied variance is given by




2(1− ln KS0 )
K 2
C (K ,T )dK +
∫ S0
0
2(1+ ln S0K )
K 2
P (K ,T )dK
 , (4.1)
where S0 is the current asset price, and C (K ,T ) and P (K ,T ) are call and put option prices at
strike price K with maturity T . Using the appropriate option prices and calculation methods,
the annualised IV is obtained for each country with 30-day expiry.
Corresponding to each 30-day implied variance, the annualised 30-day realised variance
in Carr and Wu (2009) is calculated as:









3For details of the methodology in calculating the model free implied-variance see Chapter 3, section 3.3.
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where Ft ,T denotes the time t forward price with expiry date T . Realised variance, in high-
frequency econometrics, is a measure of the sum of finely-sampled squared returns over a
fixed time interval during the trading day. It is a consistent estimator of the corresponding
quadratic return variation when returns are sampled at increasingly higher frequency and
microstructure effects can be ignored. Empirical studies have demonstrated that this type of
measure produces more accurate ex-post measures of actual variance than measures based
on daily or coarser frequency data (Andersen et al. (2001) and Barndorff-Nielsen and Shep-
hard (2002a,b)). However, since the standard market practice to calculate the realised vari-
ance in a variance swap contract is using daily returns, I proceed with daily data to quantify
variance risk premium. The variance risk premium calculated by Carr and Wu (2009) rep-
resents an actual measure based on ex-post knowledge of the realised variance. I propose
a measure of realised variance based on conditional variance expectations that provides an
expected measure of the variance risk premium over T .
The conditional variance model is proposed by Corsi (2009), termed Heterogeneous, Au-
toregressive model of Realised Volatility (HAR-RV). Financial data show well-known stylised
facts such as strong persistent autocorrelations of squared and absolute returns that last for
long periods (long-memory 4), fat tails of return distribution, etc., which pose challenges to
standard econometric models. The HAR-RV model is an approximate long-memory condi-
tional volatility model which is able to reproduce these features that standard GARCH and
stochastic volatility models can not. Stemming from the idea of Heterogeneous Market Hy-
pothesis presented by Müller et al. (1993), which recognizes the presence of heterogeneity
across traders, Corsi (2009) concentrates on the heterogeneity that originates from the dif-
ference in the time horizons. Typically, the financial markets are composed of participants
with different trading frequencies: high frequency for market makers and speculators, and
relatively low frequency for institutional investors. The main idea is that market participants
4See Baillie (1996) for a review on long memory processes.
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with different time horizons perceive, react to, and cause different types of volatility com-
ponents, which is shown as volatility cascade generated by heterogeneous market structure.
Motived by this idea, Corsi (2009) developed an additive cascade model of different volatility
components each of which is generated by the actions of different types of market partici-
pants. This model incorporates a simple AR-structure in the realised volatility over different
horizons, and is able to reproduce the observed volatility persistence as well as other main
stylised facts of financial data.
Following the idea of Corsi (2009), the realised variance over a desired horizon h is given
by
RVt ,t+h =RVt+1+RVt+2+·· ·+RVt+h , h = 1,2,3 . . . .
By definition RVt+i−1,t+i ≡RVt+i . Hence, a weekly realised variance at time t is given by
RVt ,t+5 =RVt+1+RVt+2+RVt+3+RVt+4+RVt+5,
and a monthly realised variance is
RVt ,t+22 =RVt+1+RVt+2+ . . .+RVt+22,
where h = 5 and 22 counts trading days as a proxy for weekly and monthly horizons. The
proposed cascade HAR-RV model is represented by
RVt ,t+h =β0,h +βd ,hRVt−1,t +βw,hRVt−5,t +βm,hRVt−22,t +²t ,t+h . (4.2)
Equation (4.2) can be seen as a three-factor stochastic variance model, which predicts the
next h-period ahead value based on the past realised variance over daily, weekly, and monthly
horizons. Of course the realised variance over other horizons can be easily included in the
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model as additional explanatory variables, but daily, weekly, and monthly measures afford a
natural economic interpretation.
Hence, the variance risk premium, in a simpler notation, is given by
V RPt ,T = E P [RVt ,t+h]− IVt ,T , (4.3)
with h (in trading days) matching T (defined in years). The difference measures the profit
and loss per dollar from a long variance swap contract and holding it to maturity. Dividing
both sides by IVt ,T captures the return from the investment,
RV RPt ,T =




For the empirical analysis of variance risk premium spillover effects, I consider variance
risk premiums of four major markets across the globe – The U.S., the U.K., the Eurozone, and
Japan. The representative equity index for each market is the S&P 500 index, FTSE 100 index,
DJ EURO STOXX 50 index, and NIKKEI 225 index. Data under examination spans from 2004
to 2014.
Option prices used to calculate IVt ,T are obtained from Ivy DB Global Indices database
from OptionMetrics, as described in section 3.3.4, Chapter 3. Option prices are filtered to
include options with strictly positive bid prices, or last prices (defined as the closing trade
price or the settlement price of the option) whenever bid prices are not available. Options
with missing implied volatilities or Black-Scholes delta are discarded. Option series with
maturities shorter than 7 days and longer than 300 days are excluded. Interest rates are zero
coupon rates obtained within the database and are linearly interpolated to match option
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maturities.
Calculation of equation (4.1) requires option prices for a continuum of strikes, but option
strikes traded in the market are limited. To minimise the estimation error in equation (4.1)
I select out-of-the-money options, whose implied volatilities are fitted and interpolated and
extrapolated to obtain a smooth implied volatility function. Option prices for a full range of
strikes are then translated from the Black-Scholes model through this implied volatility func-
tion. IVt ,T for a 30-day horizon are then linearly interpolated using two nearest maturities5.
Daily equity index prices are needed to calculate RVt ,T . Data is obtained from Datas-
tream. Denote by Pt the closing price of the index, daily realised variance is calculated from
squared returns:






To match the 30-day horizon with IVt ,T , the HAR-RV model considered is
RVt ,t+22 =β0+βd RVt−1,t +βw RVt−5,t +βmRVt−22,t +²t ,t+22, (4.5)








RVt−22,t =RVt−21+RVt−20+ . . .+RVt .
Table 4.1 reports OLS estimates of the HAR-RV regressions of equation (4.5) for each of
the markets. The standard errors reported in parentheses are based on a Newey-West correc-
tion allowing for serial correlation of up to an order of 44 days, as suggested in Andersen et al.
(2007). The estimates of coefficients show that most of the estimates are highly statistically
5For details of IVt ,T calculation see section 3.3, Chapter 3.
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significant, but with a rather weak significance for all daily coefficients. The estimates con-
firm highly persistent volatility dependence. The monthly variance component appears to
have a relatively bigger influence on the predictions than daily and weekly components for
all markets, except Japan. Interestingly, daily variance components seem to have a relatively
weak impact, and two of the coefficient estimates across sample are statistically insignificant
at the 10% level.
Corsi (2009) examined S&P 500 futures from 1990 to 2007 for realised volatility using the
HAR-RV model for one-day prediction. Realised volatilities aggregated over three different
horizons are all highly significant, and the importance of the market components decrease
with the horizon of the aggregation. The results show that daily volatility components appear
to have a stronger impact on the predictions than weekly and monthly components. Realised
variance in his paper is constructed by tick-by-tick spot logarithmic middle prices of bid and
ask quotes. Similar to Corsi (2009), Andersen et al. (2007) studied same data on realised
volatility but spans from 1986 to 1999 with tick-by-tick high-frequency data. They estimated
the HAR-RV model for h = 1,5, and 22 with an additional jump component in the regression.
They found that the relative importance of the daily volatility component decreases from the
daily to the weekly to the monthly regressions, whereas the monthly volatility component
tends to be relatively more important for the longer-run monthly regressions, which echoes
my findings.
The insignificant coefficient estimates may be due to the high level of noise contained
in daily close price which is used to construct realised variance, as opposed to intra-day
data. The noisier estimation of the daily realised variance induces weak significance of the
daily volatility component, while weekly and monthly realised variances, being averages over
longer periods, arguably contain less noise and more information on the volatility process
and, hence, receive higher weights from the model.
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Figure 4.1 shows time series of HAR-RV expectations of annualised realised variance for
each of the markets. Each of the series clearly exhibits a high degree of serial correlation. As
can be confirmed in the autocorrelation plots in Figure 4.2. High values of Q-stats of Ljung-
Box test rejects the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. It shows that the HAR-RV model is
able to reproduce the persistence in empirical data. Table 4.2 provides descriptive statistics
for the four sets of expected realised variances. All exhibit patterns of low level of variance in
calm market conditions, and spikes during market turmoil, the most obvious being the 2008
financial crisis.
4.5 Empirical results
4.5.1 Variance risk premium dynamics
Table 4.2 presents descriptive statistics for each market for the realised variance and
volatility and implied variance and volatility respectively in Panel A and B. Panel C presents
summary statistics for annualised variance risk premiums and return variance risk premi-
ums given by equation (4.3) and (4.4). Data is from May 2004 to December 2014. The av-
erages of the variance risk premiums are negative for all countries, with similar magnitude.
Variance risk premiums show large kurtosis ranging from 30 for the U.S. to 75 for the Eu-
rozone, and sometimes large skewness. The distribution of return variance risk premiums
appear to be close to normal. Carr and Wu (2009) examined variance risk premiums for 5
stock indexes and 35 individual stocks. The mean, standard deviation, skewness, and kur-
tosis for variance risk premium on the S&P 500 index for a sample from January 1996 to
February 2003 are−0.0274, 0.0363,−1.44, and 17.86 respectively. Results of my sample share
similar magnitude with those reported in Carr and Wu (2009), but with higher kurtosis.
The mean estimate of variance risk premiums represents the average profit or loss for
181
a variance swap contract. If an investor holds a long 30-day variance swap contract with a
notional of $1 on the S&P 500 index to maturity, the average payoff for the sample period is
$-0.0144. Similar losses result for the other three countries. On the other hand, the return
variance risk premium gives the return of going long a variance swap contract and hold it
to maturity. The average return for the U.S., U.K., Eurozone, and Japan are −19.4%, −14.7%,
−5.30%, and −1.80% respectively. Despite the different scaling, it is clear that investors are
willing to accept negative returns on the long swap contract, hence, shorting variance swap
contracts on these four markets will generate positive returns for this sample period.
Figure 4.3 plots time series of variance risk premiums and return variance risk premiums
for the four markets. The figure suggests that variance risk premiums (hereafter VRP) display
significant time variation. Volatility of the variance risk premium is smallest for the U.K. at
3.2% and biggest for Japan at 6.1%. The graphs show common periods of VRP spikes, the
most obvious being around the 2008 financial crisis, where not surprisingly, the minimum
and maximum values occurred during this period. VRPs are small with little variation prior to
2007 for all countries, and began to increase starting around the sub-prime mortgage crisis
in early 2007. The second episode of spikes, but with smaller magnitudes, occurred around
May 2010, known as the flash crash for the United States trillion dollar stock market crash,
and its influence quickly spread over to the other markets. The third common episode of
spikes occurred around August 2011 when stock prices drop sharply across the world. This
was due to the fears of contagion of the European sovereign debt crisis as well as the down-
grade of the credit rating of the United States.
Despite the similarities of the behaviour of variance risk premiums between the four
markets, there appears an unusual spike uniquely for Japan in March 2011. On Friday March
11, 2011, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake hit Japan and triggered powerful tsunami around the
area. Immediately after the earthquake, the tsunami disabled the power supply and cooling
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of three Fukushima Daiichi reactors, which lead to a nuclear meltdown in the following three
days. The Fukushima nuclear accident was the largest nuclear disaster since 1986 Chernobyl.
The variance risk premium was large and negative the following Monday, followed by con-
secutive large and positive variance risk premiums for the next 10 trading days. Stock market
fell after panic selling as fears of nuclear disasters intensified. Realised volatility shot up sig-
nificantly as the market became more disturbed. Another episode of large VRPs unique to
Japan occurred in May 2013, when NIKKEI 225 fell by 7%, its worst intra-day fall since the
2011 earthquake. This was attributed to the investors being rattled by weak economic data
from China and indications that the U.S. Federal Reserve may start reducing its bond-buying
program as early as June.
Table 4.3 shows that variance risk premiums are highly correlated across countries (num-
bers in parenthesis show return variance risk premium correlations between markets), all of
which are above 0.5. The highest correlation is between the U.K. and the Eurozone, being
0.85, and this is not surprising as these two markets are geographically the closest with no
non-overlapping trading hours. In contrast, Japan has a relatively weak correlation with the
U.S. (0.51) and the Eurozone (0.52).
4.5.2 Spillover analysis
To study the spillover effects of variance risk premiums between countries, vector au-
toregressive (VAR) models are employed. As described in Chapter 3 section 3.4.3, the VAR
model, popularised by Sims (1980), is used to capture linear interdependencies among mul-
tiple time series. A VAR(p) model takes the general form:
Yt = c+Π1Yt−1+Π2Yt−2+·· ·+Πp Yt−p +²t (4.6)
Where Yt = (y1t , y2t , · · · , ykt )′ denotes a (k×1) vector of times series variables of interests.
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c is a k dimensional vector. Πi are (k × k) coefficient matrices, and ²t is an (k × 1) unob-
servable vector of random process with zero mean and covariance matrix Σ. ²t is serially
uncorrelated but may be contemporaneously correlated. p is lag length. Applying to the
sample variables, the VAR(p) system is:
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Where U S t , U K t , Eur ot and JP t denotes measures of variance risk premiums of the U.S.,
the U.K., the Eurozone, and Japan.
The main assumptions of VAR models are that time series Yt are (weakly) stationary with
time invariant mean and covariance matrix, and that ²t are serially uncorrelated innovation
processes that follow multivariate normal distributions. However, daily variance risk pre-
miums are a result of linear combination of daily IV s and RV s looking 30 calendar days
ahead in the future. By construction, therefore, any two observations within 22 trading days
apart will contain overlapping information, and thus induce serial correlation. This can be
confirmed by Ljung-Box test statistics reported in and plots of autocorrelation functions in
Figure 4.4.
Portmanteau test Q-statistic can be used to detect serial correlation on the level series
and serial dependence on the squared series. Ljung and Box (1978) Q–statistic is Q(m) =
T (T + 2)∑ml=1 (ρˆl )2T−l . Where ρˆl is lag-l sample autocorrelation. The null hypothesis is H0 :
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ρ1 = . . . = ρm = 0 against alternative Ha : ρi 6= 0 for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Under appropriate
assumptions Q(m) is asymptotically chi-square distributed with m degrees of freedom.
Table 4.4 reports Ljung-Box tests for serial correlation on variance risk premiums and re-
turn variance risk premiums in squared brackets. Tests statistics are reported for 10, 15, and
20 degrees of freedom. As can be seen that variance risk premiums for all countries are se-
rially correlated with large Q-statistics. P-values of the test statistics shown in parenthesis
are essentially zero. The Q-statistics for return variance risk premiums are bigger than those
for dollar amount variance risk premiums, suggesting possible more severe serial correla-
tion in return variance risk premiums. Further evidence can be seen in the autocorrelation
function in Figure 4.4. It suggests that variance risk premiums for four countries are serially
correlated.
While a simple AR structure of each component variable in the VAR system may or may
not capture serial correlation, serial dependence of the time series will remain if not ac-
counted for, and its effect will feed into the residuals causing failure of model validity checks,
hence render inference on the VAR model invalid. In fact, full sample VRPs and subsamples
of VRPs have been fit using the VAR model. Both statistics of multivariate Portmanteau tests
and White heteroskedasticity tests are large and significant with p-values practically equal
to zero, suggesting that there is serious autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the residu-
als. The results are not made better by increasing the order of autoregressive terms. Hence it
suggests that the VAR model does not provide a good fit directly to variance risk premiums,
and steps must be taken to account for both effects.
ARCH models provide a natural remedy to capture such characteristics in the time se-
ries. ARCH stands for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity. Changes in the scale of
a variable give rise to heteroskedasticity. In the pioneering work of Engle (1982), a stochas-
tic process is defined whose variables have conditional mean zero and conditional variance
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given by a linear function of previous squared variables. The variable of interest is the re-
turn of an asset, and the variance of the return is conditional on the information in previous
returns. Subsequent research has provided many alternative functions to allow conditional
mean to vary through time, and to allow for more components in the conditional mean to
capture dynamics of different asset classes.
There is a multitude of ARCH specifications, and the best known being GARCH (gener-
alised ARCH) from Bollerslev (1986). Letter ‘G’ stands for generalised by including a lagged
variance term in the conditional variance equation. Let rt be the log return of an asset at
time t , with conditional mean µt and conditional variance ht conditional on information







αi (rt−i −µi )2+
q∑
j=1
β j ,ht− j (4.8)
where {²t } is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables with mean zero and variance 1. ²t is often
assumed to follow a standard normal distribution. Other distributions such as standardized
student-t distribution and generalized error distribution are also popular candidates. Con-
straints are ω > 0, αi ≥ 0, βi ≥ 0. The unconditional variance E [ht ] = ω1−α−β is finite if and
only if αi +βi < 1, assuming p = q = 1, whereas the conditional variance ht evolves over
time.
The GARCH(1,1) model with conditional normal distribution is the most popular ARCH
specification in empirical research, particularly in modelling daily returns in their ability to
capture stylized facts of daily returns. The estimation of parameters is easily obtained by
maximum likelihood methods. Considerable empirical investigations have been applied to
financial markets covering equities, foreign exchange, and interest rates. A review of theory
and empirical evidence up to the 1990s can be found in Bollerslev et al. (1992). In this study,
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I apply GARCH(1,1) models to variance risk premiums 6.
As can be seen from Figure 4.3, the 10 years time series of variance risk premiums exhibit
distinct patterns in different periods, with time varying volatility and high and low level of
volatility clustering, it is thus difficult to adequately capture the dynamics of the time series
with possible structural breaks using one GARCH equation7. In order to better describe the
characteristics of variance risk premiums, I divide the full sample into three subsamples to
investigate them individually.
The subsamples are pre-crisis May 2004 – April 2006, crisis September 2008 – March 2009,
and post-crisis January 2012 – November 2014. Subsamples are chosen such that there is no
obvious structural break during each period. The construction of realised variance incor-
porates overlapping information from its history, thus produces serial correlation up to 22
observations. This autocorrelation is naturally present in variance risk premiums and needs
to be accounted for. I introduce appropriate AR(m) structure into the mean equation to
capture this effect. Parameters of the mean equation and variance equation are obtained
simultaneously by maximum likelihood estimation.
Table 4.6 presents GARCH fitting of subsamples of variance risk premiums for each mar-
ket. The autoregressive terms in the mean equation are indicated as AR(), and the numbers
in the parenthesis indicate the location of the lags. All lags included are statistically signifi-
cant. Parameter estimates of α+β are very close to 1, suggesting that the volatilities of daily
variance risk premiums are highly persistent. Empirical estimates of the sum of α and β
sometimes exceed 1 if parameters are not constrained. There are three cases in the subsam-
ples return estimates of α+β> 1 without parameter constraints – the pre-crisis Japan, crisis
Eurozone, and post-crisis Japan subsample. One way to get around this problem is by es-
6The following analysis in GARCH modelling and spillover analysis is done for the dollar measure of variance
risk premiums, since the Ljung-Box Q-statistics are smaller than those for the return variance risk premiums.
7GARCH specification with various combination of p and q together with AR structure in the mean equation
have been explored to model the full sample variance risk premiums, however none is able to fully capture the
dynamics. The Ljung-Box test on standardized residuals for serial correlation is statistically significant.
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timating an integrated GARCH (IGARCH) model introduced by Engle and Bollerslev (1986),
which imposes a constraint that α+β = 1. But, under this specification, the unconditional
variance is infinite, which seems hard to justify for variance risk premium series.
An alternative approach to estimate parameters of GARCH(1,1) model is known as vari-
ance targeting, introduced by Engle and Mezirich (1996). This is an useful technique to re-
duce the dimension of optimisations in maximum likelihood estimation. It involves a two-
step estimation where, the first step sets the unconditional variance E [ht ] equal to the sam-
ple variance calculated from the data. ω is then parametrised by E [ht ](1−α−β). In the sec-
ond step, two parameters α and β can be estimated by maximum likelihood. This method
has been recommended in Christoffersen (2003) and Hull (2011). Shephard and Sheppard
(2010) also applied it to high-frequency based volatility models. I apply this method for the
three subsamples in estimating the parameters.
To check the validity of the GARCH model, the standardized residuals series are exam-
ined. Let at be the residuals of the mean equation, then at = rt −µt . Standardized residuals
are given by a˜t = atp
ht
. The Ljung-Box Q-statistic of a˜t can be used to check the adequacy
of the mean equation and that of a˜t 2 for the volatility equation. Table 4.6 reports Ljung-Box
Q-statistics up to 20 lags adjusted for degrees of freedom with p-values reported in paren-
thesis. As can be seen, the Q-statistics for both a˜t and a˜t 2 are small and p-values are large
for most of the samples, indicating that there is no serial correlation or heteroskedasticity in
the residuals, hence the fitted GARCH models are adequate. Further evidence can be seen
from the plots of standardized residuals in Figure 4.5, which look like white noise processes.
However, subsample pre-crisis Japan rejects the null hypothesis of Ljung-Box test on a˜t 2
at 10% level, suggesting there is remaining ARCH effect in the standardized residuals. But
note that the p-value of Q(19) is 0.77, suggesting there may be minor correlations at lag 20
for squared standardized residuals, but not up to 19 lags. The same is the case with post-
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crisis Eurozone, where Q(20) gives p-value 0.02 while 0.25 for Q(17). This could be driven by
occasional extreme values or level shifts of variance risk premiums in the respective periods.
To study the spillover effects of variance risk premiums using the VAR model without
compromising VAR assumptions, I feed standardized residuals of fitted GARCH model into
the VAR analysis. Since standardized residuals behave more or less like a white noise process,
I expect no or little significant self-explanatory lags for each market. Any significant other-
explanatory lags indicate explanatory power of one market to another, hence the spillover
effect. VAR models are fit for the three subsample periods to study the dynamics of differ-
ent periods. Empirical results are now reported separately for each subsample commencing
with the most recent subsample.
4.5.2.1 Post-crisis spillover
Table 4.7 reports estimates of the vector autoregression model for the post-crisis subsam-
ple. A VAR(2) is estimated according to Akaike (AIC), Schwarz (SIC), Hannan-Quinn (HQ),
and final prediction error (FPE) information criteria. The first column reports regression re-
sults of US on the lags of the US, UK, Eurozone, and Japan. The results show that none of
the coefficient estimates are statistically significant, indicating that no lags of other markets,
as well as own lags of US, have explanatory power on US. This is also confirmed by the very
low R2 of 0.015 and F -statistic equals 1.342. Likewise for Japan, there is no significant self-
explanatory lags, but a significant lag of US at lag 1. For UK and Eurozone however, there is
significant self-explanatory power at lag 1, at 5% and 1% level respectively, reflecting possi-
ble information not captured at lower lags in GARCH fitting. It is worth noting that lags of
US are highly significant in the regressions of UK, Eurozone, and Japan, indicating that the
history of US have significant explanatory power on other three markets, suggesting possible
lead-lag relationship.
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The dynamic properties of a VAR(p) model is often summarised through some structural
analysis. Impulse response analysis traces the effects of a shock to one endogenous variable
on the other variables in the VAR system. If there is a reaction of one variable to an impulse
in another variable, there may be causal effect from the latter to the former. It moreover
traces the speed and persistence of the shocks, and therefore enables the examination of the
time structure of the transmission. I consider in this study generalised impulse response
functions proposed by Pesaran and Shin (1998) as opposed to the orthogonalized impulse
response function in that the generalised impulses are invariant to the ordering of the vari-
ables. Since there is no economic theory underpinning the causal relationship between vari-
ance risk premiums, it is reasonable to use generalised impulse response functions to study
the inter-relationship between them without a priori assumptions.
Figure 4.6 shows impulse responses to one standard deviation innovations of four mar-
kets. Column one shows responses of US, UK, Eurozone, and Japan to one standard devia-
tion shock to the US. Similarly, columns two to four show responses of each country to one
shock to UK, Eurozone, and Japan respectively. The vertical axis shows the magnitude of
the responses, and the horizontal axis shows the time line of responses. It can be seen from
the figures in the first column that UK, Eurozone, and Japan all have lagged responses to a
shock to the US. They not only respond contemporaneously but also one day beyond. The
effect of a shock to US on UK and Eurozone decreases on the second day and tapers out
thereafter. The magnitude of the contemporaneous response is about one half. Japan on the
other hand, shows little contemporaneous response on day one, but an increased response
on the next day, and tapers out thereafter. This is possibly due to the time zone difference
between US and Japan, where there is about 8.5 hours difference between the close of the
Japanese market and the open of the US market8. On the same calendar day US should have
8For details of opening and closing time of these four markets see Chapter 3 Figure 3.1 and discussions
thereafter.
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no impact on Japan. But the Japanese market reopens about 3 hours after US market closes.
Any information not captured on day one along with new information is reflected immedi-
ately on day two, which shows a much stronger reaction than day one. There also seems to
be some residual response on day three. Information in figures in the first column suggests
that US leads UK and Eurozone by one day, and Japan by two days.
Figures in columns two and three show responses to a shock to UK and Eurozone respec-
tively. It is not surprising that UK and Eurozone respond to each other contemporaneously
as the two markets operate at almost the same time. Despite 6 hours difference between
the opening of US and European markets, US responds to UK and Eurozone with no lagged
effect. This is possibly due to two hours overlapping trading hours before the European mar-
kets close, and all information successfully communicated to the US market. However, Japan
reacts to both European markets very weakly, and with lagged effects up to three days. UK
and Eurozone lead Japan by two days. Column four shows responses of three western mar-
kets to a shock from Japan. It is clear that all responses are very small, if not none, indicating
that Japan does not have a big impact on western markets.
Besides impulse response analysis, the Granger Causality test is another popular struc-
tural analysis for VAR models. The Granger Causality, proposed in Granger (1969), refers to
a statistical concept whether one time series is useful in predicting another. If past values of
X contains information useful in predicting Y above and beyond past values of Y alone, then
time series X is said to Granger Cause time series Y.
Table 4.8 reports pairwise Granger Causality test and tests whether an endogenous vari-
able can be treated as exogenous. For each equation in the VAR, the output displays Wald
test statistics for the joint significance of each of the other lagged endogenous variables in
that equation. For example in the first VAR equation, test on Excluded(UK) tests for the joint
significance of UK lag 1 and lag 2. The null hypothesis is that the coefficient of UK lag 1
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equals that of UK lag 2 equals to zero. The χ2 statistic and p-value indicate that the null can-
not be rejected, suggesting that the history of UK up to 2 lags does not ‘Granger cause’ the
US. Similar conclusions can be drawn for the joint significance of Japan lagged values, where
test for Eurozone is marginally rejected at 10% significance level, but is not rejected at a 5%
level. The statistic in the last row (All) is the statistic for joint significance of all other lagged
endogenous variables in the equation. It can be seen that the test statistic is insignificant,
suggesting that the history of UK, Eurozone and Japan do not Granger Cause US. Likewise
for the VAR equation for UK, Eurozone and Japan, lags of US are statistically significant for
all three markets, implying uni-directional Granger Causal effect from the US market. But
none can be explained singly by any other market than the US.
It can be seen from both impulse response analysis and Granger Causality tests that for
the post-crisis subsample period, the US market is the dominant source of uncertainly in the
world where the European markets and the Japanese market are strongly impacted. As op-
posed to findings in the 1980s and 1990s studies in volatility spillovers, the Japanese market
is no longer the leader of information distribution, but rather a follower. The global markets
are highly integrated between the western countries as information is incorporated contem-
poraneously with a maximum one day of delay, whereas it takes up to three days for Japan to
fully digest it.
The validity of the estimated VAR model can be checked by the examinations of the resid-
uals of the system. Table 4.9 reports autocorrelation test and heteroskedasticity test. The top
panel shows Portmanteau tests for autocorrelation up to 12 lags. The null hypothesis is that
there is no residual autocorrelations up to h lags. Each column reports lags, Q-statistic, p-
value, and degrees of freedom respectively. It can be seen that the p-values are large for all
lags suggesting that the null hypothesis of no residual autocorrelations cannot be rejected.
The bottom panel reports White tests for residual heteroskedasticity. The test regression
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is run by regressing each cross product of the residuals on the levels and squares of the orig-
inal regressors and test the joint significance of the regression. The output shows both joint
test and each individual component. It shows clearly that the null hypothesis of no resid-
ual heteroskedasticity cannot be rejected. Since we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no
residual autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, it can be concluded that the VAR model is
not mis-specified, and the inference on the structural analysis is valid.
4.5.2.2 Crisis spillover
The same as the post-crisis spillover analysis, I employ the same methodology analysing
the crisis period. The crisis period spans about six months from breakout of the 2008 global
financial crisis to the end of the first quarter in 2009, covering the most volatile periods since
the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Since it is the crash episode that market participants worry
about the most, and that world’s markets tend to be heavily impacted by one another, it is
important to understand the interrelations between these markets. Any lead-lag effect may
have important implications on asset allocation across markets.
Table 4.10 reports vector autoregression estimates for crisis period. A VAR(1) is fitted and
is considered adequate by residual checks in Table 4.12. The output shows that the lag of US
has significant explanatory power on all other markets, and no other lags is significant in the
VAR system, indicating that none of UK, Eurozone, and Japan’s one period history is able to
provide useful information in predicting any market.
Figure 4.7 shows impulse response functions for a crisis subsample. The impulse re-
sponses show very similar pattern to those of post-crisis period. UK, Eurozone, and Japan
have lagged response to a unit shock to the US, and the impact of the shock lasts two to three
days. The responses are positive on the first two days, with a minor negative correction on
day three. Responses of UK and Eurozone show a decreasing trend whereas Japan has the
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biggest response on day two due the time zone effect.
US responds little to Japan. UK and Eurozone have one day lagged response to Japan
with a significant negative response on the second day. It suggests that given one unit shock
in Japan, UK and Eurozone show about −0.1 response to that shock. On the other hand,
Japan shows a lagged response to shocks to UK and Eurozone. The bi-direction response
may suggest a feedback effect between Japan and European markets as they process new
information.
Compared to post-crisis results, responses in the crisis period take longer to die down.
Information between some of the markets is fully processed by up to three days, reflecting
the fact that there is explosive information flow and great uncertainty during market turmoil
periods. Traders take caution in executing orders when they are unclear about the market
direction and face mixed signals, which may result in a delayed reaction to a particular in-
formation. However, despite this, the US is unambiguously the leading source of uncertainty
during the crisis period.
This can be confirmed by the Granger Causality tests in Table 4.11. US has uni-directional
explanatory power on all other markets, but no market is able to predict US. However, past
history of all other markets has predictive ability in explaining UK, Eurozone, and Japan.
The p-values of exclusion test for All for UK, Eurozone, and Japan are 0.002, 0.003, and 0
respectively, suggesting that all other lagged variables are jointly significant in predicting
these markets.
4.5.2.3 Pre-crisis spillover
Lastly, I investigate spillover effects for pre-crisis subsample. Data ranges from May 2004
to April 2006, where markets are generally quiet with little volatility around the world. Vector
autoregressive estimates in Table 4.13 show that again US has predictive power on other
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markets, and not vice versa. Lagged value of UK seems to have significant explanatory power
on Japan.
The impulse responses analysis for pre-crisis subsample (see Figure 4.8) is almost identi-
cal to those of post-crisis subsample, and hence the interpretation. US leads UK, Eurozone,
and Japan by one day; responds weakly to UK and Eurozone; almost no response to Japan.
UK, and Eurozone lead Japan by one day, and respond very little to Japan. It is worth noting
that in this period Japan has a subtly increased response to UK on the second day. Granger
Causality test confirms that besides the uni-directional causality from US to other markets,
UK has significant predictive power on Japan. The model’s adequacy can be confirmed by
Table 4.15.
To summarise, the VAR model together with structural analysis, impulse response func-
tions and Granger Causality tests, on pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis subsamples of variance
risk premiums show that the US is unambiguously the leading source of uncertainty in the
global market, and no other single country or a combination of countries have predictive
power on the US. The western markets generally have a leading impact on Japanese market,
especially during low volatility periods, where western countries lead Japan by one day. How-
ever, during market turmoil periods, there appears to be complex feedback effect between
the European markets and the Japanese market, where no clear leadership can be identified
during this periods. The Japanese market does not have much impact on the western coun-
tries. The global markets are highly integrated in that information flow from one market to
another is fully processed within two days, but in crisis period it may take longer as greater
uncertainty exists in the market.
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4.6 Conclusions
In this study, I analysed variance risk premiums in the notion of a variance swap. The
variance swap rate represents the risk-neutral expectation of realised variance. The differ-
ence between the realised measure and risk-neutral measure quantifies the variance risk
premium. I calculate the risk-neutral expected variance using a set of option prices, and
construct realised variance using the HAR-RV model based on daily data. Variance risk pre-
miums are calculated for the U.S., the U.K., the Eurozone, and Japan for the period from 2004
to 2014. Variance risk premiums across markets are on average negative with negative skew-
ness and large kurtosis. Similar patterns are observed for all countries that the magnitude
of variance risk premiums are high when equity markets fall. It shows clear evidence that
investors are willing to accept negative returns to go long a variance swap to hedge away the
increase in return variance.
To analyse the spillover effects of variance risk premiums across markets, I employ a vec-
tor autoregressive methodology and its structural analysis. Since the time series of variance
risk premiums exhibit significant time variation, I divide the full sample into pre-crisis, crisis,
and post-crisis subsamples to accommodate statistical assumptions required by VAR anal-
ysis. Empirical spillover results show that the U.S. is unambiguously the distributor of un-
certainty in the global market, and no other country is able to predict the U.S.. Japan seems
to have little impact on western markets as indicated by low correlation and the role as a
follower. In general, the results show that these markets are highly integrated in that new
arrived information is fully processed within two days, but in crisis period it may take longer
due to greater uncertainty.
In this study I fit univariate GARCH models to each subsample/country and extract stan-
dardized residuals for each country as endogenous variables fed into the VAR model to ad-
dress autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in VRP data. A potential alternative method to
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address concerns on overlapping returns could be to construct daily exposure to VRP, as dis-
cussed in Kozhan et al. (2013). This involves engaging in a variance swap and delta hedging
it. Instead of holding it to maturity, sell it the next day. This procedure can be repeated every
day, and ignoring transaction costs, it gives the daily exposure to variance risk premium.
Variance risk premiums have been well researched for the U.S. market, however, little
is documented in the international setting. A number of studies have observed that the
variance risk premium has predictability on the U.S. equity market returns. Bollerslev et al.
(2014) validated the return predictability pattern for the U.S. and extended the regressions
to seven other countries (including France, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the Netherlands,
Belgium, and the United Kingdom). Their empirical results show that the return predictabil-
ity pattern observed for the U.S. market generally holds true for most of the other markets,
but the degree of predictability is attenuated. The interesting results prompt the authors
to investigate whether the variance risk is priced at a global level rather than a country-
specific level. They then construct a global variance risk premium proxy as a market cap-
italization weighted average of each individual country variance risk premium (the largest
weight around 60% is assigned to the U.S.), and regress each market’s returns on the global
variance risk premium. They find stronger predictability for all markets in the sample, and
the results are robust with alternative measures of variance risk premiums. In a similar spirit,
Londono (2015) finds that the U.S. variance risk premium has predicative power on interna-
tional stock returns while other markets’ own variance risk premiums do not for domestic
stock market returns. In his two-country setup in explaining U.S. return predictability on in-
ternational stock returns, he finds that the macroeconomic uncertainty is transmitted across
countries, and the uncertainty-originated country’s variance risk premium plays a key role
in explaining both countries’ stock returns.
The empirical results of the dynamic interaction between international variance risk pre-
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miums revealed in this study provide support to the economic interpretation shared by the
two studies (Bollerslev et al. (2014) and Londono (2015)). Variance risk premium can be in-
terpreted as a measure of aggregate risk aversion or aggregate economic uncertainty. The
lead-lag relationship between international variance risk premiums, given that the underly-
ing economies are fundamentally different, suggests that the country-level uncertainty may
be exposed to a global risk factor, potentially largely captured by the U.S. market risk. Simi-
lar interpretation is drawn in the foreign exchange market, as in Della Corte et al. (2016), the
currency variance risk premium contains a compensation for a local risk as well as a global
risk. An alternative interpretation may be explored from the contagion literature, where be-
havioural arguments are employed to explain excessive correlations between markets. All
of these different economic mechanisms likely play some role in generating dynamic rela-
tionships between international variance risk premiums. I will leave it for future research to
provide further empirical evidence.
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4.7 Appendix
Table 4.1: HAR-RV regressions
RVt ,t+22 =β0+βd RVt−1,t +βw RVt−5,t +βmRVt−22,t +²t ,t+22
U.S. U.K. Eurozone Japan
β0 0.0107*** 0.0115*** 0.0180*** 0.0300***
(0.0032) (0.0025) (0.0036) (0.0057)
βd 0.0091 0.0184* 0.0157 0.0336**
(0.0143) (0.0105) (0.0109) (0.0152)
βw 0.3445** 0.2496** 0.1624** 0.3328***
(0.1401) (0.1199) (0.0679) (0.1054)
βm 0.3753*** 0.3970*** 0.4640*** 0.1191
(0.1342) (0.0648) (0.0583) (0.0765)
R2 0.5644 0.4710 0.4287 0.3063
Table reports OLS estimates of the HAR-RV regressions for 22 days ahead annualised realised variance
predictions for the U.S., the U.K., the Eurozone, and Japan. Daily realised variances are squared returns
of daily close prices spanning the period from January 2004 to December 2014. Standard errors reported
in parentheses are based on a Newey-West correction allowing for serial correlation of up to order 44.
R2 of regressions for each of the market is reported in the last row.
***,**,* denotes significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics of realised variance and volatility, implied variance and
volatility, and variance risk premium
Panel A
Realised variance Realised volatility
U.S. U.K. Eurozone Japan U.S. U.K. Eurozone Japan
Mean 0.040 0.035 0.051 0.059 0.179 0.173 0.213 0.233
Median 0.022 0.023 0.037 0.047 0.149 0.150 0.191 0.216
Maximum 0.736 0.534 0.522 0.932 0.858 0.731 0.723 0.965
Minimum 0.013 0.013 0.020 0.031 0.113 0.113 0.143 0.175
Std.Dev 0.063 0.043 0.048 0.058 0.090 0.071 0.074 0.069
Skewness 5.575 5.977 4.461 8.139 3.434 3.429 2.744 4.861
Kurtosis 40.567 48.200 29.238 87.546 17.642 19.068 12.759 36.127
Panel B
Implied variance Implied volatility
U.S. U.K. Eurozone Japan U.S. U.K. Eurozone Japan
Mean 0.055 0.049 0.063 0.077 0.209 0.199 0.231 0.255
Median 0.031 0.030 0.043 0.055 0.176 0.172 0.207 0.235
Maximum 0.728 0.870 1.201 0.967 0.853 0.933 1.096 0.983
Minimum 0.010 0.008 0.010 0.013 0.100 0.089 0.098 0.113
Std.Dev 0.074 0.062 0.070 0.094 0.106 0.095 0.097 0.110
Skewness 4.316 4.881 5.079 5.064 2.396 2.336 2.230 2.828
Kurtosis 23.861 37.833 48.452 34.612 10.331 11.002 10.846 14.247
Panel C
Variance risk premium Return variance risk premium
U.S. U.K. Eurozone Japan U.S. U.K. Eurozone Japan
Mean -0.014 -0.014 -0.012 -0.018 -0.194 -0.147 -0.053 -0.018
Median -0.007 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.217 -0.174 -0.086 -0.074
Maximum 0.328 0.157 0.207 0.448 1.374 1.539 1.560 2.044
Minimum -0.348 -0.396 -0.717 -0.628 -0.795 -0.838 -0.808 -0.827
Std.Dev 0.034 0.032 0.036 0.061 0.275 0.307 0.318 0.401
Skewness -1.888 -4.411 -5.406 -3.692 0.592 0.659 0.701 0.965
Kurtosis 30.409 40.495 75.771 29.645 3.458 3.531 4.040 4.688
Table provides descriptive statistics for realised variance, implied variance, variance risk premium, and return
variance risk premium defined by equation (4.5), (4.1), (4.3), and (4.4) respectively. Summary statistics are also
reported for realised volatility and implied volatility calculated as the square root of the realised variance and
implied variance. Results are reported for 2594 daily observations from 2004 to 2014.
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Table 4.3: Pairwise correlations of (return) variance risk premiums
Correlation U.S. U.K. Eurozone Japan
U.S. 1 (1)
U.K. 0.68 (0.63) 1 (1)
Eurozone 0.59 (0.65) 0.85 (0.81) 1 (1)
Japan 0.51 (0.39) 0.70 (0.56) 0.52 (0.52) 1 (1)
Table reports pairwise variance risk premium (return variance risk premium) correlations
for the period from May 2004 to December 2014.
Table 4.4: Ljung-Box test on [return] variance risk premiums
U.S. U.K. Eurozone Japan
Q(10) 4055 [8666] 8151 [11951] 5012 [10689] 12579 [14913]
(0) (0) (0) (0)
Q(15) 5676 [11113] 10135 [15614] 6585 [13865] 17826 [21008]
(0) (0) (0) (0)
Q(20) 7126 [13196] 12141 [18836] 7762 [16213] 22277 [26434]
(0) (0) (0) (0)
Table reports Ljung-Box test statistics on variance risk premiums [return variance risk premiums]
from May 2004 to December 2014 for serial correlation The Q(m)-statistics follow a chi-squared
distribution with m degrees of freedom. Test statistics reported are for degrees of freedom 10, 15,
and 20. Values in parenthesis are p-values of Q(m). All p-values are < 0.0001.
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Table 4.5: GARCH fitting for subsample variance risk premiums
US UK Eurozone Japan











α+β 0.941 0.773 0.966 0.955
Qa˜t (20) 7.15 11.20 16.12 19.73
(0.97) (0.89) (0.58) (0.18)
Qa˜t 2 (20) 16.86 17.41 11.19 23.03
(0.40) (0.50) (0.89) (0.08)











α+β 0.990 0.966 0.950 0.944
Qa˜t (20) 16.94 21.50 14.00 13.99
(0.59) (0.31) (0.78) (0.60)
Qa˜t 2 (20) 10.49 14.62 17.38 4.45
(0.94) (0.75) (0.56) (0.99)











α+β 0.820 0.995 0.996 0.971
Qa˜t (20) 21.65 23.54 22.71 15.95
(0.20) (0.13) (0.09) (0.39)
Qa˜t 2 (20) 11.92 18.06 29.04 5.65
(0.81) (0.39) (0.02) (0.99)
Table presents GARCH fitting with AR structure in the mean equation to subsamples of variance risk premiums for
each market. Subsamples are selected for pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis period. Parameters of subsamples pre-crisis
Japan, crisis Eurozone, and post-crisis Japan are estimated using variance targeting technique to mitigate estimation
difficulty, as the sum of α and β exceeds one without constraints. Ljung-Box Q-statistics on standardized residuals
adjusted for degrees of freedom are reported for each subsample with p-value reported in the parenthesis.
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Table 4.6: Vector Autoregression Estimates for post-crisis subsample
US UK Eurozone Japan
US(-1) -0.043 0.260 0.253 0.256
(-0.989) (6.157)*** (6.012)*** (5.825)***
US(-2) -0.024 0.134 0.112 0.044
(-0.538) (3.042)*** (2.559)** (0.971)
UK(-1) 0.052 -0.140 0.035 -0.083
(0.910) (-2.499)** (0.628) (-1.420)
UK(-2) 0.060 -0.010 -0.067 0.015
(1.047) (-0.182) (-1.199) (0.256)
Eurozone(-1) -0.075 -0.081 -0.242 0.100
(-1.294) (-1.433) (-4.296)*** (1.701)
Eurozone(-2) -0.124 -0.094 -0.054 0.084
(-2.155) (-1.671) (-0.965) (1.437)
Japan(-1) 0.011 0.005 0.038 -0.068
(0.301) (0.148) (1.061) (-1.829)
Japan(-2) 0.040 -0.007 0.006 0.015
1.117 -0.198 0.170 0.413
C -0.002 -0.105 -0.098 -0.101
(-0.042) (-2.863)*** (-2.684)*** (-2.635)***
R2 1.5% 6.1% 6.6% 8.0%
F -statistic 1.342 5.813 6.396 7.829
Table reports Vector Autoregression estimates for post-crisis subsample. First column reports number of lags included
in the regression. Column two to five reports estimates of coefficients with t-statistic in the parenthesis. R2 and F -
statistic is shown at the bottom of the table. *** and ** indicate coefficient estimates are statistically significant at 1%
and 5% level.
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Table 4.7: VAR Granger Causality test for post-crisis subsample
Dependent variable: US
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
UK 1.644 2 0.440
Eurozone 5.447 2 0.066
Japan 1.309 2 0.520
All 6.770 6 0.343
Dependent variable: UK
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
US 42.088 2 0
Eurozone 4.075 2 0.130
Japan 0.064 2 0.969
All 43.833 6 0
Dependent variable: Eurozone
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
US 38.633 2 0
UK 2.155 2 0.340
Japan 1.141 2 0.565
All 45.975 6 0
Dependent variable: Japan
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
US 33.926 2 0
UK 2.275 2 0.321
Eurozone 4.175 2 0.124
All 60.799 6 0
Table reports Granger Causality tests for post-crisis subsample. Each equation tests for the joint
significance of excluded variables in explaining the dependent variable. A probability of zero
rejects the null that the coefficient estimates of the Excluded variable(s) equal to zero at all con-
ventional levels, suggesting that the Excluded variable(s) ‘Granger cause’ the dependent variable.
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Table 4.8: Validity check for post-crisis VAR estimation
VAR Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations
Lags Q-statistic Probability df
1 0.096 NA* NA*
2 0.731 NA* NA*
3 9.841 0.875 16
4 28.882 0.625 32
5 48.314 0.460 48
6 58.128 0.683 64
7 73.332 0.688 80
8 101.326 0.335 96
9 117.064 0.353 112
10 131.489 0.398 128
11 142.607 0.517 144
12 153.440 0.631 160
















Table reports validity tests for the estimated VAR model. Top panel reports Portmanteau tests for
residual serial correlation and bottom panel reports White tests for residual heteroskedasticity.
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Table 4.9: Vector Autoregression Estimates for crisis subsample
US UK Eurozone Japan
US(-1) 0.041 0.318 0.303 0.552
(0.441) (3.555)*** (3.259)*** (6.843)***
UK(-1) -0.176 -0.172 -0.155 -0.118
(-1.252) (-1.276) (-1.102) (-0.970)
Eurozone(-1) 0.169 0.050 0.062 -0.018
(1.289) (0.395) (0.476) (-0.159)
Japan(-1) 0.050 -0.096 -0.130 -0.062
(0.566) (-1.123) (-1.466) (-0.800)
R2 0.015 0.094 0.088 0.252
F -statistic 0.732 4.852 4.516 15.856
Table reports Vector Autoregression estimates for crisis subsample. First column reports number of lags included
in the regression. Column two to five reports estimates of coefficients with t-statistic in the parenthesis. R2 and F -
statistic is shown at the bottom of the table. *** indicate coefficient estimates are statistically significant at 1% level.
Table 4.10: VAR Granger Causality test for crisis subsample
Dependent variable: US
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
UK 1.568 1 0.211
Eurozone 1.662 1 0.197
Japan 0.321 1 0.571
All 2.366 3 0.500
Dependent variable: UK
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
US 12.640 1 0.000
Eurozone 0.156 1 0.693
Japan 1.262 1 0.261
All 14.981 3 0.002
Dependent variable: Eurozone
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
US 10.619 1 0.001
UK 1.213 1 0.271
Japan 2.148 1 0.143
All 14.032 3 0.003
Dependent variable: Japan
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
US 46.830 1 0.000
UK 0.940 1 0.332
Eurozone 0.025 1 0.874
All 49.418 3 0.000
Table reports Granger Causality tests for crisis subsample. Each equation tests for the joint sig-
nificance of excluded variables in explaining the dependent variable. A probability of zero rejects
the null that the coefficient estimates of the Excluded variable(s) equal to zero at all conventional
levels, suggesting that the Excluded variable(s) ‘Granger cause’ the dependent variable.
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Table 4.11: Validity check for crisis VAR estimation
VAR Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations
Lags Q-statistic Probability df
1 3.734 NA* NA*
2 29.629 0.020 16
3 35.994 0.287 32
4 51.882 0.325 48
5 67.279 0.366 64
6 103.235 0.041 80
7 113.976 0.102 96
8 128.032 0.143 112
9 140.308 0.216 128
10 154.313 0.263 144
11 162.064 0.440 160
12 192.980 0.181 176
















Table reports validity tests for the estimated VAR model. Top panel reports Portmanteau tests for
residual serial correlation and bottom panel reports White tests for residual heteroskedasticity.
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Table 4.12: Vector Autoregression Estimates for pre-crisis subsample
US UK Eurozone Japan
US(-1) -0.006 0.268 0.231 0.150
(-0.116) (5.512)*** (5.108)*** (3.225)***
UK(-1) 0.075 -0.126 -0.021 0.184
(1.205) (-2.100)** (-0.383) (-3.187)***
Eurozone(-1) -0.097 0.043 -0.099 -0.053
(-1.417) (0.652) (-1.610) (-0.833)
Japan(-1) 0.010 -0.002 0.039 -0.011
(0.206) (-0.036) (0.853) (-0.234)
R2 0.001 0.068 0.058 0.057
F -statistic 0.117 10.692 8.930 8.818
Table reports Vector Autoregression estimates for pre-crisis subsample. First column reports number of lags included
in the regression. Column two to five reports estimates of coefficients with t-statistic in the parenthesis. R2 and F -
statistic is shown at the bottom of the table. *** and ** indicate coefficient estimates are statistically significant at 1%
and 5% level.
Table 4.13: VAR Granger Causality test for pre-crisis subsample
Dependent variable: US
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
UK 1.453 1 0.228
Eurozone 2.008 1 0.157
Japan 0.042 1 0.837
All 2.246 3 0.523
Dependent variable: UK
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
US 30.384 1 0.000
Eurozone 0.425 1 0.514
Japan 0.001 1 0.971
All 33.195 3 0.000
Dependent variable: Eurozone
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
US 26.096 1 0.000
UK 0.147 1 0.702
Japan 0.728 1 0.394
All 26.596 3 0.000
Dependent variable: Japan
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
US 10.400 1 0.001
UK 10.154 1 0.001
Eurozone 0.694 1 0.405
All 29.535 3 0.000
Table reports Granger Causality tests for pre-crisis subsample. Each equation tests for the joint
significance of excluded variables in explaining the dependent variable. A probability of zero
rejects the null that the coefficient estimates of the Excluded variable(s) equal to zero at all con-
ventional levels, suggesting that the Excluded variable(s) ‘Granger cause’ the dependent variable.
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Table 4.14: Validity check for pre-crisis VAR estimation
VAR Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations
Lags Q-statistic Probability df
1 0.914 NA* NA*
2 9.394 0.896 16
3 23.293 0.869 32
4 38.717 0.828 48
5 54.572 0.794 64
6 67.115 0.848 80
7 83.448 0.816 96
8 98.055 0.823 112
9 107.577 0.892 128
10 129.748 0.797 144
11 141.006 0.858 160
12 159.454 0.809 176
















Table reports validity tests for the estimated VAR model. Top panel reports Portmanteau tests for




Figure 4.1: Time series plots of HAR-RV annualised expected realised variance
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(a) U.S. (b) U.K.
(c) Eurozone (d) Japan






Figure 4.3: Variance risk premiums
212
(a) US VRP (b) UK VRP
(c) Eurozone VRP (d) Japan VRP
(e) US RVRP (f) UK RVRP
(g) Eurozone RVRP (h) Japan RVRP
Figure 4.4: Autocorrelation plots of variance risk premiums
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(a) standardized residuals pre-crisis US (b) standardized residuals pre-crisis UK
(c) standardized residuals pre-crisis Eurozone (d) standardized residuals pre-crisis Japan
(e) standardized residuals crisis US (f) standardized residuals crisis UK
(g) standardized residuals crisis Eurozone (h) standardized residuals crisis Japan
Figure 4.5: Standardized residuals plots of subsamples
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(i) standardized residuals post-crisis US (j) standardized residuals post-crisis UK
(k) standardized residuals post-crisis Eurozone (l) standardized residuals post-crisis Japan











































































































This thesis contains three individual essays on inferring information from financial deriva-
tive instruments. The thesis begins with an introductory chapter, which outlines the main
ideas of each chapter as well as the structure of the thesis.
Chapter 2 presents empirical analysis on estimating bankruptcy probabilities from op-
tion prices and CDS spreads for 12 U.S. financial institutions. Assuming the risk-neutral
density for the underlying asset to be a mixture of two lognormals augmented with a prob-
ability of bankruptcy, option-implied bankruptcy probabilities are inferred from calibrating
the risk-neutral density to the observed option prices. CDS-implied bankruptcy probabili-
ties are inferred from a non-linear equation that is set based on the fair valuation of a CDS
contract. Comparisons between option-implied and CDS-implied bankruptcy probabilities
show that the two sources provide complementary information in assessing bankruptcy risk.
The derivative markets provide useful information ex-ante.
In the fixed income markets, modelling default probabilities embedded in bonds, CDS,
and other fixed income instruments has become standard routines in the real world practice,
whereas using option information to estimate default rates is not well established. Option-
implied information bears the advantage that it can be used to infer default rates for shorter
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horizons given flexible option maturities, while CDS and bonds can only provide a default
estimate for the next few months or up to one year. Certainly, option contracts would serve
as an appealing instrument for market practitioners to assess near-term default rate, and
the magnitude of default probabilities and risk-neutral densities discovered in this study will
help to provide reliable signals regarding a firm’s financial status, especially during turbulent
market conditions.
Motivated by the information superiority contained in option contracts, chapters 3 and
4 examine spillover effects in an international market integration setting based on option-
implied information. Chapter 3 focuses on implied volatility spillovers and chapter 4 con-
centrates on variance risk premium spillovers. The first part of chapter 3 details the construc-
tion of volatility indices for a sample of equity markets around the world. The method to con-
struct volatility indices follows the steps of the CBOE procedure, but modified to address the
estimation errors associated with the CBOE procedure. This is the first study that calculates
volatility indices for a large sample of national equity markets, and makes a comparison with
the CBOE method. The results provide empirical evidence that the CBOE method induces
estimation errors for all markets examined. In chaper 4, variance risk premiums are con-
structed by the difference between the risk-neutral expectation of realised variance, proxied
by the implied variance extracted from options, and realised variance under the physical
measure, calculated based on the HAR-RV model.
Spillover effects of implied volatility and variance risk premium are investigated using
vector autoregressive analysis. Issues of serial correlation and heterogeneity are addressed
and different steps are taken in each chapter to mitigate the impact of these issues. Em-
pirical results show remarkable consistency in international markets lead-lag relationship
between implied volatilities and variance risk premiums. The results support the notion of
informationally efficient international stock markets, in that information flow across bor-
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ders is quickly processed with little delay. The empirical findings are in general consistent
with those found in international finance literature which studies spillover effects based on
historical measures, e.g., return and volatility. Measures constructed from information ex-
tracted from option contracts serve as appealing alternatives as they provide forward looking
information.
Volatility spillovers have been studied extensively in the literature. Many have attributed
these spillovers to intensified international linkages across countries, or economic funda-
mentals; others have theorized they come from market contagion. However, there is little
documentation on variance risk premium spillovers. This is the first study to provide empir-
ical evidence on dynamic interactions between international variance risk premiums. The
limited studies on variance risk premia around the world have focused on the stock market
return predictability from the U.S. market variance risk premium. In this study, empirical
results have shown a leading role of the U.S. variance risk premium on other markets. This
provides supporting evidence to the findings in these studies. The economic interpretation
is that the country-level risk aversion or economic uncertainty, as proxied by the variance
risk premium, may be exposed to a global factor which potentially largely captured by the
U.S. market risk. While other explanations from behavioural arguments may be plausible in
generating dynamic interactions between international variance risk premiums, this is left
for corroboration in future research.
In summary, this thesis provides views on information inferred from the derivatives mar-
kets from different perspectives, and it shows that the financial derivative instruments con-
tain useful forward looking information. Stemming from the empirical evidence on equity
markets, future research could potentially focus on inferring information from derivatives
on other markets i.e., exchange rates, commodities etc., and investigate linkages across dif-
ferent asset classes.
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In this thesis, information from the derivatives markets has been extracted and analysed
predominantly on developed markets and western markets. This is primarily due to data
availability and subject to the development of each country’s derivatives markets. However,
one cannot talk about globalisation and correlations between international markets without
putting developing markets into perspective. For example, China, India, and Brazil, as the
most populous countries in the world, are growing very fast, and they will have a huge impact
on the development of the derivatives markets throughout the world in the years to come.
Take China as an example, it is the world’s second-largest economy, and it is growing
rapidly every year on average around 7%. According to the world investment report, China
has been one of the world’s largest foreign direct investment recipients for the past few years.
This can be attributed to the comparatively low labour costs as well as being the biggest in-
ternal market with 1.3 billion potential customers. No doubt there will be shift in investment
focus from the western countries to China as it becomes more important in the world econ-
omy. However, the derivatives markets in China are underdeveloped. China has consider-
able tradings in commodity derivatives and growing futures markets, but credit derivative
products and options are very limited. It lacks a well-established legal framework and is
complicated with weak supervision from different regulators. Since derivatives are impor-
tant tools for transferring risk from one entity to another, it is important for China to further
develop its derivatives markets not only to meet the demand of all kinds of investors but also
to be fully integrated in the international financial society. This argument goes with all devel-
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